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Abstract  
The UK has a protracted history with coal production and use.  Whilst now in 
significant decline, until recently coal was a staple in UK energy generation 
despite concerns about the environmental and social impacts of its use.  New 
‘clean’ coal technologies, i.e. where emissions are reduced or abated using 
technical enhancements such as Carbon-dioxide (CO2) Capture and Storage 
(CCS), have been proposed as a means of reducing harmful emissions, whilst 
maintaining coal use in energy production.  Yet, in the UK, targets for coal with 
CCS projects have not been met (Department for Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC), 2010).   
This research builds on and extends the concept of organisational fields to 
explore the interesting case study of coal use in the UK from c1960 to the 
present day.  It considers the influence of multi-level, multi-actor (ML/MA) 
governance arrangements on the prospects for the sustainability of coal.  By 
illuminating organisational fields of governance that emerge over time and at 
different levels (UK and Yorkshire & Humberside), it adds a significant 
temporal dimension to ML/MA debates.    The research findings, therefore, go 
beyond a snap-shot or single policy approach to illuminate the agency and 
motivations of different actors in steering continuous patterns of development.  
In doing so it reveals previously unknown field dynamics. 
The insights developed show that dynamic processes of replication within 
organisational fields create a ‘wicked’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973, p.160) 
problem with disconnects both between and within fields.  Specifically, social 
and environmental fields have become diffuse, heterogeneous and 
unpredictable.  In contrast, economic fields have become more focused and 
centred with dominant actors exhibiting power beyond the economic 
organisational fields. This wicked context has potential for conflict and 
contestation and makes outcomes from ML/MA governance arrangements 
difficult to predict. Ultimately, this has important implications for the 
sustainability of future coal use.   
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Chapter 1 – Coal use in the UK: Framing a wicked problem 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis conceptualises coal use in UK electricity generation as a wicked 
problem (Rittel and Webber, 1973, p.160); one that is multi-layered, complex 
and has multiple, competing explanations.  It uses both governance and 
sustainability as organising principles to explore, characterise and understand 
the changing features of the governance of coal and implications for the 
prospects and sustainability of coal use in the UK.  
Following Stoker (1998) and Rhodes (1996) this research views governance 
as an ‘imprecise’ term (ibid., p.652), but one that is often used to describe 
conditions by which actors beyond state governments have roles in shaping 
society. However, whilst imprecise, using governance as an organising 
principle allows for a rich and ‘thick understanding’ (Geertz, 1973, p.14) of the 
processes and outcomes of governance (Adger and Jordan, 2009).  In this 
thesis, these are viewed as inextricably linked with the processes and 
outcomes of sustainability (Farrell et al, 2005, pp. 129-130; Lemos and 
Agrawal, 2006).  
The thesis explores the case of coal use in electricity generation in the UK 
between the 1960s and the present day.  It considers the implications of new 
governance mechanisms on the changing market for coal and for the 
sustainability of ‘new’ or ‘clean’ coal, i.e. where emissions from coal are 
reduced or abated using technical enhancements such as Carbon-dioxide 
(CO2) Capture and Storage (CCS).  To do this, an analysis of the discourse 
(Dryzek, 2005) relating to the governance of coal has identified distinct 
organisational fields (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Going beyond traditional 
uses of organisational fields as collections of organisations that, together, 
create an institutional setting, this thesis generates new ‘organisational fields 
of governance’.  These show that more than the formal, nominally ‘new’ 
governance arrangements for coal exist.  Instead in reality, multiple, 
overlapping and distinct organisational fields that illuminate previously 
unknown agency and motivations become evident.  This complex institutional 
setting creates pressures and dynamics both between and within fields which 
have been identified and are presented here.   
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The research characterises the organisational fields in to distinct eras of 
governance.  These demonstrate that, over time and at different levels of 
analysis, economically, socially and culturally driven disconnects, both 
between and within organisational fields of governance, have emerged. This 
characterisation contributes a novel temporal dimension to the discourse on 
multi-level, multi-actor (ML/MA) arrangements intrinsic to new governance in 
wicked contexts.  This deep and rich understanding of both the temporal 
dimension and the dynamics between and within organisational fields of 
governance at different levels has important implications for the future of coal 
in the UK.   
Following this brief preamble, this chapter further conceptualises and 
problematises the wicked problem of coal use in UK electricity generation in 
section 1.2.  Together sections 1.1 and 1.2 provide context for the research 
aims and objectives set out in section 1.3. Section 1.4 then signals the novel 
contribution this research makes.  Finally, section 1.5 details the logic and 
structure of this thesis.   
1.2 UK coal use, a wicked problem 
Coal use is increasing globally (Shearer, 2018), but is in significant decline in 
the UK, (Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), 
2018a, ET4.2; Carbon Brief, 2016, 2017; Appendix A), and the UK 
Government has announced its intentions to further reduce unabated coal by 
2025 (BEIS, 2016).  However, during the early part of the 21st century, and 
despite government and industry targets to reduce its use (Smith, 2010, p.100; 
Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC), 2012a), coal accounted 
for over one third of the electricity generated in the UK (Digest of UK Energy 
Statistics (DUKES), 2015, ET2.1).  Coal is the most carboniferous fossil fuel 
(US Energy Information Administration, 2016) and issues relating to the 
sustainability of its combustion - climate change, public health factors, 
resource depletion, water use, land use, risk - are well documented.  Yet during 
these peaks in coal use, and currently, electricity from coal is generated from 
unabated1 coal fired power stations characterised throughout this thesis as ‘old 
coal’.  In addition, as discussed in chapter eight, energy transitions away from 
                                            
1 That is coal fired power stations without emissions abatement technologies such as CCS.   
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coal, to alternative lower carbon sources of energy have been slower than 
predicted (Commission on Climate Change (The CCC), 2018a; Carbon Brief, 
2017), and the UK stands at a critical juncture in energy policy if it is to be able 
to meet its targets for CO2 emissions reductions (The CCC, 2018b)    
Technological solutions to this paradox are being sought by industry and 
government actors as a means of balancing competing demands.  The timely 
introduction of so called ‘new’ or ‘clean’ or ‘sustainable’2 coal technologies 
(BEIS, 2017a; DECC, 2010a, 2012; World Coal Association (WCA), 2012, 
2015), have been discussed as a means of reducing CO2 emissions whilst 
maintaining business as usual (BAU) governance arrangements, operations 
and infrastructure.   
One such technology, CCS with coal, was widely discussed as a means of 
reducing carbon emissions in the atmosphere.  In 2009 the UK Government3 
announced that no new coal fired power stations would be built in the UK 
without CCS technology (Carrington, 2009).  For some, however, new coal 
technologies have been viewed as a temporary fix at best and, at worst, a risk 
laden endeavour which will neither mitigate against the causes of climate 
change (Tickell, 2015), nor help societies develop sustainable energy 
solutions.  In this latter view, a technical solution to capture rather than reduce 
or prevent CO2 emissions, may be preferable to unabated coal, but cannot be 
viewed as environmentally, socially or economically sustainable.   
From the 1980s onwards, successive UK governments have offered differing 
views on the desirability of continued use of coal in the energy mix with 
implications for the future of this key resource.  From the miners’ strikes of the 
1980s to commitments to reduce NOx and SO2 in the 1990s and latterly CO2 
emissions,4 ‘coal’ use in and of itself, may be considered a political issue with 
economic, environmental and social consequences.  This is especially (but not 
                                            
2 Hereafter ‘new coal’.  The term new coal rather than clean coal is adopted here to avoid 
conflation of the concept and the technologies.  However, unless identified in quotations the 
terms are used synonymously. 
3 Then Labour under Gordon Brown 
4 Largely through legislative and regulatory processes e.g. the planned closure of coal fired 
power stations under the EU Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD), EU Industrial 
Emissions Directive (IED), Climate Change Act 2008.  See chapter 8 for full discussion. 
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uniquely5) the case in the UK, particularly in former coal mining regions that 
remain hosts to the electricity generation infrastructure now often located close 
to coal mines (Pearce and Evans, 2015, no pagination).   
As with all matters relating to sustainable development (World Conference on 
Environment and Development (WCED), 1987, p.43), features of the debate 
on continued coal use spread wider than the environmental arena.  The legacy 
of a coal mining industry in the UK, now reduced but once significant, continues 
to have local (Beatty, Fothergill and Powell, 2007) and national, economic, 
social and environmental relevance; in particular for those regions that still host 
coal fired power stations.  In these coalfield regions, such as Yorkshire, North 
Nottinghamshire and Wales, associated physical infrastructure (transport 
links, workers’ housing, power stations) and social institutions (generations of 
mining families, trades unions, mining communities) were built around coal.  
Typically, whilst low carbon developments are being planned (for example see 
the Teesside Collective), such former coalfield regions are now poor and 
underdeveloped with high levels of unemployment, (Foden, Fothergill and 
Gore, 2014; Strangleman, 2001), poor health, and worsening environmental 
outcomes (Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, 2013, 2016). 
To add a further layer of complexity, in order to avoid the worst impacts of 
climate change, it is crucial that a timely alternative to unabated coal is 
established in line with international targets for greenhouse gas (GHG) 
reduction (DECC, 2012a; International Energy Agency (IEA), 2016); even 
though coal use has decreased, this remains a priority.  In this view, if CCS is 
not deployed, the UK will find it at best difficult and, for many observers 
impossible, to make the required deep cuts to CO2 emissions (The CCC, 
2018b; National Audit Office (NAO), 2017a; Haszeldine, 2015; IEA, 2017; 
2015; International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2014; DECC, 2012a) 
required under the Climate Change Act of 2008.  However, projects to test 
CCS have faltered in the UK.   In April 2012, the Coalition Government 
launched a CCS Roadmap and competition to demonstrate commercial scale 
CCS (DECC, 2012a) on fossil fuel power plants.  The Roadmap included 
                                            
5 Consider, for example, attempts by US President Donald Trump to bolster the US coal 
sector in order to garner votes and the resultant increases in coal production 
(https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34992). 
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£1billion in funding to support development of full-scale CCS by 2020 (ibid., 4).  
However, in December 2015, the then Conservative Government removed its 
support for the programme.   There are now no commercial scale CCS projects 
in the UK and targets, originally established in 2012, for four plants being 
operational by 2018 (DECC, 2012b) will not now be met with potentially 
harmful consequences (Global CCS Institute (GCCSI), 2016).   
As discussed further in chapter two, since the 1980s with the intentional ‘rolling 
back of the state’ (Scott, 2013, p.65; Pierre and Peters 2000), and its planned 
replacement with multi-level/multi-actor approaches to governance (Gillard et 
al, 2016), the mechanisms and institutions, processes and outcomes of 
governance have changed.  This is perhaps especially significant for coal 
production and use with private ownership of formerly state-run industries, and 
complex and contradictory planning, taxation and subsidy policies governing 
coal use.   
An additional feature of the wider debate relevant for the wicked problem of 
continued coal use, is that the stated level at which governance activity occurs 
also fluctuates between national, international and sub-national (Drake, 2009). 
This period of fluctuation coincided with recognition of borderless 
intergenerational, environmental problems; biodiversity loss, ozone depletion, 
climate change.  As a result, state actors, as well as civic and corporate actors 
at different levels of governance become, at least nominally, part of ML/MA, 
market friendly forms of governance (Baker & Eckerberg, 2010; Adger and 
Jordan, 2009; Gouldson and Murphy, 1998).   
Finally, as discussed in chapters five and seven, continued coal use is 
essentially resource depleting, CCS is an end of pipe technology therefore 
difficult to consider as a sustainable energy solution.  What becomes 
interesting in this thesis is the extent to which new coal, whilst characterised 
as a new clean technology, remains inextricably, structurally, institutionally, 
culturally linked with ‘old coal’.  Similarly, the extent to which new governance 
is inextricably, structurally, institutionally, culturally linked with old governance 
in wicked contexts – in ways that are perhaps uncharted or not fully understood 
elsewhere – is illuminated here. 
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Sustainability can in and of itself be considered a complex issue (WCED, 2008; 
Kasemir et al, 2003) and within it issues of complexity, i.e. those that 
legitimately have many descriptions and potential outcomes (Casti, 1986) 
require innovative approaches to research.  From an ontological perspective, 
this research begins by examining changes in governance arrangements, 
actors and entities over the period 1970 to 2014.  Using an analytical 
framework developed from Dryzek (2005) for discourse analysis, it examines 
changes in organisational fields over time, in terms of structure, agency at both 
UK and local level.  It finds the discourse on coal use has changed from one 
dominated by the view that ‘coal is king’ (and accepted as an environmental 
bad because of its economic and public goods), to coal seen as either a win-
win low carbon, or a contested, energy option resulting from institutional 
carbon lock-in (Unruh, 2000) in this period.  The research then goes on to 
explore the changes in the market for coal and CCS between 2014 and 2018 
following the UK Government’s withdrawal from CCS development 
programmes.   
The problem of continued coal use for electricity generation in the UK, either 
unabated in existing coal fired power stations or using new coal technologies 
yet to be developed, has been characterised here as wicked. Rittel and 
Webber (1973) have framed such problems as those that are difficult or 
impossible to solve.     Conklin (2006) also describes wicked problems as those 
that are difficult to resolve and where incomplete, contradictory or changing 
features of the problem overlap and are difficult to recognise.  In this case, coal 
use and plans for its decline are considered as problems with multiple levels 
of complexity which may be framed in different ways depending on different 
actors’ views and understandings of the problem.  To gain a sufficiently rich 
understanding of coal use in the UK and, specifically, why a technology once 
heralded as the UK’s best chance of mitigating against climate change6 has 
faltered, it is necessary to look beyond individual policies or pathways.   
The issue is complex and contested.  Within the discourse on coal use, key 
environmental and distributional questions arise.  These questions link to 
debates on the processes and outcomes (Adger and Jordan, 2009) of 
                                            
6 I.e. CCS with coal 
7 
 
 
 
sustainability and governance which are intertwined with debates on power 
(Lukes, 1974, 2005; Clegg, 1989) and justice at multiple levels of society 
(Jessops, 2004).   Given the complexity of the problem with economic, social 
and environmental dimensions, and that the UK has what will be shown in this 
thesis to be a protracted history with coal, the historical social science 
approach adopted is appropriate for this research.  Discourse analysis of 
interview, observation and bureaucratic data from 1960 to June 2018 is used 
to discover key governance metaphors and rhetorical devices (Dryzek, 2005) 
evident throughout the period of study (c1960 to c2014).  As a result, the 
actors, relationships and entities embedded within metaphors are discovered 
and explored in ways that illuminate the complexities embedded within the 
wicked problem of coal use. 
This brief introduction to core features of the discourse on continued coal use 
in the UK, suggests that key distributional questions - scalar, temporal, agency, 
economic, environmental and social – remain unanswered.  In order to begin 
to consider these questions in useful depth, this research critically examines 
the evolution of social, economic and environmental organisational fields.  
Using the terms governance and sustainability as ‘organising principles’ (Baker 
and Eckerberg, 2010, p.6), the research adopts a multi-methods approach 
appropriate to this challenging environmental social science problem 
(Creswell, 2013).   
To summarise, continued coal use in energy generation in the UK, whilst in 
decline, is characterised here as a wicked social and environmental science 
problem; complexities exist and are not well understood, in particular in terms 
of their emergence over time.  The thick and rich, empirical and theoretical, 
understanding of the emergence of the current context as presented here 
matters for such wicked, complex environmental and social science problems.  
The conceptual aim of this research is to explore and explain whether new 
forms of governance influence the sustainability of coal use in UK energy 
generation.  In order to address this aim, this research considers governance 
and sustainability of coal over time and at two levels (Gibson et al, 2010; Cash 
et al., 2006); UK and Yorkshire and Humberside.   
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1.3 Research aims, objectives and questions 
The primary aim of this research is to establish whether, why and how new 
forms of governance affect the prospects for the sustainability of ‘new coal’.  
The overarching research question simply reflects closely the research aim.   
Do new forms of governance affect the prospects for sustainability of 
‘new coal’?  If so, how and why? 
The core research objectives are to: 
1. Provide a characterisation (with theoretical and analytical 
underpinning) of coal use in the UK using governance and 
sustainability as organising principles. 
 
Associated research question: 
a. What are the key characteristics of governance and 
sustainability relevant for UK coal use in electricity 
generation, in terms of: 
- Governance arrangements 
- Actors, agency and relationships 
- Organisations and institutions (entities)?  
 
2. Develop a critical understanding of the existence and evolution of 
organisational fields of governance over time and at multiple levels, 
for the case of UK coal use.   
 
Associated research questions: 
a. Are organisational fields of governance evident? 
b. Have these changed over time, if so how and why?  
c. Do organisational fields differ at different levels of 
governance?  If so how and why?  
d. Why and how have changes occurred? What are the 
changing ‘forces’ for organisational fields for governance 
over time and at different levels? 
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3. Draw from this, conclusions on the prospects for sustainability of 
new coal and coal use. Contribute to knowledge on whether, how 
and why new forms of governance make ‘new coal’ more 
sustainable than ‘old coal’.  Provide recommendations for practice 
and policy in wicked contexts. 
 
Associated research questions: 
a. What are the implications for continued coal use and 
sustainability of new coal? 
b. What are the implications for policy development?  
 
These research objectives introduce interesting temporal and scalar issues 
relating to the evolution of governance without making ‘…die hard ontological 
and epistemological commitments’ which may ‘…blind us to alternatives 
because they mean that we view the world in a particular way’ (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979, p.24).   
This research has three main research purposes; description, understanding 
and change (Blaikie, 2010, p.59).  It is essential given the breadth of purpose 
here, and complexity of the wicked phenomenon under study, that the 
ontological approach adopted reflects these layered purposes.  Table 1 below 
summarises how this thesis is structured in order to address this issue. 
 
Table 1 Research questions and purpose with corresponding chapters 
1.4 Novel contribution 
Ultimately, this research employs well established terms to empirically and 
theoretically explore the important, but currently not well understood dynamics, 
Research 
question 
Research purpose Chapter 
1a 
 
 
 
Description 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 
2a, b Description 4, 5, 6 
2c Description, understanding 4, 5, 6, 8 
2d Understanding 2, 6, 7, 8 
3a Understanding, change 7, 8, 9 
3b Description, understanding, change 1, 7, 8, 9 
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relationships and connections inherent to sustainability, in a real world context.  
In addressing these aims this thesis contributes to debates on the shaping of 
processes and outcomes of multi-level, multi-actor (ML/MA) or new 
governance arrangements. Specifically, this research makes epistemological, 
conceptual and applied contributions to knowledge in three main ways.   
Firstly, from an epistemological and conceptual perspective, this research 
builds on and extends organisational fields literature to develop fields of 
governance as the unit of analysis.   This novel approach adds strength to the 
use of fields as a legitimate means of exploring issues of power and agency 
when attending to wicked problems, in this case coal use.  The organisational 
fields of governance developed in this research, look beyond a specific 
governance mechanism, policy or instrument.  In this way, the inherent 
complexities of the wicked problem of coal use have been conceptualised and 
problematised effectively.   
Chapters three and seven explore this process of conceptualisation in more 
depth, but to summarise here, in wicked contexts, examination of individual 
organisations, specific sectors or institutional scales at a single point in time 
would not sufficiently have addressed the complexity.  Instead by critically 
reflecting on the evolution of governance and sustainability processes and 
outcomes, this research contributes to a better understanding of a wicked 
social and environmental problem.  Bringing the use of organisational fields as 
a unit of analysis in to the governance literature in this way creates a deeper 
and ‘thicker’ (Geertz, 1973, p.14) understanding of the processes of change 
over both time and levels.  This is a novel contribution to the governance 
literature, both in terms of using the organisational field as the unit of analysis 
and in developing a useful case to explore complex governance themes.   
Following Dryzek (2005), the research identifies metaphors and the actors, 
entities and relationships within them to create a characterisation of multiple 
eras of governance of coal.   This unique characterisation illuminates forces 
and dynamics of change, including the emergence of both consolidating and 
disconnecting forces over time.  The insights drawn from this historical, 
explorative approach to the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions posed, have not simply 
added a novel ontological dimension, but also, significantly, illuminated the 
emergence of current governance arrangements in terms of both structure and 
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agency.  In contrast to pluralist descriptions of governance (Lindblom, 1979), 
this thesis finds that the power (Lukes, 1974) and agency of few dominant, in 
particular Government actors with political and nominally  economic motives, 
is significant in determining governance processes, even where multiple actors 
are, ostensibly at least, involved in determining outcomes.   
Dynamic processes of replication and isomorphic change happen within 
organisational fields.  The concept of isomorphism has been used to describe 
the tendency for organisations to merge or homogenise over time (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983).  Here, as discussed in chapters three and seven, in keeping 
with Milstein et al (2002, p.152) the concept is used to show that contrary to 
traditional views on change, isomorphic pressures do not always lead to 
homogeneity within the field.  More specifically, this research shows that 
structure and agency issues can lead, over time, to diffusion within fields and 
disconnects between fields, as where powerful actors are dominant their 
interests are served.  This diffusion makes outcomes from specific governance 
mechanism such as public engagement activities, or any single policy for 
example, difficult to predict.  It also creates potential for conflict and 
contestation.  In contrast, the economic field has become more focussed, 
centred and, evidently, dominant beyond economic organisational fields 
boundaries.  This has important implications for sustainability in nominally 
ML/MA settings. 
The second methodological contribution this research makes is that case 
specific outcomes relating to power and agency dynamics within ML/MA 
governance arrangements are generalizable to wider contexts.  Because of 
the conceptual strength of organisational fields (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Hoffman, 2001, pp.34-35), case specific outcomes relating to power dynamics 
at different levels of governance (Gibson, 2010; Cash 2006) are generalizable 
to other wicked problems. In this sense, in agreement with Sneddon et al 
(2006), this research finds that ‘…a pluralistic, critical approach to sustainable 
development offers fresh interpretations of intractable environment-
development dilemmas’ (ibid., p.255), but critiques the extent to which this 
approach is adopted in wicked contexts.  The bringing together of critical 
approaches to discourse analysis with the strength and legitimacy of new 
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institutionalism to explore a case study, overcomes critiques of the case study 
as a limiting tool (Yin, 2014).   
In particular, this research proposes that wicked phenomena are likely to 
emerge where structural and agency imbalances have arisen over time.  In 
such circumstances, the efficacy of new governance mechanisms as a means 
of stimulating and delivering sustainable development7 is limited.  For the case 
of coal use in the UK, this research shows that place specific, economic, 
environmental and social drivers have led to diffuse social and environmental 
organisational fields.  It also shows that whilst dominant throughout the 
discourse, the economic field consolidates over time and at both levels of 
enquiry.  A final interesting feature of the case study is that actors operating at 
national level within the economic field have control over decisions (and non-
decisions (Clegg, 1989, p.11)), policy instruments and action beyond the 
economic sphere.  This dominance of economic actors, together with the 
legacy effect of coal, has implications for justice and power, and ultimately 
sustainable development at different levels discussed in chapter seven. 
Thirdly, this research shows that the temporal dimension developed here not 
only adds complexity and conceptual interest to the problem, but also creates 
opportunities for greater understanding of wicked contexts in other applied 
settings. The research therefore lends support to practitioner and academic 
literature relating to limits of ‘one-size-fits-all’ governance arrangements, by 
efficiently illuminating features of wicked contexts such as coal use in the UK, 
that need to be focused on by policy makers if multi-level, multi-actor 
arrangements are to be directed to shape sustainability outcomes. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The structure of this thesis follows a traditional logic which frames then 
explores the environmental social science problem under consideration.  
Following this introductory chapter, which presents a contextual narrative, 
chapter two provides in depth coverage and critical reflection of the literature 
with particular interest in implications and emergence of new governance 
arrangements for sustainable development, including the role of government, 
                                            
7 Sustainability and sustainable development are used synonymously for grammatical 
reasons unless otherwise stated. 
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private and civic actors in decision making. Chapter three details the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions adopted in scoping and 
designing this research.  It then describes and reflects on the methodological 
and analytical approaches employed.  The remainder of the thesis then 
proceeds in six parts: three analytical chapters, each corresponding to an 
identified governance era and/or level, present the research findings.  
Together, these create a substantive narrative and deep understanding of the 
evolution of contemporary governance of coal.  Chapter seven then presents 
an in-depth discussion that draws out themes emerging from the research. 
This discussion chapter critically reflects on the prospects for sustainability of 
‘new coal’. Chapter eight brings the thesis up to date with a critical reflection 
on changes to governance and policy conditions relating to coal use and the 
changing market for coal and CCS between 2013 and 2018.  The final 
concluding chapter reiterates the contribution to knowledge made by this 
research, provides an internal critique of the thesis to address its limits, and 
suggests future direction of research.  
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Chapter 2 - Historical context of governance and sustainability of coal use 
Economic, social and political factors drive the continued extraction and use of 
fossil fuels for electricity generation, despite recognised concerns over the 
sustainability of their use.  Energy security, economic growth, stable 
commodity prices for coal, profit maximisation of firms and electricity demand 
amongst others, are all factors driving continued coal use for electricity 
generation.  The challenges of anthropogenic climate change and 
environmental degradation associated with coal and other fossil fuel use are, 
however, clear; GHG emissions, public health concerns, underdevelopment in 
coalfields, environmental degradation.  Individual nation states, including the 
UK, are responding to these global challenges in different ways for example 
by setting targets, notably Kyoto (United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1997) and the Paris Climate Agreement 
(UNFCCC, 2015).  In the UK the establishment of legislation and a legally 
binding policy framework under the Climate Change Act (2008), is designed to 
cut carbon emissions or otherwise mitigate against anthropogenic climate 
change.  The establishment of emissions reductions targets delivered via five 
carbon budgets is considered an effective and innovative approach to climate 
change (Gillard, 2016, p. 26; The CCC, 2017) and considerable reductions in 
emissions have been witnessed (BEIS, 2018a).   
To date, activity designed to meet targets, has focused on reducing carbon 
intensity of the energy sector; coal reduction has played a significant part in 
achieving emissions reductions (The CCC, 2017).  New energy technologies 
are also being sought as one of a number of means of meeting GHG reduction 
targets (DECC, 2012a; BEIS, 2017a).  In keeping with this focus, new, clean 
or sustainable coal technologies are being designed to reduce the 
environmentally harmful effects of coal combustion (Haszeldine, 2016).  Clean 
coal technologies include; integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC), flue-
gas desulfurization, fluidized-bed combustion, low nitrogen oxide burners, and 
of particular interest in this thesis, Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 
(Haszeldine, 2016; WCA, 2018; Coal Industry Advisory Board, 2008).  As 
discussed in this thesis, the latter, CCS, has become synonymous with new 
coal over other clean coal technologies.  However, as noted in chapter one, as 
an end of pipe technology, CCS is a contested technology and considered a 
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temporary fix at best by some contributors (Tickell, 2015; Rochone, 2008; 
Flannery, 2007).  For these actors, the environmental impacts of coal 
extraction and the technical unknowns associated with full chain CCS make 
new coal an unfavourable, albeit low carbon, technology.  In this view, as a 
short-term measure to reduce carbon, CCS cannot sustainably contribute to 
either mitigating against anthropogenic causes of climate change or adapting 
to the effects of climate change.  As this research will go on to demonstrate, 
others still, argue that CCS is not simply desirable, but essential if we are to 
reach emissions reduction targets in a broadly BAU context (BEIS, 2016; 
DECC, 2008, 2012; GCCSI, 2011, 2016).   
An additional layer of complexity, raised in chapter one and discussed in 
chapter eight, is that in recent years, CCS, and other low carbon energy 
developments, have faltered and derailed where options for development are, 
typically, not deemed economically viable.  Academic, practitioner and political 
debates relating to new coal are further complicated, by temporal issues; whilst 
CCS demonstration projects have been developed, new technologies have not 
been fully tested at scale8.  Questions have been raised over whether these 
delays in CCS development are a consequence of technical, or economic, 
political or social issues (GCCSI, 2016; Haszeldine, 2016, p.222; Greenpeace, 
2008a).  Core debates explored here with particular reference to coal (new 
coal and old coal) and CCS - governance and regulation of new technologies, 
the role of civic, corporate and other non-state actors, social, economic and 
environmental justice and sustainable development - are timely given 
continued unabated, albeit reduced, coal use in the UK.   
To date, literature relating to continued coal use in the UK has predominantly 
focused on assessing either financial or technical features9 (Haszeldine, 2012; 
Scott et al 2013) or public acceptance (Markusson 2013; Ashworth et al 2010, 
2012; Brunstig and Upham, 2011; Upham and Roberts, 2011).  The aim in both 
literatures has been to guide or shape the direction and acceptance of this 
technology.  Whilst the latter literature usefully highlights the limits to public 
                                            
8 Carbon Capture is not a new technology, and each aspect of the full chain has been tested 
at industrial scale (Haszeldine 2016).  However, demonstration of full chain technology i.e. 
capture, transport and storage of CO2 generated from power plants is at an early stage 
(GCCSI, 2018; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 2018). 
9 It must be noted here that a review of technical literature on CCS is beyond the remit of this 
thesis.  For a useful summary see Rackley, S. 2010. 
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engagement (and this research builds on these solid foundations), existing 
works are arguably too narrow in focus and ‘theoretically opaque’ (Jordan, 
2008) in terms of implications for governance and sustainability of this, and 
other, new technology.  This research expands the debate from a narrow, 
snapshot focus of a specific technology, policy or government intervention, to 
consider and propose organisational fields of governance as the unit of 
analysis.   
Drawing upon a range of interdisciplinary debates and insights, this chapter 
advances a conceptual framework that seeks to capture the core elements of 
the literature in these debates.  It provides a useful backdrop to suggest how 
and why the current governance context has emerged and ultimately considers 
whether new forms of governance have implications for sustainability of new 
coal.  The discourse is broad and varied and consensus amongst academics, 
practitioners and other stakeholders difficult to attain.  However, by applying 
the lens of governance and sustainability to this problem, an understanding of, 
risks, complexities and paradoxes associated with spatial and temporal justice 
and power inequalities (economic, social and environmental) emerges. The 
resultant long exposure picture suggests that the future of a low carbon 
technology of coal and CCS as a sustainable solution to complex problems is 
questionable.  Furthermore, what emerges, is that moves towards governance 
for sustainability; corporate and public engagement in decision making, new 
governance arrangements to promote green growth for example, are not 
sufficiently ingrained, granular or heterogeneous as would be necessary to 
meet sustainable development aspirations.   
Two dominant literatures, governance and sustainability, and their relevance 
to the research challenge at hand are explored here.  For Petschow (2005), 
linking these two literatures adds analytical strength to the debates which 
enables innovative insights in to this paradox (ibid., p9). In this sense, it is 
important to look at both literatures (as well as the junctures between them), 
as this wicked context can legitimately be portrayed as an issue of 
‘unsustainability’, and therefore a ‘crisis of governance’ (Adger and Jordan 
2009, xvii).   
Following this preamble, section 2.1 continues with a brief profile of coal at two 
levels of enquiry; the national, UK level, and the sub-national Yorkshire and 
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Humberside.  Section 2.2 and 2.3 then consider the two conceptual terms 
important to this thesis, sustainability and governance, respectively.  Finally, 
section 2.4 provides a brief summary of the contribution chapter two makes to 
achieving the research objectives.   
2.1 A profile of coal at two levels of enquiry 
Coal use has a strong economic and social history in the UK; coal fuelled the 
industrial revolution, and at its peak, coal mining offered employment to 
hundreds of thousands (Beatty et al, 2007; The National Archives, 2014).  In 
the 1940s and 1950s, the newly nationalised mining and power industries 
contributed significantly to post war recovery and growth (Humphrey and 
Stanislaw, 1979).  Conversely, eras of boom and bust, economic 
underdevelopment, poverty and unemployment, social upheaval and 
disenfranchisement have been, in part at least, attributed to the collapse of 
coal mining and the industrial heartlands in 1980s and 1990s UK (Aragon et 
al, 2015; Foden et al, 2014; Strangleman, 2001).   
At the level of the coalfield, for example in Yorkshire and Humberside, coal 
connects with heritage (Hall, 1981; Strangleman, 2001) and its continued use 
remains, in short, relevant.  Recent mine closures and public inquiries in to 
police behaviour during mining strikes for example (BBC, 2015) have re-ignited 
debates on the significance of coal use in regions where mining and electricity 
generation have historically played a key part in local economies.  This thesis 
proposes that new coal and CCS developments cannot be viewed in isolation 
from these debates on the legacy issues surrounding coal use.   
2.1.1 UK coal usage for electricity generation 
As noted in chapter one, coal use for electricity generation fluctuates during 
the period under study.  Appendix A provides a summary of coal use statistics, 
some key points to note include:  
• Between 2000 and 2012, coal accounted for a an average of 35% per 
cent of the total electricity generated in the UK, with peaks in 2007 
(37%) and 2012 (41%).  
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• Following a peak in 2007, coal use for electricity (trend) gradually fell in 
line with cheaper gas prices until 2011, and then increased again in 
2012 and 2013 to 54.91million tonnes.   
• Annual coal use (tonnage) for electricity generation increased over the 
period 2000 to 2013 by 6.7%. 
• At peak usage times, coal use is estimated to be in the region of 50%. 
• In 2012, the year the UK Government launched its CCS Roadmap 
(DECC, 2012a), usage was 7.42% higher than the average for the 
period 2000 to 2012 and 19.65% higher than in 2011. 
• From 2015 onwards, coal use has been in decline. 
• In April 2017, the UK experienced its first 24-hour period without using 
coal in electricity generation since the 19th century. 
• In 2017 and 2018, coal use continues to decline but high levels of usage 
are witnessed during periods of cold weather. 
As will be discussed in full in chapters five, seven and eight, higher (or at least 
comparable) levels of price uncertainty, immediate infrastructure costs for 
other low carbon energy options (for example natural gas, nuclear, 
renewables), contribute to coal’s continued use.    For much of the 20th and 
early twenty first centuries, eroding cost advantages in reducing coal as a 
feedstock for electricity generation (including associated costs of NOx, SO2 
and CO2 emissions reductions and plant closures under the EU Large 
Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) and subsequently the Industrial Emissions 
Directive (IED)), have not been sufficient to offset low and stable commodity 
prices (UK CCS Research Council (UKCCSRC), 2013).  In addition, whilst 
policy interventions and carbon taxation have been shown to impact coal use, 
there are limits to the extent to which further cuts are feasible under current 
policy conditions (The CCC, 2018b). 
2.1.2 Coal and CCS  
CCS is promoted as a technology option which potentially allows for continued 
coal use whilst significantly reducing carbon released into the atmosphere in a 
cost effective manner (DECC, 2012b; GCCSI, 2016; Haszeldine, 2016; WCA, 
2012; Ashworth et al, 2010).  Yet full chain use of CCS to abate emissions 
from coal and gas in energy generation remains a largely untested technology, 
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and questions exist over whether options for CCS with coal are commercially, 
economically or socially acceptable (Huijts et al, 2007; Scott et al., 2013; 
Shackley et al, 2009; Upham and Roberts, 2011).  In addition, as discussed in 
full in chapter eight, funding commitments from the UK Government to test 
CCS projects in the UK at commercial scale, have been delayed and ultimately 
reneged upon (Energy and Climate Change Committee, 2016, p.3), despite 
planned targets to have operational CCS in the UK by the 2020s (ibid., p.9). 
It is widely recognised that in order to ameliorate current economic and 
ecological crises, more sustainable modes of energy production will need to 
be developed.  In response, commitments have been made at international 
level to test CCS capabilities particularly with regard to its use with coal in 
electricity generation.  The 2008 G8 summit, for example, committed to 
development of twenty projects and to have CCS ‘widely deployed’ by 2020 
(G8 Hokkaido, 2008, item 31).  Whilst early commitments were ambitious 
(IPCC, 2005), progress towards these commitments internationally has been, 
at best, steady (GCCSI, 2011, 2016).  
In 2012, the UK Coalition Government launched its CCS commercialisation 
programme and CCS Roadmap (DECC, 2012a) designed to support the 
development and roll-out of commercial scale CCS projects in support of wider 
efforts to reduce GHG emissions.  Coal and CCS demonstration projects in 
the UK (appendix B) had already demonstrated key technical features of the 
technology.  The Roadmap set out plans to have four operational CCS plants 
by 2017.  By 2015, when the UK Government pulled out of its 
commercialisation programme, no CCS with coal projects were operational at 
commercial scale in the UK.  For most projects, operational status has been 
dependent on frequently delayed (NAO, 2017a) UK or EU funding decisions 
expected in 2013 and 2014 (appendix B).   
Whilst CCS can be used with all fossil fuels there are advantages to its use 
with coal.  Coal is widely and readily available (World Coal Association (WCA), 
2012, 2018). It is relatively cheap, easy to extract and transport, already forms 
a significant part of electricity generation worldwide and is likely to continue to 
do so (UNFCCC, 2015; International Energy Association (IEA), 2015; WCA, 
2018). Additionally, the international community (at least as represented by 
UN, G8 and the OECD) proposes continued resource extraction and use as a 
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necessary aid to development and in order to satisfy demand for energy 
requirements.  Finally, coal use worldwide, for electricity production, as well as 
steel, chemicals and cement, is forecast to increase to 2022, especially in 
China, India and the USA (IEA, 2017).   
In summary, coal with CCS is seen by many policy, government and 
commercial actors as (prima facie) a technological solution to the problem of 
continued fossil fuel use. By others, however, it is seen as a temporary 
measure, albeit a necessary one (Friends of the Earth, 2005a, 2005b), and by 
others still as an untested and potentially detrimental technology which will 
inevitably lead to continued coal use (Rochone, 2008).  CCS with coal remains 
an internationally contested technology and whilst research in to the technical 
feasibility of CCS is developing (UKCCSRC, 2018; Rackley, 2017; Talo & 
Pettinau, 2014), persistent questions remain regarding the shaping of its 
development and deployment (BEIS, 2016; Stephens et al., 2009; Markusson 
et al., 2011). 
Whilst untested at scale10 in the UK, there is perhaps an underlying 
assumption that technical issues relating to capture, transport and storage of 
CO2 will be solved (UKCCSRC, 2015, 2012).  Front end engineering design 
(FEED) data from capture demonstration projects, suggests technical issues 
are less problematic to developers than economic, social and political ones 
(E.On 2011; GCCSI 2011, 2015, 2018; World Coal Association (WCA) 2012, 
2016). For some, these issues relating to socio-political drivers and barriers to 
CCS are not insurmountable (Scott et al, 2015) however the social and political 
issues relating to new coal, and continued coal use more widely, are not fully 
understood.  This is problematic for a set of technologies which have been 
described as essential if the UK is to make deep CO2 reductions (BEIS, 2016; 
IEA, 2016; GCCSI, 2016; Haszeldine, 2015; Boot-Handfield et al., 2014). 
In the early years of the 21st century, CCS has been widely portrayed as a 
potential low carbon energy option which will support the transition to low 
carbon economies.  CCS is also seen as contributory to economic 
development in otherwise underdeveloped regions (Trades Union Congress 
                                            
10 The terms industrial scale and commercial scale are discussed later in chapter five.  Here 
they refer to CCS on operational industrial or commercial plant as opposed to test facilities.  
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(TUC), 2014b).  However, of the non-technical issues not yet fully explored in 
the literature, there is perhaps most concern with regards to whether economic 
conditions are right for the wholesale adoption of CCS at a commercial scale 
(Markussen et al., 2012; Rubin et al., 2012).  Governments and industry 
associations have characterised CCS as a low carbon opportunity for green 
growth (BEIS, 2017b; DECC, 2012a, 2015, WCA, 2016), yet reviews of 
demonstration projects as well as forecasts for commercial scale activities are 
less conclusive (Rubin et al., 2012;  Hammond and Shackley, 2010).  A 
consistent feature of FEED studies is that deployment of new coal 
technologies will increase operating costs of electricity generation (E.On, 
2011).  As discussed in chapter eight, this is to a degree contested when 
considered in the context of costs of alternative low carbon energy (see 8.1.3) 
and more recent projects such as Boundary Dam11 in Canada suggest that 
when considered with savings from emissions reductions, costs of electricity 
generation from coal with CCS become commercially viable (GCCSI, 2018). 
Timing of the deployment of CCS matters (UNFCCC Conference of the Parties 
(CoP) 21, 2015; DECC, 2010a).  According to the Global CCS Institute’s early 
review of CCS projects’ status, four commercial scale projects would need to 
be operative in the UK by 2017 (GCCSI, 2011).  Critics point out that test 
facilities have been slow to develop largely for economic and governance 
reasons (Gough et al., 2010; Haszeldine, 2009). Attempts to establish 
commercial scale operations have been unsuccessful, at least in part, because 
economic conditions and market incentives were not clear to incumbent 
industrial and government actors (E.On, 2011).  In addition, where there have 
been successful attempts to develop CCS at scale, for example in South 
Korea, or Canada, significant government and public sector funding has 
supported technology development.  In such settings with high levels of social 
acceptance and public private partnerships, progress towards large scale 
deployment of CCS is improved (GCCSI, 2015).   These features of the debate 
are explored more fully in chapter eight. 
                                            
11 Boundary Dam is a coal fired power station with retrofitted CO2 capture facilities.  The 
project was completed in 2014 and has been operational since.  Captured CO2 is 
transported by pipelines for Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) at a nearby oil plant and a portion 
is stored in a geological aquifer. 
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Another non-technical issue of significance to wide scale deployment of new 
coal technologies is public acceptance.  This literature is consistent with 
debates that hold that for new technologies in general and for those relating to 
climate change or other wicked problems (Rittel and Webber, 1973) in 
particular, public acceptance is seen as a key part of adoption processes 
(Parry and Murphy, 2013).  It has long been recognised that key to social 
acceptance is the relative trust with which the actors involved in projects are 
held in the local community (Ashworth et al., 2012; Huijts, 2007). Socio 
technical and political dimensions of new coal are complex and intractable 
(Stephens et al., 2009).  However, the social acceptance of CCS is shaped by 
the social and political contexts of the countries and locations in which the 
projects occur (Markusson et al., 2012) and considered effort with multiple 
phases of development may be required for acceptance (Wilson et al., 2012). 
To summarise, Fleishman et al (2010) suggest that ultimately public perception 
of CCS technologies may impact the likelihood of wide-scale adoption of new 
coal.  Ashworth et al (2010) for example, have found that public acceptance of 
CCS technologies improves with knowledge of the technology (Ashworth et 
al., 2012).  Markusson et al’s findings support this view, however with 
recognised limits regarding the extent to which different publics with cultural 
differences accept CCS as a new technology (2011, 2012, p.222).  It is not 
clear that public acceptance will occur without considerable effort to address 
such differences. Similarly (and in keeping with Arnstein’s Ladder of 
Participation (1969)), the limits to simple information giving and consultative 
approaches have been found in Germany where increasing scepticism to CCS 
projects has been voiced (Upham and Roberts, 2011).   
The literature reflects diversity of opinion on CCS and the contradictory roles 
and views of actors and key stakeholders within the discourse.  In addition, the 
politicisation of the technology, no doubt in part due to its potential as a key 
mitigation technology (IPCC, 2005), has in some ways further polarised and 
fragmented the international, national and regional landscape for CCS 
development, particularly with regard to institutional structure and governance 
(de Coninck and Backstrand, 2011).  They present a useful picture of the 
relative power and influence of CCS actors at international, regional and 
national level which suggests that the IPCC special report on CCS (IPCC, 
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2005) had a defining role in shaping norms, understandings and expectations 
around CCS development, but that these norms have not been adopted 
equally by different actors and institutions at international or state levels (de 
Coninck and Backstrand, 2011).   
For most projects (appendix B), as explored more fully in chapters five and 
eight, operational status of CCS projects is highly dependent on governance 
conditions, taxation and, ultimately, funding.  Delays to funding decisions 
between 2011 and 2015, and contradictory signals to the market from 
government led to closure or derailment of planned projects.  For example,  
just six months prior to withdrawing £1billion of funding for CCS projects, the 
UK Government had confirmed its intention to invest in CCS developments in 
the UK in line with its CCS Roadmap (Energy and Climate Change Committee, 
2016; DECC, 2012a).  This is of relevance both at national and sub national 
levels, given significant CCS with coal projects were expected to be based in 
Yorkshire and Humberside region (White Rose, Don Valley Power Project). 
2.1.3 Yorkshire and Humberside 
From chapter one and as explored in depth in chapters four and six, the 
Yorkshire and Humberside region has a long history with coal mining and its 
use in electricity generation.  During the first decades of the 21st century, the 
coal mining industry in the region declined further with the last deep coal mine 
in Kellingley, Yorkshire closing in 2015 (BBC, 2015).  However, throughout the 
period of study, coal use in the region’s coal fired power stations was 
significant.  Between 2000 and 2015, the region generated an average 17% of 
UK GHG emissions (Pearce and Evans, 2015,  no pagination).  In addition, 
during the period of study, the region hosted the largest single source CO2 
emitter in Europe, one of three (now two12) coal fired power stations then 
operational in the region.  For these and other technical and geological 
reasons, it has been stated (albeit by actors with vested interests in developing 
CCS with coal) that the UK and more specifically Yorkshire & Humberside 
region has the ‘perfect’ context for CCS (CO2Sense, 2011, no pagination).   
                                            
12 The scheduled closure of SSE’s Ferrybridge C plant closed was brought forward to March 
2016 following a fire in one of its cooling towers (SSE, 2015) 
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The Yorkshire & Humber region was historically economically reliant on three 
core industries coal mining, steel works and textiles.  In the mid-1980s, 56 
collieries were active in Yorkshire (National Coal Mining Museum (NCMM), 
2014).  However, the politically active coal mining industry suffered during the 
1980s and 1990s, when some 67,000 jobs were lost from the region’s coal 
mines between 1981 and 2004.  A significant number of these were not 
replaced (Beatty, Fothergill and Powell, 2007) and whilst unemployment rates 
are decreasing, levels in the region remain higher than average for the UK 
(Office for National Statistics (ONS), 2018), with a lower proportion of people  
with higher level skills during the early part of the 21st century (Leeds City 
Region Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP), 2016, p.1).  This chimes with 
Beatty et al’s (2007) findings that despite investment in regeneration in former 
coalfield regions, the decline of the coal mining industry, coupled with pre-
existing high levels of unemployment, has resulted in long term and ‘hidden 
unemployment’ (ibid., p.1654).  In addition, contemporary research noted that 
environmental features of redevelopment and regeneration were often under 
considered (Jackson and Roberts, 2000).   
These findings correspond with the literature on the limits to the regenerative 
capacity of new governance arrangements in wicked contexts (discussed here 
in section 2.3 and chapter seven) and interview data presented in this thesis.  
Similarly, Perrons (2000) finds that regional inequalities that have developed 
over time are not addressed by considering single issue (e.g. employment) 
development pathways.  Instead in her working paper, she advocates an 
alternative holistic approach that would overcome the limiting features of single 
regeneration projects (ibid., p.1).  
Coal use had, and continues to have, significant environmental, social and 
economic impacts.  As will be explored in more detail in chapters four and six, 
this research shows that coal, in and of itself, remains an issue in the Yorkshire 
and Humber region, both in terms of the legacy of its decline and in terms of 
its unabated use in the region’s coal fired power stations.  
2.2 Sustainability of coal 
The profile of coal and new coal presented in section 2.1, identified that 
embedded within the discourse are core issues relating to environmental, 
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social and economic impacts of its use.  Sustainability emerged as a concept 
in the early 1970s following the UN Conference on Human Environment and 
publication of seminal works such as Donella Meadows’ ‘Limits to Growth’ 
(Meadows et al, 1972) and Goldsmith and Prescott-Allen’s ‘Blueprint for 
Survival’ (1972).  Both include the core principles that unfettered human 
development is unsustainable, and that alternative approaches to social and 
economic development consistent with environmental conservation must be 
developed.  Early use of the term was intended to bring together broad 
conceptual facets relating to societal, environmental and economic issues. The 
Brundtland report provides a useful starting point in any discussion on the 
definition of sustainable development (SD).  In it development is sustainable 
where it: 
‘…meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs.’ 
(World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p.8) 
This definition introduces notions of both intergenerational equity, and limits to 
resource use.  As a broad concept, the intention of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (WCED) was to include connectivity between 
social, environmental and economic facets of human-nature interactions 
(WCED, 1987; Kates et al, 2005; Baker 2006).  The concept of sustainable 
development implies connections between these conceptual facets both within 
and between generations in the context of understood limits to resources:  
‘…not absolute limits but limitations imposed by the present state of 
technology and social organization on environmental resources and by 
the ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of human activity.’ 
(WCED, 1987, p.8) 
These points are relevant here because whilst often criticised for its unwieldy 
breadth, the term does not lack utility.  Kates et al (2005), for example, suggest 
this broad definition makes it ‘enduringly relevant’ (ibid., p20) and useful for: 
‘…places from local to global; and institutions of government, civil society, 
business, and industry to each project their interests, hopes, and 
aspirations onto the banner of sustainable development.’ 
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(ibid., p.10) 
What is of particular relevance for the case of coal use in the UK, is the extent 
to which this broadest definition to include social sustainability, justice (Fraser, 
1999) and equitable inter and intra-generational distribution of resources as 
essential, is practically applicable in real world problems.  Our Common 
Future’s (WCED, 1987) exploration of core, underpinning principles for 
sustainable development remains useful as a practical backdrop for analysis 
and therefore this well-documented definition of sustainable development will 
be adopted here.   
At national (and sub-national) levels of governance, implementation of these 
critical objectives requires political effort and directed policies in order to 
recognise own and others’ development needs.  This set of strategic 
imperatives to ‘allow nations to move from their present, often destructive, 
processes of growth and development onto sustainable development paths.’ 
(ibid, p49) are considered here: 
‘They include: 
• Reviving growth;  
• changing the quality of growth;  
• meeting essential needs for jobs, food, energy, water, and 
sanitation;  
• ensuring a sustainable level of population;  
• conserving and enhancing the resource base; 
• reorienting technology and managing risk; and 
• Merging environment and economics in decision making.’ 
(ibid., p.49) 
Whilst all of these strategic imperatives are integral to sustainable 
development, some are more directly relevant to this research.  These are 
briefly explored here and used for reflection in chapter seven.   
Reviving and changing the quality of growth:  as indicated in chapter one and 
section 2.1.3 above, in the UK many formerly economically viable, coalfield 
regions are now underperforming in terms of social, economic and 
environmental indicators (appendix C).  For the Yorkshire and Humberside 
region, low carbon, sustainable, economic growth has been identified as 
critical in multiple development targets (Leeds City Region LEP, 2012). 
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Meeting essential needs for jobs, food, energy, water and sanitation:  
Yorkshire and Humberside (and other coalfield areas) suffer from 
underdevelopment with lower levels of educational attainment than the 
national average, high unemployment and public health issues associated with 
poor air quality and particulate matter are more common than in non-coalfield 
regions (Foden et al., 2014; Appendix C). 
Conserving and enhancing the resource base:  Regardless of the efficiency of 
combustion, CO2 capture methods or technology employed to clean coal, its 
use is still depleting a non-renewable natural resources (NRNR) and so at best 
weak sustainability can be achieved (Neumeyer, 2003). For the case of the 
governance of coal use in particular, it is also worth noting that the Aire Valley 
has reportedly poor and declining biodiversity despite conservation efforts in 
national and regional regeneration projects (RSPB, 2013). 
Reorienting technology and managing risk: Carbon Capture (CC) technology 
has been used in extraction for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) for decades, the 
technology is now being employed – i.e. reoriented for use - alongside fossil 
fuel combustion as a proposed low carbon energy option.  However full chain 
carbon CCS is relatively new and associated distribution of risks/benefits is 
untested. In this wicked context, this ‘reorienting’ also raises questions relating 
to carbon lock-in (Unruh, 2000). 
Merging environment and economics in decision making:  using sustainability 
as an organising principle allows environmental, economic and social 
implications of continued coal use to be explored in more depth.   
In the thirty years since Our Common Future (1987), much of the discourse 
and literature on sustainability and sustainable development (SD) has focused 
on defining sustainability, and on providing robust mechanisms to assess 
sustainability.  Pezzey (1992) for example produced an analysis of the terms 
such as sustainable resource use, sustainable development and sustainable 
growth. For him sustainability means: 
‘…maintaining utility (human wellbeing) over a very long term future,’ 
 (Pezzey, 1992, p.7).   
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Pezzey’s review (1992) concludes that distribution of resources via free market 
forces is unlikely to lead to sustainable development that will enable 
intergenerational justice for a number of reasons.  Importantly for this thesis, 
choosing a policy option which contributes to sustainability and 
intergenerational equity requires judgement over the natural and human 
capital inputs; the free market does not have this judgement (ibid., p8).  Given 
the increasing hegemony of the market on future energy decisions in the UK, 
this raises concerns for sustainability of continued coal use. 
In his informative work, Neumayer explores notions relating to human and 
natural capital in relation to strong and weak sustainability (2003).  He defines 
development as being sustainable if: 
‘it does not decrease the capacity to provide non-declining per capita 
utility for infinity,’  
(Neumayer, 2003, p.8)   
In this way, he expresses sustainable development as being weak if capital 
(natural and human) is treated in aggregate i.e. where the total human and 
natural capital is viewed as significant for wellbeing of current and future 
generations, natural and man-made capital are seen as substitutes (ibid., 
p.128).  In contrast, strong sustainability sees natural capital and human 
capital as non-substitutable (ibid., p172).  For this case, the use and 
distribution of natural capital and, therefore non-renewable natural resources, 
is core to the problem; given the inevitable decline in non-renewable 
resources, prima facie only weak sustainability might be considered possible.  
This theme is explored further in the discussions in chapters seven and eight. 
Kates et al (2005) summarise the literature on definitions of sustainability to 
suggest that sustainable development is about sustaining environment, 
systems and community and developing human behaviour, economies and 
society.  Nicola Dempsey and others (2011) progress the debate by 
reconsidering the embeddedness of social features of sustainability, in her 
case within an applied, urban development and planning context.  Sustainable 
communities have been described as communities with high degrees of social 
cohesion (Lister, 2000).  In Dempsey et al (2011), the authors usefully 
summarise literature relating to the apparent lack of clear understanding of 
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what the social aspects of sustainability mean in a ‘real world context’ 
(Dempsey et al., 2011, p.290) as well as the homogenising treatment of 
community in the literature.  They present two dimensions of social 
sustainability as relevant and operable, these are: equitable access to 
resources and ‘the sustainability of the community itself’ (ibid, 292).  
Communities in this sense may be viewed as sustainable where there exists: 
‘…social interaction between community members; the relative stability 
of the community, both in terms of overall maintenance of 
numbers/balance (net migration) and the turnover of individual members; 
the existence of, and participation in, local collective institutional, formal 
and informal; levels of trust across the community including issues of 
security from threats, and a positive sense of identification with and pride 
in, the community.’ 
(Ibid, p.294) 
For governance of coal use and sustainability outcomes in former coalfields, 
this debate ties with issues of social equity (Hopwood, 2005; Putnam, 2000).   
To summarise, Tim O’Riordan usefully suggests, ‘sustainability is not just a 
word but a way of becoming’, a way of developing science and society that is 
‘geared to compassion, fairness, empathy, and social justice’ (O’Riordan, 
2014, no pagination).  Following Baker (2007), this research considers 
sustainable development as a useful ‘organising principle’ (2007, p1, Baker 
and Eckerberg, 2010), with which to consider the juncture between societal, 
economic and environmental problems.  In this sense, these definitions and 
conceptions of sustainability are useful in the construction of sustainability as 
an organising principle for this research.  From the discussion above, this 
thesis considers sustainability in three core ways:  equitable access to 
resources, justice and integration in decision making, community 
sustainability.  This is important where social issues relating to the 
sustainability of coal are underexplored in the literature.  
2.3 Governance – an organising principle 
Core to this discussion is the premise that for the wicked problem of coal use 
in the UK, it is not sufficient to look at governance of specific institutions, 
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policies or other interventions; governance of the firm, governance of 
technology, even governance of sustainability would be too narrow a focus.  
Instead wider debates on governance including structure and agency are used 
to draw out relevant features as related to continued coal use. 
The literature on (environmental) governance as a concept and organising 
framework is broad and increasingly wide reaching, as a result, a wide range 
of definitions and conceptual frameworks have been developed with differing 
reflections and connotations (Lemos and Agrawal 2006, p.297).  For most 
however, the simple concept that governance is not government features 
strongly.  For this research, the importance of this concept becomes clear 
when considering the evolution of ‘governance’ from ‘government’ discussed 
in chapter seven.   
The meaning and definition of governance, considerations on theory of 
governance and in some cases its relevance as a construct for analysis, are 
multiple and contested (Rhodes, 1996, Petschow et al, 2005 Adger & Jordan, 
2009). However, for this research following Lafferty (2004), (also Gouldson & 
Murphy 1998, Kooiman 2003, Petschow et al 2005), governance is considered 
as an organising principle which can be defined, broadly and simply, as: 
 ‘…the act or process of governing…’  
(Lafferty, 2004, p.6) 
This remarkably simple definition, of course, has embedded within it multiple 
facets; most notably that governance is a process. In Stoker’s useful essay he 
summarises the multiple views of governance in to five complementary 
propositions (Stoker, 1998) to suggest that governance:  
‘…refers to a set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also 
beyond government …identifies the blurring of boundaries and 
responsibilities for the tackling of social and economic issues 
…identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships 
between institutions involved in collective action …is about autonomous 
self-governing networks of actors …recognises the capacity to get 
things done which does not rest on the power of government to 
command or use its authority.  It sees government as able to use new 
tools and techniques to steer and guide.’  
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(ibid, p.17)  
In the context of continued coal use, these propositions fit well.  Certainly, at 
least prima facie, multiple actors from within and beyond government are 
nominally involved in determining the future of coal use through for example 
consultations13.  The legacy of the historical context, in and of itself creates a 
‘blurring of boundaries’ which means it is not always clearly possible to denote 
responsibility for complex social and economic issues to one actor or 
institution.   
As outlined in chapter one, this research seeks to better understand both 
power dependencies and relationships of governance: the extent to which 
these dependencies and relationships might be considered ‘autonomous, self- 
governing networks of actors’ (ibid.) albeit as part of wider organisational fields 
of governance is relevant.  Finally, the extent to which, new governance tools 
and techniques are used to guide sustainable development, is explored within 
the case context.  Whilst desirable in the context of sustainability (Gillard, 
2016), and useful as a means of defining governance as an organising 
principle, this is an arguably idealistic view of governance in practice and 
reality.  Chapter seven returns to these themes to question the extent to which 
these propositions are evident in this wicked context.   
Beyond these propositions on governance, this section summarises three core 
features inherent in many conceptualisations of governance.  Firstly, 
governance is viewed as purposeful activity with the intention of creating 
change. Secondly, governance involves and includes actors other than 
government actors and at multiple levels in the act of governing. Thirdly, 
governance is, in and of itself, an iterative, abductive process; outcomes 
matter but, significantly, process matters too.  The remainder of this section 
expands on these core features of governance and their relevance for this 
discussion on sustainability.   
2.3.1 Governance as purposeful change 
The view that governance is, perhaps foremost, about purposeful efforts to 
create change gained favour in the early 1990s in keeping with contemporary 
                                            
13 As discussed in chapters five and eight. 
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processes of neo-liberalisation.  Kooiman (1993, 2003) for example suggests 
that governance involves a: 
‘…purposeful effort to guide, steer, control, or manage sectors or facets 
of societies’  
(Kooiman, 1993, p.2).   
For new coal technologies, government and corporate policy is geared toward 
changing (either reducing or abating) coal use in order to meet regional, 
national and international targets for both energy generation and GHG 
emissions increases (BEIS 2017b; DECC, 2012).  This links with governance 
for sustainability debates in which changes in the mechanisms of governance 
are designed to accelerate change (Dunsire,1993, p.21) and the purposeful 
steering (Bailey and Grossardt, 2010) of society toward sustainability and 
sustainable development goals (Petschow et al., 2005).     
Whilst predominantly emerging from a corporate centric, neo-liberal 
perspective, the new governance agenda moves away from the ‘no holds 
barred, liberalise at all costs’ type Washington consensus policy development 
of the 1980s and early 1990s (see tables 10 and 11).  Instead, governance 
arrangements which encourage multi-actor partnerships between corporate, 
public and civil actors are encouraged to devise policy appropriate to local 
situations (Newig, 2008).  The voluntary, complex, polycentric nature of these 
new mechanisms, suggests that a more thorough investigation of the 
behaviours, and associated impacts, of significant actors from government, 
civil society and business spheres at different levels becomes significant.  This 
is especially pertinent given more recent findings which suggest that policy 
makers have a tendency to back track or capitulate on commitments when 
issues become complex (Howlett, 2014). 
Rosenau (2003) makes a useful contribution to the discourse by outlining the 
ways in which the dual processes of globalisation on the one hand and 
decentralisation and localised policy development on the other create 
complexities in governance.  Rosenau identifies sources of ‘fragmegration’ (a 
confluence of ‘aggregation’ and ‘fragmentation’) which operate at micro to 
macro levels.  These forces include the weakening of states, social mobility 
and technological advancements amongst others (Rosenau, 2003, p.27).  He 
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concludes by suggesting that these dual processes and associated 
complexities of governance lead to three principal conceptual problems in the 
good governance for sustainable development debates.  Firstly, there remains 
an argument between economic and environmental developers over what 
development should be (e.g. Ruggie, 2002).  Secondly, there is a question of 
authority.  Rosenau states that governance ‘is crowded with diverse actors at 
every level of community who take positions and pursue policies relevant to 
sustainability’ (Rosenau, 2003, p.34), but that these actors have no authority 
at global or international level to enact changes.  Thirdly, there is a disconnect 
between local, indigenous and global scientific knowledge; despite many 
environmental [and social or economic] problems originating in the local, 
solutions tend to originate in the scientific and/or autocratic international 
community. These three ‘conceptual blocks’ combined with the ‘patchwork 
quilt’ which is governance make it difficult to see how new governance 
arrangements can be assessed as beneficial to sustainable development or 
otherwise (ibid., p.35).   
Rosenau’s analysis provides a useful conceptual framework, but others have 
provided more practical insights, for example with specific reference to the 
environmental outcomes associated with the adoption of new governance 
arrangements.  In their assessment of ways that environmental risks are 
governed, with particular reference to new ways of governing corporations, 
Gouldson and Bebbington (2007), for example, use the UN Global Compact to 
frame the debate (Gouldson and Bebbington, 2007, p.4).  They identify a 
number of issues which make the assessment of new ways of governing 
difficult; corporations operate in ‘complex networks’ which are not governable 
within national boundaries and yet there are no statutory, international 
institutions to govern corporations’ behaviours, furthermore the ‘regulatory 
space’ (Hancher and Moran, 2000) national government is reduced via the 
process of liberalisation (ibid, p.6). Gouldson and Bebbington’s findings 
support the suggestion here that governance is complex:  
‘...new forms of governance are based on new forms of engagement 
between state, market and civic actors… the associated governance 
processes tend to be complex and fragmented, with power being 
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diffused amongst a wide range of actors operating at different scales in 
different contexts’  
(Gouldson and Bebbington, 2007, p.17).   
Governance arrangements are intended to create change and steer toward 
sustainability in the varied institutions, processes, actors, treaties, policies, 
legislative processes active at global, national and local levels (Campos and 
Nugent, 1999; Rosenau, 2003).   
2.3.2 Governance and sustainability 
In the preface to Adger and Jordan’s reader, the authors suggest that 
sustainability (or rather unsustainability) is ‘first and foremost’ about (a crisis 
of) governance (Adger and Jordan 2009, xvii).  Petschow et al., (2005) also 
set out a sound rational for the linkage of these two concepts for analytical 
purposes.  This research adopts this primary understanding of the organising 
principles under scrutiny here i.e. that governance and sustainability are 
interconnected processes with interconnected outcomes.  It does not adopt 
the assumption of causality or suggest the relationship is unidirectional, 
instead it critically examines the quality of the relationship between 
governance and sustainability - the extent to which these two organising 
principles affect the multiple, iterative processes and outcomes inherent within 
them then becomes more interesting. 
A central and pressing theme is whether institutional and governance 
arrangements help society move toward sustainability (Glasbergen, 2007, 
p.1).  Referring once more to Stoker, he suggests that within governance 
processes, governments are able to ‘…use new tools and techniques to steer 
and guide’ outcomes (Stoker, 1998, p.17), but the underpinning epistemology 
here suggests that within the complexities of governance and sustainability 
establishing the sustainability outcomes of a specific tool or techniques would 
not be possible.  Core to the research aims here, is the view that whilst 
governance arrangements and sustainability outcomes are interrelated, the 
wicked context means such assertions are meaningless. 
Whilst new governance arrangements are proposed by some as a means of 
mitigating against the negative impacts of the resource depletion (i.e. 
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aggregate human and natural capital, weak sustainability), the impact of new 
governance arrangements are not fully understood in wicked or complex 
contexts.  Whilst this research supports the view that there are connections 
between sustainability and governance, this does not imply a linear 
relationship.  Within the complexities of governance and sustainability of new 
coal, what becomes relevant are the multiple relationships that are context and 
place specific.  Governance is complex (Rosenau, 2003) and new 
mechanisms, including polycentric approaches or stakeholder engagement, 
are not universally seen to be effective for environmental management or 
emphatically lead to sustainability.  The remainder of this review moves on 
from definitions and normative constructions of governance to consider the 
multi-level, multi-actor nature of governance in relation to coal use.  
2.3.2.1 Multi-level, multi-actor governance arrangements; opportunities 
and constraints 
This section considers ML/MA governance arrangements for coal use in the 
UK to give an underpinning for the analysis in chapters four to six and to frame 
the discussion in chapter seven.   
Core to definitions of both sustainability (Kates et al, 2005, Kasemir 2003, 
WCED, 1987) and governance (Stoker 1998; Kooiman, 2003) is the tenet that 
actors beyond state governments, should participate in decision making in 
meaningful ways. This includes community and other social actors (Cotton, 
2014; Seyfang et al, 2014; Middlemiss, 2013), at multiple levels (Paavola, 
2016), as well as business and corporate actors (Gouldson and Sullivan 2007; 
Van Alstine and Barkemeyer 2014; Fairbrass and Zueva-Owens, 2012; 
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011; Blowfield, 2005).  Beyond multiple actors’ 
involvement, for governance for sustainability, a core feature as discussed 
above is the level at which meaningful governance activity occurs (Paavola et 
al., 2012).      
Governance in this sense is considered as: 
‘…arrangements in which public as well as private actors aim at solving 
societal problems or create societal opportunities’  
(Pierre, 2000, p.138). 
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Similarly, Kooiman (2003) sees governance as:  
‘…a process of interaction between different societal and political actors 
and the growing interdependencies between the two as modern 
societies become ever more complex, dynamic and diverse’  
(Kooiman, 2003, p.12) 
Especially relevant to the case of coal use in the UK, is the ‘rolling back of the 
state’ (Scott, 2013, p.65) of 1980s and 1990s. In particular for a sector once 
governed and managed by state actors, the privatisation of UK coal mining 
operations14 and the electricity generators15 had a significant impact on the 
governance arrangements associated with coal use.  These statutory changes 
to governance arrangements introduced new roles for private sector firms in 
governance. Two features of the debate are relevant for the case of coal use.  
Firstly, the shift in priorities of private sector firms from public service provision 
of employment and electricity, to profit generation and shareholder return.  
Secondly the new relationships that emerged between corporate, government 
and civic actors in response to international concerns on the roles of firms in 
delivering sustainability (Blowfield and Murray 2008; Fairbrass and Zueva-
Owens, 2012; Warhurst, 2005). 
Calder and Culverwell (2004) suggest that there is significant pressure from 
the international community (for example the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development) on firms to operate responsibly and adopt sustainable practices.  
However, whilst the pressure to act exists, there is little material support for 
them to contribute to sustainable development and a deficit of guidance on the 
types of governance or CSR strategies which might benefit sustainable 
development means performance in this regard is not as positive as hoped 
(Calder & Culverwell, 2004, p.3).   More recent research corroborates these 
findings:  Whilst voluntary guidance and a multitude of sets of codes of practice 
are available to firms (ISO 14001, Equator Principles (Amalric, 2005) and IFC 
industry specific guidelines, ICMM standards and ISO 26000 for example), the 
                                            
14 The National Coal Board was renamed the British Coal Corporation (BCC) in 1987.  The 
BCC’s role was to oversee the privatisation of British coal mines 
15 The Electricity Act 1989 provides for the privatisation of electricity operations in the UK.  
The Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) assets were broken to become three new 
companies; Powergen, National Power and the National Grid. 
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adoption of standards and sustainability reporting is voluntary, and success is 
varied (Barkemeyer et al., 2015; Comyns et al., 2013), furthermore evidence 
on the impact on sustainable development not conclusive.   
Chapters one and two identified that coal use, both in terms of new coal and 
its future use, and old coal and its legacy, has social implications.  Civil society 
participation and consent is discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3 as an integral 
component of both governance and sustainability debates.  This feature of the 
discourse may be especially relevant for coal use in the UK, where 
communities located close to existing coal fired power stations, formed in large 
part because of connections to coal, will host new coal developments.   
Public engagement is widely attested to as a key feature of good governance 
including corporate governance (Seyfang et al, 2014).  For new coal projects, 
where targets for development have not been met (Haszeldine, 2014; GCCSI, 
2015), Markusson, (2012) it has been suggested that project success will be 
improved where public acceptance of developments is better incorporated in 
to developments (Markusson, 2012; Ashworth et al, 2011; Brunstig and 
Upham, 2011).  In addition, for larger scale new coal projects and the 
development of nationally significant infrastructure projects (NSIPS) such as 
power stations, engagement with stakeholders effected by the projects is a 
requirement under planning legislation (Cotton, 2014).  
The discourse on public engagement in decision making; participatory 
approaches, community engagement, democratic processes and sustainable 
development, is becoming rich, particularly where it relates to governance and 
policy makers.  Yet processes and outcomes of engagement are not fully 
understood or applied, this is especially the case in contested space and 
wicked contexts.  Questions remain over the mechanisms employed to ‘do’ 
public engagement which are typically instrumental at best (Cotton and 
Devine-Wright, 2012; Doering 2014) i.e. where ‘the public’ is imagined, and by 
and large treated in practice, as essentially homogenous and external to 
decision making.  An example of this in the context of coal is the Coal 
Consultation in the UK (BEIS, 2016, 2017a).  The consultation was launched 
with the stated intention of reaching a wide range of stakeholders (BEIS, 2016, 
p.2).  However, as will be discussed in chapter eight, little attempt was made 
to engage beyond a single questionnaire available through the BEIS website.  
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Consequently, a total of 94 unique respondents16, largely from industry and 
academia responded with little evidence of civic engagement.  Returning to 
Pierre (2000), thoughts on interdependency between government, corporate 
and social actors are especially interesting and relevant to the case of coal use 
for two reasons.  Firstly, in chapter one, the problem of continued coal use was 
characterised as being wicked with temporal complexities and changing 
agency and power dynamics over time.  Chapter seven expands on this feature 
of the analysis to produce a timeline of governance.   
Secondly, in keeping with Kooiman (2003) the governance arrangements for 
coal have become more complex and dynamic over time.  However, a core 
finding of this research is that whilst more complex, it is not more diverse.  As 
explored more fully in chapters five to eight, this research shows that whilst 
interdependencies exist, diffuse (i.e. rather than diverse) relationships are 
evident within organisational fields, with low levels of participation of non-
governmental actors.  As discussed here, business and civic engagement 
activities exist, however in the context of coal use, core questions on efficacy 
of the engagement and the extent to which wider actors than government have 
meaningful roles in governance and sustainability exist.  For private firms, 
behaviours and decisions are governed by the market and regulatory 
framework, and for civic or community actors, mechanisms for engagement 
are tokenistic.   Indeed, as chapter seven will go on to show, because of the 
dominance and power of government actors, the processes of change have 
created diffuse but not ‘diverse’ organisational fields.  The effect of this is to 
reduce rather than increase chances for actors and groups beyond the state 
to engage with ‘solving societal problems or create societal opportunities’ 
(Pierre, 2000, p.138).  Whilst governments require societal consent to rule 
(Lukes, 1973), the interdependencies and power dynamics in this wicked 
context, mean that civic and public participation in decision making can 
legitimately be described as ‘tokenistic’ (Arnstein, 1969, p.216; Cornwall, 
2008). 
Intrinsically, sustainability requires that governance arrangements not only 
engage with actors from different spheres; public, civic, private, but also from 
                                            
16 Including a campaign lead by an ENGO with 5845 signatories. 
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different levels; international, national, sub-national and local. Returning to 
Kooiman, change occurs at multiple levels (2000), similarly for Van Alstine 
change can be ‘constructed from the bottom up’ (Van Alstine, 2009, p.108).   
Others (for example Wessilink and Gouldson 2014; Gouldson, 2006, p.402) 
have questioned whether (and with what outcomes) the governance processes 
adopted at national level ‘filter through’ to processes and outcomes at local 
level. Building on wider discourse this research considers whether 
characteristics of governance are evidently different at difference levels, this 
includes roles of non-government, civic and corporate actors.  
A feature of this wider debate on multi-level governance relevant for the wicked 
problem of continued coal use, is that the level at which governance activity 
occurs has implications for sustainable development outcomes.  Drake (2009) 
for example finds that fluctuations between national, international and sub-
national governance arrangements in terms of institutions of government, 
effect prospects for the coal industry (Drake, 2009).  Muinzer and Ellis (2017), 
extend the debate with their useful discussion on the complexity in legal 
framework which has been created by the devolution of energy governance in 
the UK.  Interestingly, they find that devolution of responsibility for moving to 
low carbon energy systems, has created a ‘territoritorialised’ system (ibid., 
p.1187) which is arguably less capable of meeting national targets. 
A connected feature of this debate is the spatial dimension of social justice 
(Roberts, 2003).  For Roberts, the absence of awareness of socio-spatial 
features of development and planning (e.g. spatial justice) can and does lead 
to and ‘spatial exclusion’ (ibid, 228). This ties with research that questions the 
effectiveness of governance arrangements that only nominally encourage 
public engagement with decisions at different socio-spatial scales (Keiron and 
Grossardt 2010, p.59).  Again, referring to Beatty et al (2007), social and 
economic outcomes for former coalfield regions are typically below UK national 
averages despite more than two decades of regeneration projects in these 
regions.  These issues are explored in the data. 
Finally, an interesting feature of the recent debates relating to polycentric, 
ML/MA governance approaches to climate change governance which is 
relevant here, is the finding that the discursive norms and context are influential 
in determining policy outcomes (Gillard, 2016; Lorenzoni and Benson, 2014).  
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In the UK, a distinction has been drawn between the period 2005 and 2008 
and the period between 2010 and 2015 (Gillard, 2016, p. 26).  In the former, a 
degree of cross party consensus and purposeful intention to engage with 
actors beyond the state led to the development of ‘innovative legislation’ (ibid.) 
designed to steer climate policy.  Whereas the latter is characterised by the 
economics of austerity, notions of government responsibility and restraint and 
a watering down of climate policy.   
This has significant implications for this debate on the future of coal.  As Gillard 
puts it:     
‘…despite innovative legislation, institution building and strategic 
coordination of different types of governance actors the ideational 
foundations of ambitious climate change politics in the UK have been 
undermined’ 
(Gillard, 2016, p.26) 
This chimes with the core findings of this research to show that rather than 
desirable polycentric, ML/MA approaches to governance, the unilateral 
decision making power of government actors determines policy and action in 
the UK, and links with discussions on power and agency in decision making. 
2.3.2.2 Agency and theories of power 
Considerations of agency and power are central to this thesis however, it is 
beyond the scope of this review to treat either concept in full.  Instead, for 
brevity, agency and power are discussed in terms of their relevance in 
developing an understanding of dynamics and drivers for change discussed 
throughout.  Lukes (1973, 2005) has usefully presented power debates in 
terms of three dimensions of power, this review briefly considers each in turn. 
The one dimensional view of power, popularised by pluralists such as Dahl 
(1957, 2007) takes an operational and applied stance to power.  For Dahl and 
others, power is demonstrated where a conflict exists between two parties 
such that A has power of B, where B succumbs to A’s will.  Whilst simply 
formed and much critiqued (Clegg, 1989), this view of power, i.e. that power is 
about cause and effect, has simple utility in explaining behaviour. 
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Bachrach and Baratz (1970) in contrast, present a two dimensional view of 
power (Lukes, 1974).   In this view, individuals with power are able to shape 
society through processes of ‘non-decision making’.  Non-decision making 
power is exerted when: 
‘…a decision which results in the suppression or thwarting of a latent or 
manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision maker’  
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p.44) 
Clegg, similarly discusses power and agency in terms of non-decision making 
(Clegg, 1989, p.11).  In this view of power, not only can A exert power over B, 
they are able to agenda set.  For the wicked problem under discussion here, 
this conceptualisation seems instinctively relevant.  However, it lacks an 
explanation of why and how power dynamics emerge or change.  Lukes’ 
(1974) third dimension is useful here.  Two core features of Lukes’ third 
dimension are, prima facie, significant for this review.  Firstly, Lukes argued 
that power is not only witnessed in the explicit coercion of B by A, instead 
‘latent conflict’ can and does exist where power may be exercised even where 
those affected by power are not aware of the existence of power (Lukes, 2005).  
Again, there is an intuitive appeal to this third dimensional view in a context 
where power dynamics are normatively plural, but not evidently so.  These 
concepts of power will be discussed throughout to explore likely influences on 
the shaping of governance arrangements and outcomes. 
2.4 Summary  
To summarise this chapter on governance and sustainability of coal, it is useful 
to return to Our Common Future (WCED, 1987).  In Our Common Future, 
(WCED, 1987, p.43) Brundtland proposed that in addition to limits to 
resources, issues of equity and justice in distribution of resources are key to 
sustainability, but not solely as a moral or ethical obligation, rather as a 
necessary requirement for effective policy implementation.  Technical 
solutions to environmental and societal problems (for example suggested new 
coal) may be the most efficient in terms of sustainable use of physical 
resources, but may not necessarily be the most sustainable per se.  Bruntland 
states:   
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‘A development path that is sustainable in a physical sense could 
theoretically be pursued even in a rigid social and political setting.  But 
physical sustainability cannot be secured unless development policies 
pay attention to such considerations as changes in access to resources 
and in the distribution of costs and benefits.’ 
(WCED, 1987, p.43) 
[Emphasis added] 
Operating efficiently and within limits in this sense may protect environmental 
resources in the immediate term, but it is not sufficient for sustainable 
development.  Rather, processes which include due consideration for 
equitable inter- and intra-generational distribution of costs and benefits 
associated with human development should be considered integral to 
governance of sustainability.  Adger and Jordan (2009) add to this debate by 
suggesting that:    
‘…the processes of decision making directly affect the sustainability of 
their outcomes’  
(ibid, p.6) 
[Emphasis added]  
This useful observation of the interwoven nature of processes and outcomes 
of governance is adopted here.  For the case of coal use, the arrangements of 
rule and government have changed over time, and these process changes 
have outcome changes that also change over time with implications for 
sustainability of new coal.  However, in wicked contexts such as unabated coal 
use in electricity generation, the outcome changes are currently unknown, 
complex and non-linear.   
This research uses the well understood organising principle of governance to 
gain a greater understanding of how and why changes occur.  Furthermore, it 
adopts the view that for sustainable solutions to environmental and social 
problems, processes of governance must have consideration for equity, power 
and justice as outcomes may not be as expected.  The wicked problem under 
consideration requires a richer understanding of the related conceptual terms 
governance and sustainability.  This chapter critically reflects on governance 
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and the roles of multiple actors at different levels to consider the relevance of 
these concepts for coal use in the UK.  In doing so it promotes an 
understanding of which actors have power, what their relationships and 
influences are and what the implications of these are for sustainability.  Tying 
governance and sustainability literatures in this way adds analytical strength 
which both underpins analytical chapters four to six and lays a foundation for 
the discussions in chapters seven and eight. 
This chapter has brought together literatures on governance and sustainability 
and explored the relevance for the case of coal use in the UK.  Chapter three 
moves the thesis forward by demonstrating how these organising principles 
have been brought together to develop an epistemological approach and 
analytical framework that allows for depth and detail of understanding of a 
wicked problem.  In doing so a ‘thicker’ (Adger and Jordan, 2009 from Geertz, 
1973, p.14), more complete, interdisciplinary view is achieved.   
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Chapter 3 - Research design and methodology 
The wide reaching nature of the key themes of governance and sustainability 
poses a challenge for those seeking knowledge on, and a better understanding 
of, the relationships between and within these two phenomena.  Added to this 
challenge is the complexity of the topic i.e. the wicked problem and case of 
coal use in the UK.  These challenges are welcomed, as they present a timely 
opportunity to explore multiple social, economic, environmental phenomena, 
and to discover relationships which are of relevance to many wider social and 
environmental challenges.   
This chapter describes the choice and suitability of the research design and 
methods adopted in order to deal with the environmental social science 
challenge being addressed.  It falls in to three main sections:  section 3.1 
describes the ontological and epistemological underpinning for this research.  
Section 3.2 presents the research design; methodological tools and sampling 
techniques, ethical considerations, data generated and research phases. 
Section 3.3 then describes the design and development of a novel analytical 
approach employed here.  In particular for this study, the social dimension of 
both governance and sustainability, arguably more difficult to grapple with than 
other dimensions, is given equal attention in the analytical approach.  Finally, 
the chapter summary includes a brief discussion on the strengths and 
limitations of the research design adopted, before reiterating the original 
contribution in terms of methodology and analytical approach this study 
makes. 
3.1 Research philosophy 
3.1.1 Ontology and epistemology 
The ontological tradition in social science research is well rehearsed in the 
literature, but for Blaikie (2010), from a methodological perspective, too often, 
the design of the research question is underestimated in this tradition (Blaikie, 
2010, p. 57).  The process of design, in particular of second order research 
questions, is key to the approach adopted throughout this research. As a 
result, the research aims and objectives (see section 1.3) introduce interesting 
temporal, structure and agency questions relating to the evolution of 
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governance, without making ‘…die hard ontological and epistemological 
commitments’ which may ‘…blind us to alternatives because they mean that 
we view the world in a particular way’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p.24).  In 
social science research, researchers are delving into an identified problem by 
exploring what is known, establishing what remains unknown or unanswered, 
and generating knowledge through research.  However, ‘knowledge is laced 
with personal bias and values’ (Creswell, 1998, p.19) hence it is important to 
start with suitably broad research questions, discussed in section 1.3 above.   
This approach puts the research question at the heart of the ontology and 
epistemology (Creswell, 2007; Audi, 2007; Blaikie, 2010).  It allows for greater 
ontological and epistemological freedom and some flexibility, but without 
resulting in ‘meta-theorizing’, which, for this complex case, may result in overly 
diffuse conclusions; a kind of ‘anti-Gestalt’ whereby the whole is less than the 
total of its parts. The need for structured questions which delve into the social-
environmental problem, but in such a way that the research can be structured 
and managed to adequately tackle the research aim, through using questions 
which continually, reflexively explore the case as a deeper understanding of 
the research problem emerges (Creswell, 1998).  Continual reinterpretation of 
the research question from different but related perspectives - firstly to look at 
whether organisational fields of governance exist, then whether they differ over 
time and levels, and then to gain an understanding of structure and agency 
within fields - builds a rich picture. In addition, the iterative generation of data 
using multiple methods appropriate to this inductive and abductive analysis, 
builds on constructivist approach whilst integrating thought and analytical 
processes associated with critical realist epistemology. 
Considerable attention therefore has been paid to the iterative development of 
the research questions for both practical and epistemological reasons over the 
course of the research.  As an environmental social science problem has been 
posed, the issue is complex and could be divided up in many legitimate ways.  
From a practical, applied perspective (Hoffman, 2001), the aim of this research 
is to reveal meaning from the data, to describe and understand the formerly 
only conceptual.  It is essential given the breadth of purpose here, and 
complexity of the wicked phenomenon under study, that the ontology reflects 
these layered purposes.   
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The nature of social reality, ontology, is concerned with what things exist, the, 
the conditions and circumstances of their existence and the relationships 
between things (Blaikie, 2010).  Ontologies typically fall in to one of two 
categories, relativist and realist, that traditionally ‘lock horns’ (Burr, 2003, p.6) 
or are seen as two ends of an ontological scale.  The following paragraphs 
discuss the relative merits and limitations of the ontological and 
epistemological approaches adopted here, within a wider discussion on 
philosophy of ‘how we make knowledge’ (Dillon and Wals, 2006, p.550).  
Fleetwood (2005) is useful as a starting point: 
‘The way we think the world is (ontology) influences: what we think can 
be known about it (epistemology); how we think it can be investigated 
(methodology and research techniques); the kinds of theories we think 
can be constructed about it; and the political and policy stances we are 
prepared to take.’ 
(ibid, p.197) 
For this research, it is important that the epistemology approach adopted is 
suited to both inductive and abductive techniques because of the layers of 
‘what’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions (Blaikie, 2010) and corresponding 
description, understanding and change research outcomes.   
The complexity of multi-level, multi-actor governance context means it is 
crucial that this study be bounded by ontological constraints.  These 
constraints create a sense of safety within which to explore these complex and 
contested phenomena.  Whilst, as noted there is a need to avoid ‘…die hard 
ontological and epistemological commitments…’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 
24), it is more important to avoid creating a kind of sociological trifle; the 
purpose here is to develop rich qualitative data and a deep understanding, but 
within limits of time and resource.  Denzin and Lincoln (2013) are interesting 
on this point.  Their discussion on traditions and complexity allows room for 
exploration so that the data should be allowed to direct understanding but, 
importantly, within epistemological limits (Denzin and Lincoln, 2013). 
For this research, an interpretive, moderate constructionist approach, where 
both culture and society are relevant, provides such limits.  However, for this 
research, elements of constructivism were also adopted in the interpretation 
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as findings suggest that the individual matters; participants were encouraged 
to expand their answers with personal experience during interview.  This 
created challenges in interpretation of the data but gave unexpected richness 
and depth to the analysis.  However, as discussed in section 3.2 the data are 
analysed with the understanding that individual voices are influenced by 
structure and agency within wider, socially constructed, organisational fields; 
history, place, relationships, over time and at different levels shape discourse.  
Alternative approaches, for example extreme positivist approaches, would risk 
being overtly reductive or even conflating structure with social processes and 
relationships in real domains.  Extreme realist approaches would risk missing 
socially constructed relationships and motivations or fields themselves. 
Whilst the dominant epistemology here is moderate social constructionist, 
elements of critical realism have been embedded in the research design, the 
interpretation of data and, ultimately, in drawing conclusions.  This is 
appropriate for three main reasons:  Firstly, it allowed for a close view of the 
data from all sides, so that unknowns (for example relationships) in a wicked 
context could be considered in depth.  Secondly, to avoid conflation in 
interpretations of the data; for this case, considering governance 
arrangements for coal use over time, both structure and agency effect 
dynamics and changes in the dynamics (Archer, 1995), there is potential to 
conflate and fuse the effects.  Thirdly, importantly, employing elements of both 
epistemologies increases the analytical strength of each approach.  Here, the 
insights of Fairclough (2005) are useful as they provide recommendations on 
the use of critical realist ontology in organisational studies (Fairclough, 2005).  
Fairclough suggests that the use of discourse analysis as an analytical tool in 
organisational studies has, up to that point in its development, been limited 
given the dominance of postmodernism and extreme constructivist stances.  
What Fairclough presents as an alternative, a moderate constructivist 
approach appropriate to developing understanding through the adoption of 
critical realist ontology.  He argues for: 
‘…a critical realist position which is moderately socially constructivist 
but rejects the tendency for the study of organization to be reduced to 
the study of discourse, locating the analysis of discourse instead within 
an analytically dualist epistemology which gives primacy to researching 
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relations between agency… and structure on the basis of a realist social 
ontology.’ 
(Fairclough, 2005, p.916) 
Whilst primacy is given here to the constructionist approach, given the wicked 
phenomenon under study, it is appropriate to adopt this less ontologically rigid, 
moderate critical approach; as issues of agency, relationships, power 
dynamics and structure are not known or well understood.   
From an epistemological perspective, it is important to state that the complexity 
and richness of the research aims means a positivist approach would be 
unsuitable (Yin 2014; Blaikie 2010).  Due to the wicked nature of the 
conceptual problem identified, there would be a risk of reductionism (Neuman, 
2003) where ‘…empirical observations are at too low a level for the causal 
relationship that is stated.’ Instead there is no attempt here to identify causality 
or test an hypothesis, but rather the intention is to develop a rich understanding 
and illuminate relationships through novel use of solid, well understood 
methodological and analytical processes.  This approach is at least in keeping 
with, if not essential for, contemporary interdisciplinary attempts to better 
understand and progress complex environmental social science phenomena.  
Gillard et al. (2016), for example, suggest an interdisciplinary approach to 
develop analytical frameworks is desirable in order to ‘… become more 
theoretically robust and capable of informing effective, let alone 
transformational, climate change governance…’ (Gillard et al., 2016, 251).  In 
this sense, challenges with multiple and complex dimensions benefit from 
approaches that reflect this complexity. 
Blaikie (2010) suggests that for some social scientists, the only thing that 
research can do is descriptive and that this is useful in its own right.  What this 
research tries to do is both develop a thoroughly grounded and theoretically 
underpinned description of the current situation and its evolution, as well as 
take some abductive steps which start to attend to the interesting ‘why’ and 
‘how’ questions. 
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3.1.2 Developing organisational fields of governance as the unit of 
analysis 
To gain a sufficiently rich understanding of the governance and sustainability 
of the continued use of unabated coal in electricity generation in the UK, it is 
necessary to look beyond individual organisations, policies or networks.  
Methodologies adopted by institutional and organisational theorists are 
particularly instructive here, as they consider the multiple dynamic processes 
that lead to change over time.  At its most elemental level, the research looks 
at changes in organising structures (institutions) and actors of governance and 
sustainability over time.  Hoffman (2001), DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and 
Scott (2008) provide useful insights into the use and success of institutional 
theory in explaining organisational change.  In particular, Hoffman’s structure 
and analytical framework employed in his landmark study of corporate 
environmentalism within and around chemical, oil & gas industries in 1960s-
90s USA (Hoffman, 2001) has been instructive in the development of the 
analytical framework used here.  In ‘From Heresy to Dogma’, Hoffman (2001) 
draws together data from different sources, scales, levels of governance and 
temporal junctures and teases the data apart to show how institutions evolve 
within multiple organisational fields.  Furthermore, he illustrates that within 
these organisational fields, pressures and dynamics create change over time 
over time (Hoffman, 2001).   
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have described the isomorphic pressures that 
create change within organisational fields as being mimetic, coercive or 
normative.  Mimetic isomorphism refers to the tendency for organisations to 
mimic one another.  Coercive isomorphism, in contrast to mimetic, occurs 
when organisations are induced to change because of external pressures from 
other organisations, for example in the form of mandates or legislative 
requirements.   Normative isomorphism occurs when organisational change 
results from the influence of societal norms and values, for example through 
professional codes of conduct or standards (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
For this research, following Milstein et al (2002), consideration of these 
processes is used beyond a single organisation or sector to consider the 
processes within organisational fields.  There are two principal reasons for 
doing so.  Firstly, prima facie, the governance arrangements associated with 
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continued coal use are not leading to intended outcomes for new coal (GCCSI, 
2016); considering the effects of isomorphic pressures within fields and over 
time helps to illuminate otherwise unknown structures and outcomes.  
Historical institutionalism suggests that the evolution of change is an on-going 
and iterative process.  Change in the structure of institutions is affected by the 
agency and motivations of actors: institutions evolve in sometimes unknown 
(and possibly unknowable) ways.  In this sense, ‘…structure and outcomes are 
not those planned or intended, but the consequence of unanticipated effects 
and constrained choice.’  (March and Olsen, 1984, p. 737).    
Secondly, the organisational field, as an abstracted concept, is central to 
organisation theory (Furnari, 2015, p. ii).  As such, it has been used to suit 
multiple theoretical and applied contexts.  Scott usefully conceptualises 
organisational fields as:  
‘…a community of organizations that partakes of a common meaning 
system and whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully 
with one another than with actors outside of the field’  
(Scott, 1994, pp. 207-208)  
The organisational field is not simply a grouping of organisations with similar 
interests or purposes (typically producing similar products or services – 
chemical industry, health service, education providers or in this case electricity 
generators), but also those multiple organisations that influence their 
behaviours, actions and performance.  In this sense, a field describes a broad 
set of organisations beyond, for example traditional classifications of networks, 
sectors or industries.  In aggregate, these additional organisations 
(categorised here as actors and entities), such as regulators, funding sources, 
advocates or opposition groups, thereby forming, ‘a recognized area of 
institutional life’ (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983, p. 148).’  Fields therefore 
illuminate more than simply institutional change.   
As detailed in chapter one, a core objective of this research is to establish the 
key characteristics of organisational fields relevant to coal use in electricity 
generation.  This thesis employs the use of organisational fields to do this in 
two ways; as the unit of analysis and as a lens through which to examine the 
wicked problem under scrutiny.  The remainder of this section explores the 
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relevance and efficacy of organisational field analysis in this context and 
signposts the conceptual contribution this thesis makes by bringing the use of 
organisational fields to conceptualisations of governance and sustainability. 
Section 2.2 and 2.3 above outlines that both sustainability and governance are 
contested terms, but that these terms can usefully be used as organising 
principles.  What is clear from the discourse is that within these organising 
principles, multiple actors operating at different levels and spatial scales have 
nominal roles in processes and outcomes of both sustainability and 
governance.  However, for the wicked problem under study, organisations 
across many institutions have roles in outputs.  This complexity dictates the 
need to use a field approach rather than examine any single individual 
institution or organisation.  In addition, in the wicked context being examined 
here, new coal and new governance arrangements designed to develop 
sustainable development options, have been conceptualised here as being 
inextricably linked with old coal and old governance.  The emergence of the 
current shape of governance arrangements is not, therefore, seen in isolation; 
the organisational fields approach allows for consideration of the dynamics and 
isomorphic processes that effect these governance arrangements. 
3.1.2.1 Development of analytical framework 
A novel analytical framework appropriate to the study of organisational field 
change at multiple levels and over time has been developed.  For Hoffman 
(2001), many, sometimes unconnected, competing or dissonant fields can 
exist and influence, or be influenced by different institutions and therefore 
organisational behaviour can and is affected by multiple fields (see figure 3.1).  
This research adapts Hoffman’s approach to consider not a single organisation 
that exists within multiple fields, but the many actors, entities, and relationships 
that exist within an organisational field of governance. 
The dominant approach in organisational sciences and institutional theory 
traditionally, has however been to understate the importance of agency over 
structure in determining action (Leca and Naccache, 2006, p. 627).  However, 
over recent decades, leading institutional theorists have sought to better 
understand the relationships, power mechanisms and agency of actors, in 
terms of their capacity to develop strategies and shape institutional 
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reproduction and change (ibid, p. 628).  One approach to doing this has been 
to adopt a critical realist approach in the study of institutions and change (for 
examples see Friedland and Alford, 1996; Milstein et al, 2002; Leca and 
Naccache, 2006).  Whilst its utility in this context is still being explored 
(Delbridge and Edwards, 2013), certainly for this research, as discussed 
above, the appeal of adopting elements of critical realism (CR) within a broadly 
constructionist approach is strong.  CR allows for a thorough and in depth 
understanding – one which because of the layered assumptions of reality can 
explore relationships beyond the empirical (Leca and Naccache, 2006, p. 630).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Adapted from Hoffman, 2001, p.35) 
Figure 1 Entities, actors and relationships exist within multiple fields 
For the wicked problem of continued coal use, this view of the social world as 
being an open system in which multiple causal powers and influences may 
coexist (Archer, 1998) is appealing.  However, as stated above, identifying 
specific causality is not an aim of this research, rather the critical realist 
approach will be used within a broadly constructionist grounding so as to 
Field 1 
 
Actors 
Entities 
Relationship within field(s) 
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consider the real without conflating agency and structure.  In Meyer et al’s 
terms (2005): 
‘We argue that ingrained assumptions and habituated methodologies 
dissuade organizational scientists from grappling with problems to which 
these ideas and tools do not apply…  We urge our colleagues to 
transcend the general linear model...’ 
(Meyer et al, 2005, p. 457) 
Advancing here on organisational and institutional literatures, the intention is 
to avoid what has been characterised as an ‘over deterministic view’ (Leca & 
Naccache, 2006, p.627) presented by traditional institutional theorists, which 
can lack deeper understanding of the ways in which reproduction and change 
occur in institutions.  The analytical power of critical realism when combined 
with moderate constructivist approach rests in its ability to show, for example, 
how institutional change is a result of the actions of actors.  They also consider 
the ‘paradox of institutionally embedded agency’ (Leca and Naccache 2006, 
p. 628) i.e. question how change is possible where actors’ intentions, 
behaviours, actions, rationality are conditioned and determined by the 
institutions they wish to change.  Delbridge and Edwards’ (2013) insights also 
suggest that the integration of critical realist ontology to new institutionalism is 
beneficial (Delbridge and Edwards, 2013).  In providing empirical grounding 
for the advancement of theoretical work of Margaret Archer (1995, 2003), the 
authors illustrate the utility of critical realist ontology in new institutionalism.  
They do this by positioning agency and structure as distinct but as having 
historical associations which effect field dynamics within the organisational 
field (Delbridge and Edwards, 2013).   
For the case of coal use in the UK, many organisations are involved (firms, 
networks, government bodies), whilst these are interesting, in order to reveal 
unknown relationships it is not possible (or sufficient) here to do a comparative 
analysis of how these have emerged in time at a specific organisational level. 
Hence, this research is concerned with (i) firms and (ii) communities and (iii) 
government actors in terms of their role in influencing organisational field level 
change in institutional and organisational field arrangements.   
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For this research then, using elements of critical realism within the boundaries 
of new institutionalism, makes it possible to not only identify and describe 
organisational fields of governance, but also to investigate the dynamics of 
change within and between fields.   
3.2 Research design and strategy 
There are a number of significant epistemological and interpretive challenges 
in the production of, methods used and analysis of data for research of this 
nature.  Namely, core challenges in research design include: 
• The historical social science context; equivalent (i.e. for comparison) 
longitudinal data are not available for the whole period of study 
• Applying the organisational fields approach across levels and over time 
for governance and sustainability both of which are contested terms is 
novel 
• Generalisability of conclusions from the analysis of a case study may 
be critiqued as limited  
 
Options for research design are clearly extensive; the tools employed here 
were chosen based on their efficiency in addressing the research challenges 
identified.  This results in a multi-methods approach.  Using multiple data 
sources in this way both discourages research bias and increases 
generalisability of the research findings.  By triangulating the data from 
naturally occurring events, historical data, bureaucratic and official records and 
personal accounts, potential biases with any single method are reduced (Yin, 
2014) and data are cross verified to strengthen arguments.  This section details 
and justifies this research design.  
3.2.1 Case studies  
Eisenhardt (1989), Blaikie (2010), Yin (2014) and others, have suggested that 
case studies are useful for dealing with ‘what’ and descriptive questions, as 
well as for gaining understanding and theory building.  Whilst is it recognised 
that knowledge generated here – norms, values, institutions, structures – is 
case and context specific, it is not ethnographically so.  Taking a case at 
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multiple levels and over time, increases the validity of generalisations made 
(Yin, 2014; Flick, 2015).  The case study approach also encourages: 
‘… frame breaking insights, the tests of good theory (e.g., parsimony, 
logical coherence), and convincing grounding in the evidence are the 
key criteria for evaluating this type of research’  
(Jarvensivu, 2010, p. 100) 
Given this potential for developing a solid understanding, the case of UK coal 
use at two levels was adopted in line with these principles. 
3.2.2 Data generation 
This section provides detail on the choices made regarding data collection and 
generation17, including case selection together with an outline of how the 
chosen methods were employed.  Table 2 below provides a summary of how 
the data are used within each chapter.  
 
Research method Chapter 
P
rim
a
ry 
Scoping visits and informal meetings with expert witnesses 1, 2, 3, 6 
Semi-structured interviews 4, 5, 6 
Non-participant observation of naturally occurring events 5, 6 
Seco
n
d
a
ry 
Desk top study 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 
CCS project data 6, 8 
Bureaucratic and grey literature 4, 5, 6, 8 
Demographic data 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 
Media accounts 5, 6, 8 
Archival data  4, 8 
Company reports 5, 6, 8 
Table 2 Sources of data and associated chapters 
 
                                            
17 A full list of data sources is held in appendix D. 
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Scoping/site visits:  
Scoping visits have been identified as a parsimonious way of identifying 
research priorities (Levac et al, 2010).  This worked well to:  
(i) Further streamline research priorities and questions 
(ii) Identify potential organisations and individuals as participants 
(iii) Gain an initial picture of context and case study locations. 
A total of six visits to coal fired power stations and potential sites for new coal 
fired power stations were undertaken. 
Document review:   
Appropriate documents were identified using: 
• Iterative topic based web searches (using google, google scholar, web 
of science, University of Leeds and public library search facilities)  
• Initial exploratory and scoping/site visits 
• Discussions and personal correspondence with supervisors and expert 
colleagues 
• Snowballing – one document (text, discourse) leading to another 
• Recommendations from (but not typically authored by) participants 
Due to the broad, wide ranging nature of the subject matter, the relative paucity 
of social science literature in this field and the novelty of the research design, 
the initial desk top study and document review was necessarily far reaching 
(Gomm, 2004, p. 245) but bounded by both relevance to the question and time 
limitations.   
These limitations made a strategic approach to sampling and document 
analysis essential18 and many documents were deemed inappropriate.  
Selection/exclusion criteria included: 
• Evident bias where this was not either of specific interest or supported 
within multiple texts 
• Availability in the public domain 
• Solely technical reports or project information (for example CCS 
technical data on solvent efficiency) 
                                            
18 This is especially the case for chapter 8 
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• Relative analytical distance from research questions (for example, 
archived miners accounts of police brutality or energy company 
financial reports) 
Naturally occurring events:   
This technique is useful and effective here as it fulfils Robson’s ‘observe’ 
criteria perceived as essential for knowledge generation (Robson, 2011).   
Observing natural behaviour and using this to corroborate interview data, helps 
to some extent negate the possibility of researcher or interview bias (Gomm, 
2004, p. 223).     
Appropriate events for observation were identified by: 
• Joining relevant on-line fora (LinkedIn, CCS Network, UKCCSRC)  
• Joining company, government and community group mailing lists to 
receive email updates of activities 
• Regularly visiting company, government departments and local council 
websites 
• Personal, professional and academic contacts’ recommendations 
Events were then selected for attendance based on: 
• Relevance to research topic 
• Relevance to case locality/level 
• Expected attendees 
• Logistics (of cost, time and location, acceptance of attendance 
requests) 
Non-participant observation of naturally occurring events formed an essential 
part of this research, in particular to gain in-depth understanding of what is 
characterised here as new governance/new coal era. 
Interviews:   
Semi-structured interviews formed a key and instructive part of this research, 
in large part due to the need to listen to and understand people from different 
social and organisational groups.  For Creswell, semi-structured interviews 
allow the researcher to ‘think about’ the phenomenon under study (Creswell, 
1998).  However, using interviews risks generating bias, but in this case given 
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the epistemological approach outlined above interviews are wholly suitable.  
As Creswell skilfully puts it: 
‘Knowledge is within the meanings people make of it; knowledge is 
gained through people talking about their meanings; knowledge is laced 
with biases and values…’ 
(ibid, p. 19) 
The benefits to the research outweigh the risks and conducting semi-
structured interviews within a multi-methods approach has reduced the 
potential for research bias.  For this purpose, purposive (Palys, 2008) 
sampling, snowballing and self-selection techniques were employed.   For 
Palys, using sampling of this nature applies a strategic approach geared 
toward addressing research aims and objectives (ibid, p. 697).  Taking this 
understanding, the criteria for selection at UK level were: 
• Expertise in coal for energy generation 
• Expertise in governance and sustainability of energy (including CSR, 
stakeholder engagement) 
• UK, or/and international remit 
Criteria for selection at Yorkshire and Humberside level were: 
• As above but with local expertise19 
• Resident within 8 miles radius of existing coal fired power station 
• Resident within 8 miles of a proposed CCS project 
• Employee (or past employee) of coal fired power station or mine 
• Employee of CCS project (planned or operational) in Y&H.   
Within these groups, the sample of interviewees was generated through self-
selection (in response to a notice), opportunistic meetings of individuals at 
events and snow balling.  Appendix F shows a redacted list of interviews. 
3.2.2.1 Ethics approval 
Ethical approval was sought and granted (approval reference AREA 11-197, 
appendix G).  Three core ethical issues were considered; participants’ 
                                            
19 A number of interviewees had expertise/knowledge at both local Y&H and UK levels these 
are indicated in the detailed interviewee lists in appendix F. 
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consent, confidentiality and data security, and commercial sensitivity.  Consent 
was sought from each participant using a consent form giving a summary of 
the research and details of how data would be used (appendix H).  All texts 
and transcripts have been redacted or anonymised to maintain confidentiality, 
other than where bureaucratic data are publicly available.  To maintain data 
security, records of interviews and observations are stored in password 
protected folders following University of Leeds protocols for IT security.  
Finally, where interview or observation data might have proven commercially 
sensitive, data have been redacted or alternative texts used as examples. 
3.2.3 Research phases 
This research project was delivered through five main research phases as 
detailed below in table 3.   
 Research Activities 
Phase one • Desk top study and document review 
• Scoping visits and informal meetings with expert witnesses 
• Phase one analysis 
Phase two • Proposal of eras 
• Interview design 
• Identifying events for observation 
• Ethics review 
Phase four • Non-participant observation of naturally occurring events 
• Document review 
• Interviews 
Phase four • Coding for metaphors, actors, entities, relationships 
• Analysis and construction of organisational fields 
Phase five • Reflection and write up 
Table 3 Research phases  
The phases were non-exclusive, therefore elements of overlap and reiteration 
between phases occurred throughout the study. 
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3.3 Analytical approach – development of metaphors 
3.3.1 Discourse analysis  
The governance eras and organisational fields have been established using 
principles of discourse analysis adapted from Dryzek (2005).  Whilst it is 
beyond the remit of this study to provide a full review of the meaning and value 
of discourse analysis, which would include debates from Habermas and 
Foucault amongst others, it is useful here in this methodology section to 
consider how this analytical approach has been used and why this is 
appropriate for this research.   
Firstly, for context, the use of discourse analysis here is grounded in the 
understanding that the way things are discussed is important (Ellis and Bastin, 
2010).  Discourse can be viewed as both a way to find understanding of 
something (Hajer, 1995) and a way of creating change or action.  As a key 
tenet of the seminal work of Foucault (Goverde et al., 2000), power is viewed 
as being ‘embedded in and effectuated through a crucial combination of 
knowledge and language’ (Ellis and Bastin, 2010, p. 295).   
For Foucault, discourse is a:  
‘… complex mixture of ideas and expression through which individuals 
both perceive and in turn try to explain social reality…’  
(Goverde et al., 2000, p. 14). 
The analysis of discourse to gain greater understanding of both governance 
and sustainable development has been discussed at length (Hajer, 1995; 
Dryzek, 1997, 2005; Jamison, 2001).  Similarly, the link between language, 
discourse and power has been extensively demonstrated in the literature.  One 
of the key features of the debate which is of particular relevance to this 
research, is the explicit link between discourse and power, and in particular 
the way that discourse is used to both create one set of truths and negate 
another.  This theme re-emerges for discussion in chapter seven. 
In this way, discourse is both a means of understanding society and a force 
that drives behaviour.   For Dryzek, similarly, a discourse is: 
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‘A shared way of apprehending the world.   …discourses construct 
meanings and relationships, helping to define common sense and 
legitimate knowledge.’ 
(Dryzek, 2005, p. 9) 
This definition chimes with this research; the changes in the arrangements of 
governance (actors, structures) have, to some degree, allowed for a more 
open debate, and inclusion of wider range of actors in decision making, 
however prevailing, powerful actors and institutions still lead and shape the 
debate and decide who takes part (Rydin, 2003). For this research, a more 
critical approach to discourse analysis, which identified actors and their 
motivations, important entities – institutions, concepts, organisations - and the 
relationships between dominant actors was appropriate.   
Dryzek's approach to discourse analysis is based on the principle that 
language and rhetoric have functional roles in developing an understanding of 
decision-making.  He states that:   
‘The way a discourse views the world is not always easily 
comprehended by those who subscribe to other discourses.’ And it 
follows that  ‘… the way we construct, interpret, discuss, and analyse 
environmental problems has all kinds of consequences’  
(Dryzek, 2005, p. 9). 
Power and agency are embedded within discourse.  This is an insightful 
principle, and relevant here given that the wicked nature of the problem 
dictates that there will be multiple answers and comprehensions.  In this case, 
as changes to dominant discourse and metaphors are witnessed, we are 
simultaneously learning about which actors, entities and relationships are 
dominant for different eras. 
For Dryzek, a discourse comprises four interrelated features; metaphors, 
entities, agents/actors and the relationships between them (Dryzek, 2005).  
Metaphors (and other rhetorical devices), are seen as useful conceptualising 
or bounding themes used to frame understanding of complex scenarios.  The 
remainder of this section is a précis of how Dryzek’s approach has been 
adopted for this study. 
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3.3.2 Coding; identifying dominant metaphors 
Section 3.1 showed that the ontological approach adopted here is suited to the 
two dominant research strategies adopted; inductive and abductive20  
(Creswell, 2007), (Blaikie, 2010).  Inductive strategies, whereby data are 
generated and then where generalisations or similarities are observed (ibid, p. 
25) brought together, suited the identification of metaphors from within the 
texts.  In keeping with adoption of a critical realist ontology within a broadly 
constructivist approach, abductive strategies (ibid, p. 25) to explaining the data 
seek to identify the real underlying structure or mechanism that underlies a 
feature of the texts.  
The coding techniques employed as discussed below, work well with this 
strategy, however two assumptions were made about the codes in doing so.  
Firstly, the broad organisational principle of sustainability was used as an 
underpinning for coding; all texts were coded against one or more of the three 
pillars of sustainability i.e. economic, environmental or social.  Where a text 
relates to more than one category, it was repeated in each until similarities and 
differences or a dominant pillar became apparent.  This is purposeful to ensure 
the research is feasible within the given time and resource constraints but also 
to avoid trying to establish an ill feted ‘theory of everything’.  Secondly, as 
discussed below, where similar texts were coded, this was taken as an 
assumption of dominance of that metaphor or rhetorical device.  Once texts 
were coded, a degree of additional discourse analysis to determine dominant 
metaphors was required.  This meant iterative abductive processes.  In 
summary, an inductive approach is used for ‘what’ and an abductive approach 
is used to treat ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions.   
Three stages of coding were employed in the identification and analysis of 
metaphors and the actors, entities and relationships within them (Charmez, 
2006).   
                                            
20 A discussion on minor definitional and semantic distinctions between abduction and 
retroduction is beyond the remit of this thesis.  For the purposes of this research, the term 
abduction has been adopted as it connects with moderate constirctivism. 
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Open Coding:  Initial, open minded coding against economic, environmental 
and/or social.  This approach, adopted from grounded theorists, allowed for 
gradual movement towards themes and metaphors. 
Where codes initially identified were comparative (i.e. over time or level for 
economic, social and environmental features) rather than descriptive this was 
noted.  For example, in interview L11, the interviewee frequently referred to 
how ‘things used to be’. This feature of the text was repeated in other data to 
suggest movement toward a pattern.   
Where evident, comparisons between ‘emergent’, ‘dominant’ and ‘declining’ 
were noted.  Examples of coded texts summarised in to an MS Excel 
spreadsheet for ease of data handling are included in appendix I. 
Axial Coding: After open coping, patterns and relationships between coded 
texts emerged.  Documents, texts, interview transcripts and notes from 
observations were analysed using close reading, then coded for metaphors, 
agents and their motives, entities and the relationships between them (Dryzek, 
2005).  Data were then summarised in to an MS Excel spreadsheet for ease 
of data handling.  Once summarised, methodological triangulation techniques 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 20) (i.e. texts were coded using the same methods for 
primary and secondary data from different sources, and then triangulated for 
similarity and difference). 
Selective Coding:  The final stage of coding involved removing those codes 
that were either not relevant or deemed less relevant than others.  Codes that 
emerged from a single document or text, were not repeated, or could not be 
triangulated from multiple, unconnected sources were removed.  For example, 
an early metaphor relating to scepticism about climate change was repeated 
in more than one data source, however, as more texts were coded, this 
metaphor became less meaningful or representative of the data. 
The metaphors developed are therefore representative of collections of data; 
in each case the example or extract given has been selected on the basis of 
its representation of the metaphor.  The emergent metaphors, or collections of 
rhetorical devices (Dryzek, 2005) are presented as being relevant to economic, 
environmental or social issues.  Where there is overlap, this is noted in the 
narrative. 
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3.3.3 Presenting the discourse  
The iterative approach developed, reveals three core features:  Firstly, 
organisational fields of governance emerge for at least three distinct eras21 
characterised here for the purposes of analysis (see chapter seven) as old 
governance/old coal, new governance/old coal and new governance/new coal. 
‘Old coal’ means coal that is unabated, i.e. the emissions from coal combustion 
escape to the atmosphere.  ‘New coal’ means with new or clean coal 
technology adaptations (see 2.1.2).  ‘Old governance’ means state rule and 
management of resources.  ‘New governance’ means ML/MA governance 
arrangements which include non-state actors in meaningful decision making 
activities.   
Secondly, during these eras, the significance of at least two levels of analysis 
becomes apparent; the UK level and the sub-national Yorkshire and 
Humberside level.  In addition, both international and local levels were also 
noted as significant in the text, however, for this research problem, the UK and 
Yorkshire and Humberside levels were evidenced as being more significant.  
Thirdly, temporal connections and drivers both within and between these 
levels, influence both organisational field makeup, structure and field dynamics 
over time.  Both levels and temporal fields are, evidently, more complex than 
this summary suggests and the detail for how two levels and at least three eras 
emerge is unpacked here in chapters four to eight.   
This characterisation of governance eras and levels is reflected in the structure 
of chapters four to six.  Throughout, the metaphors are presented as a 
narrative, with each dominant metaphor denoted in the section heading to 
steer the narrative through time, feature and level.  Specifically, chapter four 
demonstrates that distinct eras of governance emerge.  It does this by 
presenting metaphors for the period 1960 to circa22 1980 in section 4.1.  
Section 4.2 then demonstrates a change in dominant metaphors for the era 
c.1980 to 2000, characterised as a period of old coal/new governance. Chapter 
five the presents metaphors for the period 2000 to c.2014 at UK level.  This 
period is characterised as being one of nominally new coal and new 
                                            
21 It is worth noting that an additional ‘post-new coal’ era may begin to be evident as 
discussed in chapter 8, but this can not yet be verified. 
22 The eras are characterisations rather than strictly delineated time periods. 
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governance.  Chapter six then details the organisational fields of governance 
for the Yorkshire and Humberside level for this new coal/new governance era.  
Chapters five and six together demonstrate the distinct differences between 
organisational fields at different levels of governance.  These interesting 
findings are brought together in chapter seven and discussed in terms of the 
dynamic and isomorphic pressures that drive change within and between fields 
over time.  Chapter eight then provides a comprehensive update on the 
changes in the market for coal and coal use in the UK, from the end of the 
empirical research (2013/4) to the present day. 
3.4 Summary 
The wicked nature of the environmental social science problem of continued 
unabated coal use in the UK, dictates the need to employ appropriately varied 
methodological and epistemological approaches in order to adequately 
address the research aims.  This research employs the core organising 
principles of sustainability and governance, as discussed in chapter two, to 
hang the analysis around, combined with the innovative use of discourse 
analysis to establish organisational fields of governance.  Bringing the 
organisational fields approach in to the governance and sustainability arena 
adds analytical strength to the research to make case findings more widely 
generalizable.  
This methodology chapter outlines how the research aims, objectives and 
questions have been addressed.  It presents the epistemological and 
ontological underpinnings adopted with reference to suitability of mixed 
epistemology for this research to generate organisational field of governance 
as the unit of analysis.  The resultant grounded analytical techniques and 
framework developed, is designed to contribute to theory and practice for 
studies of wicked phenomenon, providing a safety net for research, but without 
constraining the research with ‘die hard ontological and epistemological 
commitments’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 24).  The research design and the 
tools employed ultimately reflect this epistemological approach, in a way that 
adds validity to the discussions and conclusions drawn in chapters seven and 
nine.   
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Chapter 4 – An historical characterisation of governance at two levels: dirty old 
coal? 
This chapter contributes to the research question by presenting an overview 
and characterisation of governance processes and outcomes over the latter 
half of the twentieth century at two levels.  Together with chapters five and six, 
it provides a characterisation of coal use in the UK using governance and 
sustainability as organising principles.  In doing so it begins to address 
research questions: 
1. What are the key characteristics of organisational fields for 
governance relevant for coal use in electricity generation, in terms of: 
a. Governance arrangements 
b. Actors and agency 
c. Organisations and institutions? 
2. Have these changed over time, if so how and why? 
 
Specifically, by presenting findings from an historical, exploratory analysis of 
the longitudinal data, this chapter demonstrates that organisational fields for 
governance of coal have emerged and changed over time for at least two 
governance levels.  This greater understanding of governance leads to 
knowledge of the drivers and forces for change or stagnation; intended and 
unintended consequences are then discussed in full in chapters seven and 
eight. 
Taking each broad governance era (old coal/old governance and old coal/new 
governance) in turn, section 4.1 considers the era from the 1960s to the early 
1980s; an era characterised by traditional (‘old’ for this synopsis) styles of 
governance.  Section 4.2, then presents the analysis for the period from the 
early 1980s to circa 2000; a period of structural adjustment, change and 
turmoil, characterised here as new governance but old coal.  Each section is 
presented in terms of economic, environmental and social metaphors and the 
actors, entities and relationships that come to light in line with the analytical 
framework presented in chapter three.  Section 4.3 then summarises the 
analysis to propose organisational fields for governance emerging at the end 
of the twentieth century. These lay foundations for comparison across era and 
scales and begin to answer the research question. 
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4.1 1960s to early 1980s - old governance, old coal 
The early part of this post-world war II era was dominated by Keynesian 
approaches to regeneration, economic and industrial recovery; house building, 
infrastructure development, government and public subsidies, and much of this 
development was fuelled by coal.  Coal mining and electricity generation came 
under public ownership in 1947, and the period saw considerable activity in 
both sectors. Between the mid-1950s and early 1970s, 53 new coal fired power 
stations were built in the industrial heartlands of northern England, Wales and 
central belt Scotland (compared with 5 oil or gas).  New power stations were 
built close to mining infrastructure, heavy industry or densely populated areas 
to meet demand for electricity.  To service these power stations new rail links 
were built, and ports developed for import and export of coal to meet fluctuating 
demand (see figure 5.3).   
Whilst this narrative is well rehearsed elsewhere (Hall, 1981; Strangleman, 
2001), this analysis considers the historical context from an original 
perspective, i.e. it considers the wider governance contexts to form 
organisational fields in terms of dominant economic, environmental and social 
metaphors emerging from the data. 
4.1.1 Economic metaphors 1960 - 1980 
4.1.1.1 King coal - a national treasure 
The coal mining industry in the UK was nationalised under the National Coal 
Board (NCB) in 194623 taking ownership of 958 collieries, formerly the property 
of over 800 companies (Hill, 2001, p36).  At the same time, the UK Electricity 
Act nationalised 505 separate energy generators in to one Central Energy 
Generating Board (CEGB), managed under 14 regional (area) boards.  During 
the first decades of public ownership, coal use boomed in the UK and the 
nation’s post-war regeneration was, quite literally, fuelled by coal (Cochrane, 
1990).  Whilst social and environmental consequences of mining were 
recognised, coal was dominantly associated with national economic gain and 
                                            
23 Established under the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946 and brought in to operation 
from 1st January 1947 
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the ‘King Coal’ (Sinclair, 191724) metaphor was strong.  Reflections on this era 
from interviews corroborate this sentiment: 
‘It felt like we were part of something… building the country up again.  
We were opening a new power plant almost every month in the 60s and 
still not really keeping up with demand.  Can you imagine?’ 
(Interviewee L1, 2012) 
However, whilst coal was used in electricity generation, the decline of the coal 
mining industry started from the early 1960s, with increasing imports of 
cheaper foreign coal.  There is no suggestion of the direction of causality here, 
however during the 1960s and 1970s in the UK virtually all electricity generated 
was from coal yet, rising demand and instability of alternative fuels meant UK 
supply could not fulfil demand.  Towards the end of the era, gas and oil 
increased in the energy mix and subsequently six new advanced gas-cooled 
reactor nuclear plants opened in early 1980s.   
It is interesting to consider here whether the heavy investment in the early part 
of the era up until the early 1970s then lead to delays in progress of other fuel 
sources possibly because of extent to which other infrastructure linked with 
coal.  This concept is considered further in chapters seven and eight, however, 
it is worth noting at this stage that parallels exist between discourse on 
investment in coal with CCS versus alternative sources of low carbon energy 
and current debates on carbon lock in.  For this analysis, the arguably 
unintended consequences of economic decisions are of interest. 
Regional pride in the localities hosting ‘a national treasure’ was high: 
‘It was phenomenal really. We could see six headframes and two power 
stations from our house.  It felt like the whole country was powered from 
right here’ 
(Interviewee L12, 2013)  
This economic and physical infrastructure issue, with coal as central to 
economic development contributes to regional as well as national features of 
coal governance.   
                                            
24 King Coal the novel by Sinclair is purposefully misquoted here. 
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4.1.1.2 Keeping the lights on 
In keeping with ‘King Coal’ metaphors, metaphors relating to coal use in 
electricity generation and ‘keeping the lights on’ were dominant in this era.  The 
expansion of the national grid and power to homes, reiterate that coal was very 
much at the heart of the post war economy.  Energy efficiency and generation 
capacity was a core measure during the era, with individual plants and regional 
electricity boards competing for efficiency gains (NCMM archives).  KWh per 
tonne was an important measure of efficiency rather than price or financial 
indicators.  This is perhaps somewhat overstated here but the aim was, 
seemingly, to meet demand at any cost: 
‘We regularly got 90kwh, they don’t get anything like that now because 
they buy the cheaper coal.  We’d compete with other stations too, the 
[CEG] Board reported our weekly averages’  
(Interviewee L1, 2012) 
[parentheses added] 
In this sense wider economic, i.e. rather than solely financial, costs and 
benefits were relevant, as growing demand for energy meant coal was an 
important part of economic functioning and regeneration of the UK.  Publicly 
owned coal mines and coal fired power stations were heavily subsidised in 
order to ‘keep the lights on’ but, in a broadly Keynesian economic context, this 
was not seen as problematic. 
4.1.1.3 Economic communities of coal 
This metaphor, broadly relates to the emergence of economic communities, 
founded on and dependent on coal and other heavy industry.  For Yorkshire 
and Humber three core industries dominated; textiles, steel, and coal and 
power.  This regional distinction from national discourse suggests a degree of 
environmental determinism, for example, whole communities moved together 
because of environmental circumstances (e.g. new coal seams), and 
economic drivers associated with this.  
This regional context has wider economic implications here; in these extracts 
the drivers for social and community change were economic: 
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‘I started straight after school.  A man from the [power] plant came to 
the grammar and asked us what job we wanted to do.  I said I wanted 
to be an engineer, he asked me a few more questions, nothing very 
difficult, and I started an apprenticeship a few weeks later.’  
(Interviewee L1, 2012) 
[Parenthesis added] 
‘Everybody except the milkman worked in either the mines or the power 
stations… We thought we had jobs for life.’  
(Interviewee L2, 2012) 
The latter years of the 1970s and early 1980s were marked by a changing 
political economy; the end of the managed economy and what might broadly 
be defined as Keynesian socialism (Sheehan, 2009).  Specifically, what that 
meant for coal mining and electricity generation was a rolling back of state 
subsidies and opening of the market.  Public sector wages stopped rising in 
line with the private sector; strikes, black outs, the ‘winter of discontent’ and 
three day weeks for heavy energy users.  The groundwork for neo-
liberalisation was laid during this time and (explored in more depth in section 
4.2), but dominant in this period is what might be classed as old style, managed 
economy led by government actors. What is also interesting here are the 
relationships between dominant actors and the institutional entities evident 
within the era.  Table 4 draws these out to present a summary of dominant 
metaphors and associated agents, entities and relationships.  The significance 
of this is explored more fully in section 4.1.4 once environmental and social 
issues have been detailed. 
4.1.1.4 The political economy of change: thriving economy to three-day 
weeks 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, levels of employment were high in the UK 
and the coal industry and energy sector both exemplified and reflected this. 
Mine closures were common in the UK during the 1960s especially in the North 
East, despite continued construction of coal fired power stations.  However, 
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Metaphors/themes Level Agents and motives Entities Relationships 
Keynesian economics: public ownership, 
post war government investment to 
generate economic recovery 
 
 
UK National Government 
(development, economic 
recovery) 
British Electricity Authority 
(CEGB) 
National Government 
Administrative state 
Energy demand 
Subsidies 
Government with 
CEGB 
National treasure: the industrial north, coal 
mines and coal fired power stations 
 
 
UK 
Regional 
National Government 
Government local 
British Electricity Authority 
Coal board 
Miners 
National Government 
Power stations 
Coal mines 
Unions 
Pride 
Government with 
CEGB 
Workers with mines 
and power stations 
Keeping the lights on:  coal meeting energy 
demands 
 
UK 
Regional 
Local 
Plant and mine managers 
National Government 
Plant and mine workers 
Electricity Act  
Administrative state 
Energy demand 
Government with 
CEGB 
Workers with mine 
and plant managers 
Full employment:  hard work but jobs for 
life. 
 
 
UK 
Regional 
Local 
Unions 
Plant and mine managers 
Jobs 
Negotiated wages 
Community 
Union stewards with 
regional Authority 
Board reps 
Local government with 
national 
Economic and environmental dependency – 
moving communities 
UK 
Regional 
National Government 
Plant and mine workers 
Jobs 
Negotiated wages 
Community 
Government with 
CEGB 
Workers with mines 
and power stations 
Table 4 Economic metaphors 1960s to 1980s
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whilst new mines opened, and mine workers moved to new sites by the late 
1960s, decline in coal mining was evident with significant reduction in numbers 
employed in mining and power sectors and the early years of the 1970s saw 
the start of a period of change in the political economy.  International concerns 
for inflation, oil price shocks and increased international trade (including with 
Europe) began to affect the status of coal (Van der Ven and Fouquet, 2014).  
Imports of cheaper coal increased (Digest of UK Energy Statistics, 2012, p.54) 
some mines became inefficient and closed, and wage restrictions for public 
workers lead to strikes and social unrest.  Whilst mine closures and associated 
job losses plus wage restrictions were felt most strongly locally, and 
unemployment nationally high (Beatty et al, 2007) employment in the sector 
was higher.  An interesting feature of this era however, is the increase in 
economic migration.  Both coal mining and electricity generation were public 
bodies and miners (with their families) regularly moved between mines without 
losing jobs or changing conditions: 
‘We all moved down here [to Yorkshire] at the same time, my dad, 
brother, uncles, their families.  They [the NCB] built houses – they were 
better than what we’d had - and pretty much everyone we knew except 
the older ones, just moved [from the NE] to where the coal was so we 
all stayed in work.  Some moved to Nottingham at about the same time 
we came here and we’d have bus trips to see them’ 
(Interviewee L2, 2012) 
[Parentheses added] 
New and extended mining communities emerged in regions such as South 
Yorkshire and North Nottinghamshire as mines in the North East for example 
closed.  This publicly managed programme meant that as less productive 
mines closed, and others expanded, whole communities and economies 
changed, but within understood governance arrangements, for example 
negotiated wages.  The decline of coal during this era, however, was in some 
cases welcomed, but notably perhaps where other industry existed and 
opportunities for employment were less restricted.  
‘I’m glad my son doesn’t have to work down the mine, he’s a mechanic’ 
(BBC Archive, 1977, no pagination) 
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Coal use in UK power stations remained high during the era, and ‘virtually all’ 
UK electricity during the period came from coal (Digest of UK Energy Statistics 
Archive, n.d., p.13).  As a result, coal miners were seen as different from other 
workers and consequently able to negotiate salaries above national increases: 
‘…for a number of reasons which are exceptional to the mining 
industry— and do not apply in industry generally — the miners at this 
particular time have a case for special treatment.’ 
(HC Deb, 21 February 1972) 
But three day weeks, strikes (notably those organised by the National Union 
of Mineworkers (NUM) in 1969, 1972 and 1974) and social unrest suggested 
the start of the decline of coal.  It is interesting that despite this contextual 
backdrop, coal and coal miners, to a degree held a special position in society. 
This quote suggests why this might have been:   
‘I think even people who didn’t have anything to do with mining knew 
that it was hard work.  The whole country relied on coal for electricity… 
it meant the miners got special treatment.  But they probably went too 
far when others [public sector workers] were struggling too.’ 
(Interviewee L11, 2013) 
[Parenthesis added] 
Table 4 above summarises these metaphors to illustrate the overlapping 
entities and actors and the relationships between them.  It also suggests that 
whilst metaphors are evident at different levels, they are connected through 
actors and arrangements for governance during this era. 
4.1.2 Environmental metaphors 
4.1.2.1 Plentiful coal – the environment as a cupboard 
As summarise in table 5 below, coal in the UK was seen as a stable, readily 
available fuel stock, in particular during resource crises, where coal was used 
to meet essential needs.  The coalfields of Northern England (the North East 
and Yorkshire), Wales and the Central Belt of Scotland have been active for 
many centuries (Durham Mining Museum, n.d.).  Use of coal from these 
regions has fuelled periods of economic growth from the industrial revolution, 
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empire building, world wars, as well as regeneration of the UK during mid-
twentieth century.     
A feature of this discourse that ties with economic metaphors is the recognition 
of the environmental or geographical determinism observed as illustrated by 
this interview text.   
‘I don’t’ think half these towns would be here if we didn’t have coal under 
our feet’ 
(Interviewee L2, 2012) 
Similarly, mine closures in the North East and expansion in Yorkshire and 
North Nottinghamshire with construction of new coal fired power stations; 
movement of people, new industry around coalfields, housebuilding, suggests 
a societal and community connection to the environment.  This predisposition 
raises questions about structure and agency dynamics that create potential for 
carbon lock-in (Unruh, 2000), discussed in chapters five and seven. 
4.1.2.2 Environmental Regulations 
Regulation relating to public management of the environment (from 1970 
through the Department of the Environment (DoE)) was enacted during the 
period 1960 to 1980.  The remit for the DoE regulatory framework during the 
era related to: 
‘…planning, housing, construction, local government, water, the historic 
environment, environmental protection and for research into building 
and hydraulics.’ 
(The National Archives, n.d., p.3) 
During the era, there was a notable increase in statutory instruments, 
legislative controls and policy development associated with environmental 
protection and, in particular, clean air (The National Archives, 2016).  What 
becomes evident from this analysis is that concern for clean air and 
environmental protection exists at national level, with specific controls relating 
to coal.   
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4.1.2.3 The dirty old man of Europe; acid rain 
International, transboundary and transgenerational environmental issues (see 
chapter 2), emerge as significant during this era.  In particular, concerns about 
emissions from coal and environmental and public health impacts beyond the 
coalfields emerge from North America and Scandinavia.  Dirty coal metaphors 
are supported with scientific evidence of the (long mooted) connection 
between coal combustion and acid rain: 
‘Acid rain was not considered a serious environmental problem until the 
1970s. During that decade, scientists observed the increase in acidity 
of some lakes and streams. At the same time, research into long range 
transport of atmospheric pollutants such as sulphur dioxide, indicated a 
possible link to distant sources of pollution.’    
(US Environmental Protection Agency, n.d., p. 1) 
It is worth noting, although not strongly evidenced in the texts, that this 
corresponds with a raising awareness internationally of issues relating to 
environmental justice.   Environmental and social justice movements joined to 
form groups such as Friends of the Earth (1969) and Greenpeace (1972), and 
began to challenge governments.  Rhetoric relating to cleaner gas and nuclear 
starts to emerge towards the end of this era in concert with this rise of socio-
environmental movements. There are interesting parallels here with the 
political economy, and perceived inefficiency of national ownership emerge 
that tie with political economy and intentional ‘doing down’ of coal25. In addition, 
increased pressure to manage resources as UK coal  
                                            
25 This closely relates to Gillard’s findings that ‘conspicuous and influential’ (2016, p.16) 
changes in discourse impact policy processes and outcomes as discussed in chapters two 
and eight. 
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Table 5 Environmental metaphors 
 
Metaphors level Agents and motives Entities Relationships 
Plentiful coal with many uses; resource security; 
environment as ‘cupboard’ 
 
 
International 
UK 
Regional 
Government UK  
The Coal Board 
Powerful National 
Government 
Administrative state 
Energy demand 
 
Government with CEGB 
Emissions; dirty coal, acid rain, public health 
associations; environment as ‘sink’ 
International 
UK 
Regional 
Governments (esp UK and 
US) 
ENGOs 
Dirty coal 
Pollution 
No strong connections 
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stocks become more difficult to mine resulted in the UK government (especially 
under Heath) was seriously challenged on the coal issue (Cochrane, 1990).  
Interestingly, in contrast, and arguably as a reflection of the motivations of 
dominant actors, ‘clean coal’ metaphors were used as early as 1950s to 
influence the discourse on coal.  
‘Clean coal was being promoted way back when I was an 
undergraduate student in the late 1950s. All the promises I read about 
then have now been updated and repackaged for the 21st century.’ 
(NCMM archives, accessed 2009, no pagination) 
What this analysis as summarised above highlights is that the era is one of 
changing priorities; as economic needs are met, environmental discourse 
relating to potential harm comes to the fore. 
4.1.3 Social metaphors 
4.1.3.1 We’re all in this together – coalfield communities 
National as well as regional social metaphors and discourse during the era 
relate closely to economic metaphors; community is inextricably linked with 
economy at regional and local levels.  Consistent themes emerge from the 
texts relating to camaraderie, shared social wellbeing and community.  There 
is recognition that coal mining and work in the power plants is hard work with 
associated health and environmental problems, but that good wages and 
connection between workers, managers, Unions and Boards meant the 
benefits outweighed the negatives. 
‘People used to accept that the work was hard, but that there were 
benefits for people and communities from mining…  it used to be that the 
Coal Board looked after people.  They’d put on extra clinics and showed 
films on how to avoid getting ill’ 
(Interviewee L12, 2013) 
‘I can honestly say I enjoyed every minute of it...  It’s the men you work 
with that make it, we look after each other’ 
(NCMM Archives, n.d., accessed 2011) 
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‘Pit feeling was one of unity… it was my life.’  
(BBC Archive, 1972, 00:53 to 01:24) 
There are close links here too with economic metaphors and geographic 
determinism as illustrated above in section 4.1.1. Whole, established 
communities moved to be closer to remaining operating mines.  In addition, as 
well as regional significance of coal in terms of jobs and associated 
infrastructure, coal had cultural and social significance.  This social 
significance relates closely to the economic significance, for example in terms 
of negotiated wages, but also local incentives to work in the mines or power 
stations.  This extract from interview illustrates the point that whole 
communities were connected to the coal industry:   
‘We just had coal delivered, the whole street at the same time.  It was 
really cheap then so there wasn’t really any incentive to move to gas or 
electric boilers even when other parts of the country swapped.’ 
(Interviewee L11, 2013) 
Again, the physical and economic infrastructure developed around coal mines 
with significant government investment in coal fired power stations, perhaps 
influenced slower developments of newer or alternative technologies during 
the era.  
4.1.3.2 Coal is different 
At regional scale, and to some degree at UK level as demonstrated above, the 
dominant rhetoric that mining is different from other industry and coal 
communities are different from other industrial communities is evident during 
the era. 
‘Many towns… owed their existence to coal, and mining was the focus 
of the whole community.’ 
(Durham Coal Mining Museum Archives, n.d., no pagination) 
Coal affected every aspect of life in coal mining regions.  Yorkshire, 
Nottinghamshire and the North East became synonymous with coal mining 
and power sectors.  
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‘You’ll get a lot of people saying it’s different round here because of coal 
mining  …it was alright though.  Dirty and hard work for my dad, but 
everyone was the same and we were proud of what we did.’ 
(Interviewee L12, 2013) 
[Emphasis added] 
This notion of coal being different and ‘round here’ being different because of 
coal recurs throughout the texts and is discussed again in chapter six in 
relation to evident social metaphors in Yorkshire and Humberside. 
4.1.3.3 Strong unions – social welfare and camaraderie 
During the era, public sector workers unions had a significant role in social and 
economic welfare for their members.  In the sector, both the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) are seen to have 
major roles within the emerging organisational fields for this era.  In addition, 
close relationships between publicly owned mines and power plants and 
between bunion stewards and plant managers existed.  During the early part 
of the era, relationships between these groups were evident, two way and 
whilst not always positive connections existed especially at local and regional 
levels.   
‘Everyone used to go to the [working men’s] club so if we did have a 
problem you knew who to speak to – it’d be your union steward, or your 
manager and both would be there of a Friday… we knew what was 
happening at Ferrybridge because we’d see the lads we went to school 
with in the club too.  They’d joke we weren’t working hard enough.’ 
(Interviewee L2, 2013) 
The interview data here must be taken in the context of one set of views on an 
historical period.  However, what emerges from these data when taken 
together with archived contemporary accounts is a picture that suggests coal 
was core to UK economy and industry, but also core to communities.  Coal 
communities were not simply close networks with strong social capital, they 
were, inextricably linked with economic prosperity which was environmentally 
determined.   
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Table 6 below summarises the social metaphors and highlights the actors, 
entities and relationships within them.  An interesting point to note here, and 
discussed further below, is that throughout the era for social (and other) 
emerging fields there are strong connections within and between fields.  
Arguably, the fields are connected and to a large degree overlapping with 
social, economic and environmental features related to coalfields. This would 
suggest that, in answer to research questions 1a and 1b in particular, distinct 
organisational fields for governance can be characterised; section 4.1.4 below 
expands on this point to describe the fields for governance for this old coal/old 
governance era.  
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Metaphors Level Agents and motives Entities Relationships 
Coal ‘community’ – social networks 
 
 
Regional26 
Local27 
UK Government 
The Coal Board 
The CEGB 
Unions 
Plant and mine workers 
Families 
Community 
Welfare 
Camaraderie 
Other mining communities 
Workers with managers 
Unions and managers 
 
Mining’s different – pride, place  UK 
Regional 
Miners 
 
Community 
Welfare 
Camaraderie 
Connection to community 
Connection to environment 
Strong unions and relationships UK 
Regional 
Local 
UK Government 
Local government 
Plant and mine managers 
Unions 
Welfare 
Camaraderie 
Pay 
3 day week 
Connection to economic 
Table 6 Social metaphors 
 
                                            
26 Yorkshire and Humberside 
27 Town, village, mine, power plant 
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4.1.4 Consolidated agents, entities and relationships – the emergence 
of an organisational field of governance 
The core feature of this era is that the social (coalfield communities), the 
economic (jobs, growth) and the environmental (resources and sinks) are 
inextricably linked within the coal discourse.  Relationships exist between 
different social groups and institutions, and whilst the State is the dominant 
actors, there is a witnessed degree of agency from social, economic and 
environmental actors at multiple levels; UK and local levels but also 
international.  Evidenced through legislation and negotiated salaries.  Strong 
national unions, connections between workers and managers within 
communities and understood common goals lead to structurally embedded 
relationships. 
The consequence of this consolidated field is that when, towards the end of 
the era disconnects start to emerge in one field, other fields are quickly affected 
through mimetic isomorphic processes. Two examples of this are evidenced:  
Firstly, ‘the environment’ both in terms of resource limits but also newly, in 
terms of environmental protection emerges as a transnational issue.  
Metaphors relating to dirty coal emerge and legislation designed to ‘clean coal’ 
rather than reduce its use is enacted.  Secondly, coal communities move to 
where jobs both for local gain and to meet national ‘need’ for coal as part of 
the energy mix. 
A third feature, perhaps less well evidenced but interesting to consider, is the 
unintended consequences of events during the era as a result of the close 
relationships and ties between fields.  The 1972 and 1974 national strikes over 
pay and conditions for example, at a time when international concerns relating 
to environmental consequences of coal lead to preference for natural gas or 
nuclear as less unionised energy options.  Similarly, the international political 
economy context, and the rise of external/international economic and 
environmental pressures – international trade, oil price, transnational 
environmental issues such as acid rain – had implications for coal use beyond 
increasing imports of coal.  The discussion in chapter seven considers the 
drivers and impact of these changes features of governance over time. 
83 
 
 
 
4.2 c1980 to early 2000s – New ways of governing ‘old’ coal  
The previous section provides an outline of the governance arrangements and 
instruments, institutional entities, agents and the relationships between them 
in the era characterised as old governance/old coal.  Dominant rhetoric during 
the era related to public ownership, high levels of dependency on coal and the 
need for energy and economic stability outweighing environmental concerns.  
What also becomes apparent however is the early signs of change.  This 
section summarises the analysis of texts relating to the period from circa 1980 
to early 2000s to suggest that this era is best described as being a period of 
structural adjustment, and characterised here as one of old coal, but new 
governance.   
The radical changes to the political economy of the UK (and other countries) 
that took place during the 1980s and 1990s, including privatisation of public 
goods, reduction of the state and attempts to curb inflation, are well 
documented elsewhere.  Similarly, contemporary and historical discourses on 
issues relating to social and economic justice, and in particular of relevance to 
this discussion, the decimation of the industrial north of England, Wales and 
central belt of Scotland are well versed (Hall, 1981).  What this analysis adds 
to the discourse, is a view on how and why the resultant organisational fields 
for governance emerged from this structural adjustment, with key insights on 
the actors, entities and relationships dominant during the period.   
These insights suggest fields emerge at two distinct levels of governance 
within what has been characterised here as the old coal/new governance era, 
with both clear points of connection, and clear points of disconnect unfolding.  
Notably, the disconnects occur where economic drivers at national level 
evidently take priority over local economic, social and environmental issues. 
Chapter seven goes on to consider how powerful forces and agency of 
dominant actors shapes the organisational fields over time to show that the 
effects of this era of significant change are still evident.  This section concludes 
with a summary of the organisational fields for governance of coal.  The drivers 
and forces for change or stagnation, with both intended and unintended 
consequences are then discussed in full in chapter 7. 
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4.2.1 Economic metaphors – a political economy of change 
4.2.1.1 Decline of king coal – the dash for gas and the start of ‘the long 
goodbye’ 
In 1979 Margaret Thatcher was elected Prime Minister of the UK on a mandate 
of structural adjustment and modernisation following a decade of strikes, 
blackouts and inflation.  For the following two decades, just as coal had been 
core to post- World War II industrial and housing economic boom, the decline 
of coal was core to this well documented period of structural adjustment.  
Public ownership and management of coal had suited the Keynesian political 
economy of the 1950s to early 1970s with subsidies to keep power plants 
operational in order to meet energy demand and keep unemployment at 
manageable levels (Sheehan, 2009).  Whereas, the process of adjustment to 
free market economics of the 1980s transformed both mining and energy 
sectors.   
As touched on in section 4.1.4, the era also saw a new threat to coal in the 
form of the ‘dash for gas’ (and to a lesser extent nuclear) which, as illustrated 
in the quote below, reinforced the decline of coal in the UK. 
‘British Coal’s demise has been accelerated by the Government’s drive 
to privatise the coal industry, but more so by the recent privatisation of 
the electricity companies on whose custom British coal depends to 
survive’ 
(Fagan, 1992, no pagination)  
Here, the disconnect between state and the coal and energy industries that 
started in the late 1970s widens.   
4.2.1.2 ‘There is no alternative’28 (TINA) 
Two commonly presented sides to this metaphor which exacerbate the 
disconnects both between actors within fields, and at different levels, emerged 
from the texts: Selling off the family silver versus economic efficiency through 
privatisation. 
                                            
28 This well known phrase was famously often used by Margaret Thatcher to strengthen the 
case to move toward free market economy. 
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(i) Selling off the family silver.  The quote below illustrates the rhetoric: 
‘It still doesn’t make any sense to me thirty years later.  Ferrybridge was 
profitable when it was privatised so why not keep those profits for the 
public purse.’ 
(Interviewee L1, 2012) 
(ii) Economic (and technical) efficiency - free market capitalism.   
Conversely, privatisation brought with it economic and technical benefits.  
Foreign investment, sales of companies, takeovers in the early days post 
privatisation lead to new investment in technology with continued coal use but 
with environmental regulation leading to the extension of life of old coal fired 
boilers: 
‘They [new owners] brought us in to the 20th century really.  It was an 
American company and they already had experience of reducing 
emissions.’ 
(Interviewee L1, 2012) 
[Parentheses added] 
‘If it [coal fired power station] had stayed under public ownership, it 
would have closed or moved to gas decades ago there would have been 
no point in subsidising it’ 
(Interviewee L18, 2012) 
[Parentheses added] 
What is interesting about these extracts, is that the coal fired boilers were 
perceived at least, as being economically viable under private ownership, but 
the dominant TINA discourse suggested they were not considered so under 
public ownership.  The introduction of market forces, albeit in a still subsidised 
and highly regulated industry, is in and of itself deemed to improve economic 
viability.  In addition, had the coal fired power stations remained under public 
ownership, coal may have been phased out in favour of gas to an even greater 
extent than was witnessed in the 1990s.  As discussed in chapters seven and 
eight, the dominance of market forces in determining fuel use influences 
continued coal use. This analysis, i.e. that economic viability is considered 
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automatically the domain of the private sector, regardless of the need for public 
investment, is mirrored in chapter five and discussed in more depth in chapter 
seven.   
4.2.1.3 Us and them 
Whilst somewhat clichéd, and treated more fully in section 4.2.3.1, a rhetoric 
emerges from the texts relating to an economic ‘us and them’ scenario.  This 
is distinct from earlier texts, where analysis suggests a clearer common 
purpose with co-evolving economic relationships.  For this era as new 
governance relationships develop, two economic disconnects start to unfold.  
Firstly, a distinction between national and sub-national levels emerges: 
‘They wanted to destroy the North because we all voted Labour.  We 
could have been the most efficient generators in the world, run on coal 
from right under our feet and they would have still got rid of us’ 
(Interviewee L3, 2013) 
‘Mining, heavy industry and coal fired power plants of the North and 
Scotland just didn’t fit with the new world they [the Conservative 
government] had in mind so they started to close them down’ 
(Interviewee L30, 2015) 
[parentheses added] 
Secondly, a disconnect (or at least a new relationship) between the owners, 
shareholders and managers of the private firms and the (mine) workers and 
community becomes evident.  Whilst not evidenced in the texts, the era 
corresponds with a rise in MNCs, technocratic management (Dryzek, 2005) 
and oligopoly power (Begg et al, 2005), which provides an interesting backdrop 
for this analysis.  Ultimately, mine and plant closures lead to high levels of 
unemployment in formerly economically vibrant communities.  The connection 
between workers and public sector employers has disappeared and the 
economic ‘purpose’ of mining communities was lost. 
4.2.1.3 Dole queues; regional unemployment 
When read with the analysis in chapters five and six, this metaphor might be 
seen as demonstration of a starting point for what becomes decades of 
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underdevelopment.  High levels of unemployment and associated poor health, 
housing and educational attainment are evident.  Whilst unemployment was a 
national problem, former coal mining regions were recognised as being 
especially affected as this extract from Parliament demonstrates.  The 
Secretary of State for Industry was asked: 
‘…what consideration he is giving to the reestablishment of assisted 
area status to areas of West Yorkshire where unemployment has been 
rising much faster than the national average in recent months.’  
(HC Deb 24 November 1980 vol 994 cc193-4) 
The graph in figure 2 below details unemployment rates.  As well as the 
regional implications, this graph shows the extent to which coal and closure of 
mines and regional coal fired power stations effected employment in the 
region.  The implications for sustainable development are discussed in chapter 
seven, here, prima facie, this would suggest economic sustainability of the 
region is poor given its continued dependence on coal. 
 
Figure 2 Regional unemployment  
(Source: Office of National Statistics29) 
                                            
29  The decline in unemployment in 1988/89 corresponds with a redefining of the term 
‘unemployment’ whereby new definition no longer equates to claimant count.  Instead it 
equates to all those in receipt of unemployment benefit and not for example income support, 
 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
q1 q4 q3 q2 q1 q4 q3 q2 q1 q4 q3 q2 q1 q4 q3 q2 q1 q4 q3 q2 q1 q4 q3 q2 q1 q4 q3 q2
198019811982198319841985198619871988198919901991199219931994199519961997199819992000
% Unemployment Rate % Econ Inactivity Rate
88 
 
 
 
 
4.2.1.4 Things can only get better - regeneration 
Towards the end of this era of considerable political and economic change, 
notably following a change in government in 1997, but also following mine 
closures in early 1990s, a range of economic regeneration projects were 
implemented.  Government funded QUANGOS (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004) and 
NGOs such as the Coal Regeneration Trusts were established during this era 
and return to work programmes given regional priority. The extract below 
typifies texts on regeneration projects of the mid to late 1990s:   
‘We had £15 to £17 million to invest in projects to get people in coalfields 
working again.  Most of that was intended for Yorkshire and the North 
East, Wales and Scotland had additional funds.  It was a sweetener 
really, I could have spent that every month developing the infrastructure 
needed for the region, but the grants did help individuals.’ 
(Interviewee L30, 2015) 
As suggested in the text above, the limited success of these programmes in 
terms of longer term regeneration is attributed to both the scale of decline 
during the era, and the lack of economic alternative in the regions effected.    
Another feature of this metaphor relates to increasing divisions within the 
regions and communities hardest hit by unemployment during the era, with 
coal workers being seen as given special treatment.  These points are 
exemplified by the following extracts from Hansard: 
‘Is the honourable gentleman aware that unemployment in West 
Yorkshire has risen by about 100 per cent. since the Government took 
office? …unemployment in Batley, Dewsbury, Halifax and Huddersfield 
…[has risen] by nearly 150 per cent…’  
‘Does my hon. Friend understand that, although inflation is the first 
enemy, my constituents are bitter about the feather bedding that has 
                                            
Youth Training Scheme (YTS) or sickness benefit.  Ex miners were encouraged by authorities 
to accept sickness (later incapacity) benefit which removed them from employment statistics 
(source: interview 30 plus researcher’s own experience of working for the Department for 
Employment in 1988/89).  This chimes with Beatty et al’s 2007 findings relating to hidden 
unemployment in former coal fields. 
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been given to redundant workers in the steel and coal industries, and 
that they would like something similar?’  
(HC Deb, 1980 vol 994 cc193-4) 
To summarise economic metaphors during this era of significant change, table 
7 identifies the actors and entities with agency within the metaphors.  It shows 
that the political and economic changes have affected the agency of actors 
and entities and relationships between them within and between fields.    
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Metaphors Scale Agents and motives Entities Relationships 
Decline of coal – strikes, pit closures, 
unemployment 
Regional 
UK 
Unions 
Miners 
Strikes 
Unemployment 
Weak or dysfunctional 
TINA – neo liberal economics, privatisation and 
the rise of the MNC, public sector wage 
restraints, devolution 
UK 
International 
Regional 
Government 
Shareholders 
Privatisation 
Structural adjustment 
Tax payers 
Business and government 
International 
Us and them UK 
Regional 
Organisational 
Managers 
Government 
Workers/communities 
Strikes 
Wage freeze 
Unemployment 
Increasing disconnect 
Weak or dysfunctional 
Redevelopment Regional 
UK 
Government Development agencies Paternalistic 
Table 7 Economic metaphors 1980s to 2000 
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4.2.2 Environmental metaphors – dirty old coal 
4.2.2.1 Dirty old coal 
International discourse during the era became dominated by issues relating to 
environmental harm associated with industrialisation; pollution, acid rain, 
ozone depletion, deforestation and, ultimately, climate change.  Evidently, this 
was especially relevant for coal use.  National and international NGOs 
pressured governments to clean energy supplies and, especially to reduce 
coal use. 
However, private sector generators (notably Npower (then Powergen) in the 
UK) remained in receipt of government subsidies to ‘clean up’ coal fired power 
stations and invest in alternatives to coal.  Some coal fired plants closed. 
‘…we had to stop burning coal in Wakefield but Ferrybridge carried on’ 
(Interviewee L12, 2013) 
Coal is characterised as ‘dirty’ and earlier metaphors relating to the ‘dirty old 
man of Europe’ feature strongly.  So called clean alternatives, namely natural 
gas and nuclear as clean emerge as preferable.  Yet coal accounted for around 
half of the electricity generated annually between 1984 and 1999 (Digest of 
UK Energy Statistics, archived 2000, p.53).  Arguably economic and market 
factors (for example cheap and stable price) stimulate continued use of coal 
despite environmental concerns and regulation. 
4.2.2.2 Sustainable development and light touch regulatory approach 
At the transnational level, as raised in chapter two, Rio Agenda 21, the 
UNFCCC Kyoto Principle and pressure from now significant ENGOs was 
translated in to EU and UK legislation and policy.  In practice, this lead to the 
establishment of Environmental Agency and the Scottish Environmental 
Protection Agency with regulatory powers.  Particularly relevant are 
Environmental Protection Act 1990 and the Clean Air Act, 1993 which prohibit 
grey smoke and impact home use of coal in urban areas as well as smoke 
from generators’ stacks, and the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD, 
2001/80/EC) which came in to force at the end of the old coal/new governance 
era, marking a change in the direction for coal.   
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This new governance approach (establishment of QUANGOs or government 
departments with target setting and regulatory powers, but low policing 
powers) to manage environmental problems illustrates a change in agency.  A 
degree of separation between economic and environmental emerges here; 
coal is imported and therefore the economic benefits of extraction associated 
and the environmental harm associated with combustion have been 
disassociated.  For Yorkshire and Humberside, this is relevant because 
physical and geographic infrastructure is very closely linked with coal and 
heavy industry, and whilst towards the end of the era, regional development 
targets begin to relate to greening the economy (Drake, 2009) beyond the 
decline in the early 1990s, coal combustion remained significant (DUKES, 
2010).   
The key features of the environmental metaphors are summarised below in 
table 8.  Three interesting points emerge from this analysis.  Firstly, local 
agency has been disassociated from environmental field because of 
associated disconnection from the economic field brought about by mining 
closures.  This reduced agency by local actors is exacerbated by the strength 
of transboundary environmental concerns emerging, despite international 
recognition of significance of locally generated development paths.  Secondly, 
during the era, environmental issues are dealt with using light touch national 
regulation (targets, fines), yet subsidies for private generators continue.  
Thirdly, state actors in the form of the EA and QUANGOs as well as NGOs 
become the new custodians of the environment within a more complex set of 
relationships than previously witnessed when this role fell to the limited role of 
the Department of the Environment. 
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Metaphors Level Agents and motives Entities Relationships 
Dirty old coal Regional 
International 
Government agencies 
ENGOs 
Power companies 
Environmental 
Regulation  
Coal fired power 
stations 
Techno managerial 
NGOs as lobbyists 
Sustainable development: transnational 
pressures 
International 
National 
ENGOs Rio Agenda 21 
Environmental 
campaigns 
Environment Agency 
 
Transnational groups 
International governments 
Light touch environmentalism Local Trusts and charities Custodians Regulator with industry 
Table 8 Environmental metaphors 1980s to 2000
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4.2.3 Social metaphors – ‘there’s no such thing as society’ 
4.2.3.1 No such thing as society - us and them 
The era saw radical social change and the social disconnect between levels of 
governance identified in section 4.1 increases to the extent that for social 
metaphors in particular, the organisational fields for governance begin to split 
in to at least two separate fields.  At UK level, dominant metaphors relate to 
anti-union rhetoric, individualism and benefits from economic rationalism.  This 
core social metaphor emerging during this era relates closely to this disconnect 
as this extract demonstrated: 
‘We’d had a good relationship with the police up until then.  I went to 
school with them and they’d come in the club but then it changed’ 
(NCMM, accessed 2009) 
 
‘I knew everyone who worked here, then they brought in managers from 
outside to organise the sale and we had to just watch them do it. I was 
lucky and kept my job but it was never the same after that’ 
(Interviewee L1, 2012) 
At the local and regional level, the legacy effects of mine closures, privatisation 
and redundancies have changed the role of communities to that of providing 
welfare. 
4.2.3.2 End of an era – rise of unemployment 
The decline of coal mining and the inextricable link between coal and 
communities lead to more than economic decline.  Very high levels of 
unemployment in former coalfields again increased the distinction between 
levels where former coal fields saw higher than national average levels of 
unemployment from 1984 onwards (appendix C).  
‘We were so dependent on coal then that the whole place just collapsed.  
We were the only ones still employing [power station] and the miners 
hated that because we used imported coal.’   
(Interviewee L18, 2012) 
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An unintended consequence of high levels of unemployment as discussed 
further in chapter seven, was that actors wider than state or private sector 
owners who had traditionally had roles in decision making no longer had 
relationships within the social field.   
Table 9 summarises the social metaphors for this governance era.  It is worth 
noting here, that as detailed above, the disconnect between governance at 
different levels of society becomes apparent for this field, where relationships 
between actors at different levels within each metaphor are weak or non-
existent.  In addition, it should be noted, that for ‘us and them’ and ‘end of an 
era’ metaphors, actors identifying these themes as relevant have little or no 
governance agency or representation within the field.  Former social 
relationships and entities have significantly declined as has the connection 
between social and economic where job losses are high. 
Three key points to note from chapter four will be explored in more depth in 
the discussion in chapter seven.  Firstly, this is an era of structural adjustment 
and also civil unrest; where organisational fields had been homogeneous, 
fields now begin to split over time and level.  Secondly, former ‘groups’ and 
associations lose their power and agency in favour of economic actors; ‘tax 
payers’, individuals, expert managers.  The dominant actors change and the 
relative influence of civic society groupings, such as trades unions, declines.  
In keeping with the decline of the state is the rise of corporate actors, 
voluntarism and CSR begin to emerge as features of good governance. 
Thirdly, the role of the regulator changes and the emergence of pseudo 
governmental groups, organisations and QUANGOS influences relationships 
between private, public and civic actors. For all these issues, relationships 
within and between fields have weakened and organisational fields at two 
levels emerge.  These core features for the old coal/new governance era are 
discussed in relation to the other organisational fields for this era as well as 
evident changes in power and agency. 
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Metaphors Level Agents and motives Entities Relationships 
No such thing as society – rise of individualism 
and market capitalism 
UK 
Individual 
Firm 
UK Government 
Corporate actors 
 
Small government 
Capital 
Thatcherism 
Individual 
Manager technocrats 
 
Us and them UK 
Local 
UK Government 
 
The Police 
Strikes 
Weakened 
End of an era Regional 
Local 
UK Government 
 
Unemployment 
Ex-miners 
 
Community 
Table 9 Social metaphors 1980s to 2000s 
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4.2.4 Organisational field for governance – two levels, two eras? 
This analysis demonstrates that dominant, dynamic forces change the nature 
of organisational fields of governance including in terms of actors and their 
motivations, relationships and entities that emerge.  Normative governance 
arrangements with the emergence of new corporate centric practices and 
reduced state including privatisation of formerly state owned industries 
correspond with increased coercion in terms of statutory instruments. 
A notable feature for this era is that the reduction of the state also, somewhat 
counterintuitively, increases the disconnect between levels of governance.  
Private ownership with expert managers rather than public sector managers 
and shop stewards, means that connections between employers and 
employees are at the micro firm, even site specific, rather than community 
level.  Market is nominally dominant, but powerful economic elites (nationally 
and internationally) reduce other actors’ agency.  
What this analysis demonstrates is that unexpected consequences occur 
when complexities such as the relationships and connections within and 
between fields are not fully understood.  Also, an interesting feature discussed 
in chapter nine is that the organisational field of governance is more than 
simply a description of the mechanisms and instruments of governance.  It is 
a landscape of cultural, societal, economic and environmental relationships 
which, because of temporal features, complex relationships and wicked 
context, lead to unknown and unintended consequences.  What starts as an 
homogenous set of well understood relationships morphs, and ends with a 
complex set of fields with multiple disconnects within and between levels.   
What is also interesting, is that over time, as fields diverge more clearly along 
economic, environmental and social lines, more consistency within fields starts 
to become evident.  For the environmental field, new relationships though are 
at different levels, so political economy internationally has 
environmental/political economy connections, whereas social organisational 
field has regional, local and national connections, but not international (other 
than as extension of para/meta communities).  Rise of sustainable 
development as an organising principle starts to work in to policy, however, 
issues relating to sustainability do not feature heavily in the texts.   
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Finally, it seems clear that there are useful benefits from taking a long 
exposure view of the emergence of the contemporary wicked problem of 
continued coal use.  The historical fields are useful to give a backdrop from 
which to consider the wicked problem of continued unabated coal use in the 
UK electricity sector in chapters five to eight in order to consider whether fields 
differ over time and levels of governance. 
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Chapter 5 – UK organisational fields for new governance of new coal?  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the period from the early 2000s to circa. 
2013/14 at macro, UK level.  Read together with chapters four and six, this 
chapter contributes to the research questions by considering the 
organisational fields of governance, how these have changed over time and 
level, and the implications for sustainability of new coal. 
Following this brief introduction, section 5.2 presents metaphors, themes and 
other rhetorical devices (Dryzek, 2005) associated with new governance 
arrangements and new coal.  Section 5.3 then draws together the 
organisational fields of governance for the period and (in response to 
objectives one and two) contributes a better understanding of the processes 
and outcomes of governance and implications for the sustainability of new 
coal.   
5.2 New governance, new coal? 
5.2.1 Economic Metaphors 
5.2.1.1 Coal + CCS ‘win-win’ scenario: low carbon economic growth, 
secure energy supply and emissions reductions 
A strongly represented economic theme running throughout the data, is that of 
so called ‘new’ or ‘clean’ coal, notably coal with CCS, as a ‘win-win’ solution to 
economic, energy and environmental problems.  Coal with CCS will, in this 
sense, enable continued use of a cheap, readily available fuel stock, thereby 
underpinning economic growth and development.  Simultaneously, the use of 
CCS technologies will contribute to national and international targets for 
reduction in CO2 emissions in to the atmosphere.  For example: 
‘CCS has the potential to: reduce emissions from fossil fuel power 
stations and industrial installations by around 90%; enable fossil fuels 
to continue to be an important element of a secure and diverse energy 
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mix; reduce the costs of tackling climate change; and create new 
economic opportunities for the UK.’   
(CCS Association, 2009, p.1) 
‘Secure, reliable and affordable energy supplies are needed for 
sustainable economic growth… CCS is therefore an essential part of 
the portfolio of technologies that is needed to achieve deep global 
emission reductions.’ 
(G8 Hokkaido, 2008, item 31, p.3) 
This metaphor strengthens throughout the period with continued coal use with 
CCS technology becoming core to energy policy: 
‘CCS is the only current means by which we can retain the benefits of 
fossil fuels in terms of significant resource availability, flexibility, 
affordability and diversity, whilst meeting our legally binding target to 
reduce carbon emissions by 80% from 1990 levels by 2050’  
(DECC, 2010b, p.5) 
[Emphasis added] 
 
And from the industrial, commercial and trades associations: 
‘We have here an opportunity to meet our commitment to generate 
affordable energy whilst simultaneously cutting CO2 emissions.’ 
(Workshop participant, O10, 2013) 
In this way, the discourse framing coal with CCS as a low carbon technology 
presents the continued use of fossil fuel as consistent with mitigation against 
climate change.  Within the metaphor a difference between discourses on 
green growth and low carbon economy emerges.  For example: 
‘CCS also represents a major green growth opportunity for the UK. …if 
CCS opportunities develop as anticipated, export opportunities for UK 
based firms have been estimated to be between £3 - 6.5 billion a year 
by the late 2020s’ 
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(DECC, 2012a, p. 17) 
[Emphasis added] 
And, it is… 
‘…vital that progress is made to ensure coal burn remains at a level 
which can support UK production during the transition to the low carbon 
economy which has CCS at its heart.’ 
(Trades Union Congress, 2011, p.7) 
The more nuanced theme that coal with CCS makes a positive contribution to 
a Low Carbon Economy (LCE) is evident in the texts.  This extract from RH Ed 
Milliband MP, the then Energy Secretary perhaps best illustrates the features 
of the metaphor: 
‘…The future of coal in our energy mix poses the starkest dilemma we 
face: it is a polluting fuel, but it is used across the world because it is low 
cost and it is flexible enough to meet fluctuations in demand for power. 
In the UK, a third of our existing coal-fired power stations are due to close 
in the coming decade. 
To ensure that we maintain a diverse energy mix… we need new coal-
fired power stations—but only if they can be part of the low-carbon 
future… There is a solution to the challenge—through carbon capture 
and storage.’ 
(Hansard. HC.Deb: col 382) 
Evidently, coal extraction and use cannot be considered ‘green’ given other 
negative environmental connotations of extraction and use, however coal with 
CCS, at least, lowers CO2 emissions to the atmosphere at point of combustion 
making it consistent with necessity to reduce GHG emissions to the 
atmosphere. 
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5.2.1.2 Market efficiency 
Core to this metaphor, is the belief that coal (with or without CCS) is likely to 
be used as long as it remains economically efficient to do so.  The data suggest 
that the extension of market led governance arrangements is seen as the best 
means of meeting energy challenges30.  Market reformation, specifically 
Electricity Market Reform (EMR), was designed during this era with the stated 
aim of attracting private sector investors to update ageing energy infrastructure 
in the UK (DECC, 2011b, p.15).  EMR is intended to increase 
commercialisation through competition for government funding.  This 
metaphor is exemplified in DECC texts: 
‘We need to reform the UK electricity market to attract the investment 
needed to replace our ageing energy infrastructure… Electricity Market 
Reform (EMR) is our initiative to make sure the UK remains a leading 
destination for investment in low-carbon electricity.’  
(DECC, 2013, no pagination) 
In this light, the UK is characterized as competing in international energy 
markets for investment.  The dominant view that liberalised energy markets, 
and freedom from ‘unnecessary regulation’ is extended, to suggest market 
liberalisation contributes to energy security.  
‘The UK has experienced strong energy security from a combination of 
its liberalised energy markets, firm regulation31 and extensive North Sea 
resources.’ 
(DECC, 2013, no pagination) 
The data indicate that public investment in new coal fired power stations is 
intended to incentivise commercialisation of CCS i.e. rather than fund CCS 
development itself: 
                                            
30 See also chapter eight for fuller discussion on this rhetoric. 
31 Something of an oxymoron is observed here, however regulation in this case refers almost 
exclusively to environmental issues i.e. emissions and particulate matter limits for NOx and 
SO2. 
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‘Development and deployment of CCS is key if the UK is to achieve our 
climate change targets whilst maintaining a vibrant, competitive 
economy… Government policy is not to dictate the [energy] mix, but to 
allow technologies to compete to ensure the overall system is delivered 
at the lowest possible cost to the bill payer.’  
(DECC, 2012a, pp.15-16) 
[parentheses added]  
CCS is seen here as one of several, alternative low carbon energy technology 
options and the need to reform the market in order to ensure competition 
between technologies (i.e. economic rationality) determines which technology 
will ultimately be adopted. 
‘The Government’s objective is to have competition between low carbon 
generation technologies in the 2020s with the market deciding…’ 
(DECC CCS Roadmap, 2012, p. 23) 
[Emphasis added] 
The commercialisation programme, including establishment of UKCCSRC and 
Cost Reduction Task Force as core activities in the CCS Roadmap, 
demonstrates dominance of economic rationale for decisions.   
‘The government is looking at how to remove unnecessary regulation to 
enable CCS with coal in its reforms.’  
(Workshop participant, O10, 2013) 
‘’…coal plus CCS will only have a future if it is profitable under the new 
EMR versus unabated gas.’ 
(UKCCSRC, 2013, p.2) 
However, whilst the dominant metaphor suggests that an efficient market for 
electricity is essential, some inconsistency within this metaphor is evident.  
This extract exemplifies the point. 
‘It’s a bit of a mess… compared with Ireland or Norway even where 
there’s a lot more public ownership of utilities still, so you get a more 
104 
 
 
 
 
managed infrastructure.  In some ways this [climate change] is just too 
big a problem to leave it to chance but that’s what’s happening here.’   
(Interviewee L17, 2012) 
[Parentheses added] 
In addition, there is concern that the market led approach, and consequently 
EMR, whilst desirable is ultimately flawed.  Whilst the data on this point are not 
sufficiently rigorous to draw firm conclusions, concern for efficacy of market 
led approach where for example the carbon floor price32 is low, was also 
expressed by industry delegates at the UKCCSRC Future of Coal workshop.  
To summarise: 
‘…there’s too much at risk.  We’re talking billions to get these projects 
up and running, and then there might be a legislative change, or the 
price of carbon isn’t high enough so it’s not worth it.  Shareholders won’t 
support this sort of risk, so if the UK wants CCS at scale it’s going to 
have to pay for it out of the public purse.’ 
(Workshop participant, O10, 2013) 
The carbon floor price at the time is, in this view, so low that unabated coal 
remains economically viable.  The IEA have suggested (IEA, 2014) that €50 
would be required to make coal uneconomical and encourage generators to 
switch wholesale to gas; in April 2012 it was launched at £16. This metaphor 
is explored further in the update in chapter eight, but in summary, the price of 
carbon remains contested. 
5.2.1.3 Commercial scale and capture ready (or not at all) 
The UK CCS Roadmap focuses on developing CCS to commercial scale.  
However, the term ‘commercial scale’ (and also associated terms such as, 
large scale, ‘Capture Ready’, CCS Commercialisation Programme) is not 
understood fully.  In one sense, commercial scale means bringing together 
                                            
32 As one of the mechanisms employed to marketise carbon 
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multiple aspects of the CCS chain used separately to test full chain feasibility 
with coal.  This is a costly process:   
‘CCS is not a new or emerging technology… While all the elements of 
CCS have been separately proven and deployed in various fields of 
commercial activity, a key step is the successful integration of large-
scale CCS systems… A concerted effort is needed to commercialize 
CCS at large scale in the power sector.’ 
(WCA, 2012, no pagination) 
‘… The Government’s interventions are intended to facilitate the 
development of CCS into a mature technology capable of being 
assessed by investors on a normal commercial basis.’ 
(DECC, 2012a, p.23) 
In another, it relates to size of operation in terms of energy generation capacity, 
and here there is some confusion:   
‘The UK law on post combustion capture says the minimum capture is 
300MW, but it doesn’t matter what the plant size is, so that could be 
300MW for an 800MW plant and it would still be fine.  There’s no 
guidance on what commercial scale means.’ 
(Presentation, O11, 2013) 
‘…new plants need one CC unit per 300MW.  There’s no regulations or 
guidance yet on type, size, capture rates…’ 
(Workshop participant, O10, 2013) 
Similarly: 
Participant A:  ‘It’s understood that the whole plant must be capture 
ready33 though.’ 
                                            
33 There is a ‘…requirement for all new fossil fuel power stations to be Carbon Capture Ready, to ensure 
that newly constructed unabated fossil fuel power stations are able to fit CCS’  (DECC, 2012a, p.24) 
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Participant B:  ‘Maybe so, but what does that actually mean?  We can 
demonstrate some existing plants can be classed as capture ready, but 
we would need capture plant the size of a football pitch in some cases 
right next to a residential area?’ 
Participant A:  ‘Under the guidance we would need to take each case 
on its merits’ 
(O12, 2013) 
This concern relating to specifics of what ‘commercial scale’ means is 
interesting for two reasons.  Firstly, from an operational and commercial 
perspective, there is an inherent contradiction:  Generators are not, without 
government backing, willing to run the risk of developing a commercial scale 
operation, yet government will only support funding for commercial scale 
operations to incentivise market actors to develop CCS as an economically 
viable technology.  This also ties with environmental sticking plaster metaphor 
which suggests that, at best CCS will provide a short term respite rather than 
long term investment opportunity.  For example: 
‘In the UK, a proposed new coal-fired power plant at Kingsnorth, Kent, 
is being sold as “capture ready”; able to incorporate CCS should the 
technology ever become available in the future. However, no one has 
any idea if and when this might be.  In the meantime, and possibly for 
its entire lifetime, Kingsnorth (if built) will pump out around 8 million 
tonnes of CO2 per year…’ 
(Greenpeace, 2009, p. 6) 
Secondly, the technical leap from test to commercial scale is significant, and 
this in itself is delaying development.  In the context of wicked problems, 
Grubler and Wilson (2013) suggest that multiple small scale developments are 
more appropriate to test feasibility of full chain CCS.  An interesting associated 
point is explored by Wilson et al (2012) and Riahi et al., (2012) who also note 
that up-scaling to large scale plant for energy developments historically follows 
longer periods of small scale plant development. 
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5.2.1.4 Uncertainty (due to ineffective UK Government) 
This complex and nuanced metaphor is particularly evident amongst industry 
texts.  Observation and interview data from commercial and NGO texts in 
particular, suggest three complementary themes underpin this metaphor:   
(i) lack of ‘level playing field’ for CCS/coal in policy  
(ii) inconsistency, changing political scene, and  
(iii) cost and financial uncertainty 
(i) Lack of ‘level playing field’ for CCS/coal in policy: 
Despite government statements relating to market being allowed to determine 
most efficient energy, coal with CCS is perceived as being treated less 
favourably in policy than other low carbon energy options or, even, unabated 
gas.  
‘…at the minute we’re assuming no new coal fired plants without CCS, 
and new plants will only get permits if they are capture ready, whatever 
that means, but then unabated gas is OK?’  
(Participant, O10, 2013) 
‘There’s a catch 22 situation being discussed… a bias towards gas, 
leading to policy and investment decisions based on gas even though 
this might not be best long term solution to low cost low carbon energy.’  
(Observation notes, O12, 2013) 
 
‘If we had the same sort of investment and government backing as 
renewables, we would have working capture plants in operation already.’ 
(Participant, O10, 2013) 
Similarly, from TUC Roadmap for Coal:  
‘Actions taken now … can secure this core industry in a low carbon 
economy for the long term. Delays will drive investment and dependency 
on gas fired power without resolving the challenge of CO2 capture…’ 
(Trades Union Congress, 2011, p.6) 
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(ii) Inconsistency, changing political landscape:  From ‘no new coal’ to ‘putting 
the coal in coalition’  
During the early part of this era, coal was very much characterised as a dirty 
fossil fuel.  Dominant environmental metaphors (as discussed in section 5.2.2) 
relate to this, and government policies (UK, EU as well as regional) reflected 
the perception of coal as less desirable than either gas or nuclear.  Coal fired 
power stations are seen as costly incumbencies and policy (economic and 
environmental) is geared toward closure of ‘inefficient’ plant..   However, from 
mid to late 2000s, CCS emerges as an option for economically viable low cost, 
low carbon energy and the discourse changes from an emphatic: 
‘A coal plant is a coal plant is a coal plant – still the dirtiest form 
of energy known to us, no matter which way you look at it.’  
(Greenpeace, 2008b)   
To:  
‘…no new coal without CCS…’   
(Rt Hon Ed Milliband MP, in Guardian, 2009)  
And coal with CCS as:   
 ‘one of the four pillars of a green economy’   
(Rt Hon Chris Hulme MP, 2010) 
And finally that Government should be:   
 ‘putting the coal back in to coalition’   
(RT Hon John Hayes MP, 2013 quoted in opening address O10)34 
 
Findings from the E.On Kingsnorth CCS Demonstration also suggest that 
political inconsistency is problematic in CCS demonstration projects.  As 
discussed in section 2.1.2, the Front End Engineering Design (FEED) study 
notes that delays to adoption of CCS are largely due to economic and policy 
                                            
34 From the then Minister of State for Energy John Hayes welcome speach at the World Coal 
Association Leadership forum. 
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issues rather than, technical, environmental or geological reasons.  In 
particular, incumbent generators do not sufficiently benefit from CCS for them 
to be able to absorb investment costs and do not want to be loss leaders whilst 
UK regulatory, policy and economic positions are not clear.  The corollary 
being that the ‘test’ stage relates more to testing the market and economic 
feasibility of the technology than its potential for carbon capture.     
‘We’re pretty much ready to go on the technical side.  We know what 
we need to do and it’s case by case decisions and engineering 
workarounds.  Almost everything that delayed and finally stopped 
Kingsnorth was about economics and politics.’ 
(Interviewee L21, 2012) 
Prior to policy developed in 2012/13 and CCS Roadmap (and to a degree 
since), there was considerable confusion relating to whether CCS would be 
supported by government, and if so in what way.  Under the Roadmap, policy 
promotes commercialisation and seeks ways to make CCS economically 
viable, but there is no commitment to, for example, fund CCS for environmental 
reasons if economic viability is not proven.  From the observation data, during 
discussion on whether CCS could mean ‘new life’ for existing coal fired power 
stations: 
‘I’d like to think it will… we just don’t know... we have a commitment to 
close the boilers [under LCPD], but then there’s new rules on capture 
readiness for new plant and some retrofits may legally be considered as 
new builds and so subject to the same minimum 300MW regulations…’ 
(Participant, O10, 2013) 
[Parentheses added] 
Similarly: 
‘I feel like I’ve been to hundreds of these events [industry meeting] but 
we’re not really getting anywhere.  We basically know what to do 
technically… but the government keeps pushing it in to the long grass.’ 
(Participant O11, 2013) 
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And from document texts: 
‘The limited number of industrial-scale CCS plants currently operating 
globally is primarily a result of public policy expecting CCS to be delivered 
by the private sector, while at the same time failing to address the barriers 
which are inhibiting CCS deployment.’ 
(World Coal Association, 2012, no pagination) 
Delays are seen as specifically caused by changes in and delays to 
government policy and funding criteria.  This quote from Greenpeace 
illustrates the point:  
‘The reason [for request for delays in Kingsnorth] appears to be 
because of confusion over where government coal policy currently 
stands.’   
(Greenpeace, 2009, p.1) 
[Parenthesis added] 
(iii)  Cost and investment uncertainties:  moving goal posts 
Changes in government as well as departmental ministers’ positions on CCS, 
are seen as problematic by causing confusion and delay in CCS development 
which introduces additional risk.  This uncertainty is seen as likely to further 
derail attempts to find technically and economically viable energy solutions.  
This metaphor is evident from both interviews and observations. 
‘Nobody can make any final decisions on investment until we know 
what’s going on… this government doesn’t have a clue about how 
to deal with the problem, they don’t even seem clear on what the 
problem is.’ 
(Participant, O10, 2013) 
Here, changing Governments’ policies combined with unclear and 
unpredictable framework for funding exacerbate financial and economic 
uncertainties already intrinsic to market lead approach to governance thereby 
creating additional commercial risk.  This in turn leads to project slippage and 
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slow progress towards operational CCS.  Compare the intention for 
development of CCS during the early part of this era: 
‘The United Kingdom is advancing CCS via its large-scale 
demonstration competition, which will announce one major project 
to be operational by 2014… in April 2009 the government 
announced proposals to establish a mechanism to support up to four 
large-scale CCS demonstrations and to require any new coal-fired 
power plant over 300 MW capacity to demonstrate CCS on a 
proportion of its capacity.’ 
(IEA, 2009, p.5) 
 
Versus more recent comments on progress toward operational CCS. 
‘We’ve been using carbon capture for ages, it’s really not that 
difficult.  We could have clean coal whenever we want it, but 
someone has to stick their hands in their pockets or we’ll never get 
these projects off the ground.'  
(Interviewee L23, 2012) 
This is seen as problematic and potentially leading to project delays by 
business and commercial actors in an historically regulated industry unwilling 
to make investment decisions for CCS in a dominantly/increasingly market led 
sector.  The complexity of the issue is not lost on commercial actors: 
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(Source: DECC, E.On FEED study presentation, 2011a, p15) 
 
In this view the Government is ineffective at developing policy and a funding 
context suited to developing CCS at commercial scale.  Conversely, the UK 
Government consistently reports that development needs to be a partnership, 
multi-level multi actor governance, market led approach.  This is evidently 
problematic as discussed in chapters eight and nine.  In essence, commercial 
actors want reduced regulation but increased public funding and security 
whereas the Government wants increased responsibility, private sector 
investment, and reduced public funding.  This paradox seems part of the crux 
of the wicked problem under study.   
Perhaps this metaphor may be best summed up by the following extract from 
a speech by the then head of the CCSA: 
‘There is nothing stopping CCS but policy.’ 
(Chapman, 2008, p.1) 
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5.2.1.5 Economic Agents 
During this era at the macro level, the UK Government, especially as 
represented by DECC, is a key agent emerging from all texts, in particular their 
role in propagating the case for coal with CCS as a win-win scenario is evident.  
Reference to DECC from other actors, notably in the latter part of the period 
under study, i.e. during their production and roll out of the Roadmap for CCS 
and commercialisation programme is common.  Government regulators in the 
form of the Environment Agency (EA) and the Scottish Environment Agency 
(SEA) also feature in metaphors relating to confusion and moving goal posts, 
but to a lesser extent at UK level than at Y&H scale (see chapter six).  For 
example: 
‘…we don’t know how they [new regulations on capture ready coal 
fired power stations] are going to work yet.  I don’t think anyone 
does, not even your lot [put to a representative of the SEA, who 
agreed with a nod].’ 
(Participant, O10, 2013) 
Commercial actors, and their representatives (such as the World Coal 
Association, and UK Coal Importers), especially those involved in funded 
demonstrator projects (generators and distributors) or competing for EU or UK 
government funding are strongly evident throughout the texts.  Their role in 
promoting both ‘win-win’ and market efficiency metaphors is strong, and 
commercial actors are evident in DECC and UK government policy and wider 
texts.  However, agents from both business and public spheres see the UK 
Government, and especially DECC, as dominant and as playing a lead role in 
co-ordinating UK developments. This dominance of government as key 
economic agent is perhaps because CCS with coal is not yet a commercial 
entity.  The government is active in trying to commercialise CCS projects, in 
part because financial/economic benefits to commercial incumbents in the 
private sector are not clear. 
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‘It’s not clear how we’re [generator] going to benefit financially from 
CCS… DECC needs to lead the way on this’ 
(Interviewee L17, 2012) 
As part of this process of commercialisation, the UK CCS Research Centre 
(from 2012), an EPSRC and DECC funded membership group of academics 
with associate business and government members, also plays a key role in 
economic metaphors.   
‘A key priority [for the UKCCSRC] is supporting the UK economy by 
driving an integrated research programme and building research 
capacity that is focused on maximising the contribution of CCS to a 
low-carbon energy system for the UK.’ 
(UKCCSRC, 2012, no pagination) 
[Parentheses added] 
Academics and researchers, as well as associated organisations such as the 
IEA, in this sense become economic agents; core to research funding in CCS 
is the demonstration of economic viability.  Business and commercial actors, 
in particular power generators, chemical and extractives but also developers 
and consultancies, are represented strongly within UKCCSRC.  Prior to this 
grouping there was greater inconsistency between economic actors from 
commercial and academic spheres. 
Finally, at national scale the trades unions (notably the TUC) and other trades 
bodies as well as NGOs, are present in the discourse (for example at events, 
meetings and as report producers), but notably not frequently referred to by 
other dominant actors in the texts analysed.  These TUs and NGOs in many 
cases offer opposition to mainstream government and commercial actors, 
again they are present in metaphors that emerge around confusion and 
disconnect in particular in economic metaphors 3 and 4.    
It is worth noting in summary, that at this macro level, agency is witnessed 
predominantly at organisational level, with apparent ‘collectivities’ (Dryzek, 
2005) rather than dominant individuals.  This corresponds with findings from 
the analysis of economic entities at UK level for this era. 
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5.2.1.6 Economic Entities 
Emerging metaphors suggest a dominant economic discourse relating to 
liberalisation of a free market for electricity.  Core to this metaphor is the 
intended strengthening of market lead governance of energy sector through 
Electricity Market Reform and commercialisation programme embedded within 
it.  This extends to EU and UK funding competitions which use economic tools 
such as EU Emissions Trading Scheme and Carbon Price Floor (CPF): 
‘CPF is the necessary first step in delivering a package of reforms for 
the electricity market to support low-carbon investment’ 
(DECC, 2011b, p.33) 
Consortia of commercial organisations with interests in for example extraction, 
chemical processing, electricity generation and distribution emerge in line with 
government announcements on funding from circa 2008.  Arguably these 
company alliances have emerged as entities which can both increase 
innovation (Dalziel, 2010) and reduce individual company risk; no single 
organisation is willing to be a loss leader and hence (funded) demonstrator 
projects proposals are led by consortia organisations established for the sole 
purpose of developing a funded CCS project, examples include 2COPower 
and the Don Valley Power Project, Kingholme and White Rose Consortia. 
On the demand side of the electricity market, consumers and tax payers 
(sometimes expressed in the texts as ‘bill payers’ and occasionally ‘voters’) 
are referred to within metaphors as being ultimate funders of coal with CCS 
developments and are represented in the texts as part of the decision making 
process.  However, what is clear is that neither consumers nor tax payers are 
involved in governance or decision making in any meaningful way, rather they 
are referred to as needing to be considered by other dominant agents.  And 
policy recognises cost to bill and tax payers as significant with low cost energy 
becoming central to both EMR and policy reform more widely. 
Finally, throughout the era, economic metaphors relate strongly to coal with 
CCS as a potential ‘win-win’ scenario.  Within this metaphor, coal fired power 
stations, initially seen as dirty and nearing obsolescence, become entities with 
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potential to support this win-win metaphor.  There is a change from ‘dirty’ coal 
fired power stations in the discourse, to power stations having ‘new life’ and 
being economically viable again where CCS is developed: 
‘…some of these old turbines still have life in them...’  
(Interviewee L18, 2012) 
5.2.1.7 Economic Relationships 
For these economic metaphors, relationships are strongest between 
government and business, but business to business relationships form and 
consolidate throughout the era also.  Figure 5.1 illustrates these relationships 
and section 5.2.3 draws together the fields to infer prospects for sustainability 
understood from this analysis. 
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Figure 3 Economic relationships 2000-2013 – organisational field 
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5.2.2 Environmental Metaphors 
The metaphors relating to environmental issues for 2000-2013, are, arguably 
more nuanced and complex than economic ones, reflecting wider 
environmental discourses that emerge and consolidate throughout the era35.   
5.2.2.1 Squaring the Circle - From ‘dirty old’ to ‘new clean’ coal    
The post-industrial, ‘dirty coal’ discourse evident throughout the 1980s and 
1990s prevailed at macro level from both government and civil society sources 
at least, until the mid-2000s.  Environmental governance of coal was 
dominated by mine closures, legislation for NOx and SO2 emissions 
reductions, and closure of coal fired power stations under the conditions of the 
Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD).  However, from the mid-2000s, coal 
with CCS was promulgated as a viable technical option.  Continued coal use 
with CCS is presented by government and business actors in particular, as 
potentially having a positive environmental impact due to its expected CO2 
reduction.  However, other environmental issues relating to coal use (for 
example air quality, extraction), are less evident.  
The texts reflect at least a partial change in dominant discourse surrounding 
coal, from coal being portrayed as a dirty fossil fuel whose use must be 
stopped, to a potentially relevant, indeed an essential part of the energy mix.  
It is worth noting, that whilst data cannot suggest causality this change in 
discourse corresponds with an era of increased coal use.  When considered 
in concert with the metaphor, this increased coal use at least suggests a 
renewed acceptance of coal as an energy source as part of the energy mix on 
the part of dominant actors.  At UK level, this environmental metaphor is 
exemplified by this statement from the then Secretary of State for the 
Environment Ed Milliband: 
[There will be] ‘…no new coal without CCS…  There is no alternative 
to CCS if we are serious about fighting climate change. We need 
                                            
35 In concert with changing economic metaphors during structural adjustment of 80s and 90s  
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new coal-fired power stations… Without it [CCS] we will not 
succeed.’ 
(Guardian, 2009, p1) 
[Parentheses added] 
Coal with CCS, and other technologies such as IGCC, bio-fuel combustion at 
coal fired power stations are then presented as ‘clean’ technologies.  
Government and business texts especially present coal as a clean energy 
option, with ‘new coal’ and ‘clean coal’ and ‘low carbon energy’ used 
synonymously with reference to coal use with CCS. 
‘…a new world-leading UK CCS industry… that could compete with 
other low-carbon sources…’ 
(Davey, 2012, no pagination) 
Interestingly, this corresponds also with a growing use of environmental and 
sustainability reporting by incumbent industrial actors (see appendix B for 
examples).  This is in concert with the literature relating to CSR and 
voluntarism as part of good governance, replacing the state, as well as 
discourse on avoidance of legislation. 
The view of ‘clean’ coal developments as a means of meeting GHG reduction 
targets (as well as in conjunction with existing technologies reduction in other 
pollutants associated with coal combustion e.g. mercury, particulate matter) 
becomes commonplace in the texts.  Indeed, by the end of the era under study 
and in keeping with economic metaphors above, clean coal development is 
presented as the ‘only’ viable way of meeting both energy and environmental 
targets. 
‘CCS is the only way we can reduce carbon dioxide emissions and 
keep fossil fuels (coal and gas) in the UK’s electricity supply mix. 
Fossil fuels are an important part of the electricity mix (and will 
remain so for some time to come).’ 
(DECC, 2013, p25) 
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[Emphasis added] 
The environmental language associated with new coal technologies - clean 
coal, sustainable coal, new coal - allows for a squaring of the circle in discourse 
on continued coal use at macro scale. 
Within the texts from NGOs, however, the metaphor becomes more nuanced 
still; Greenpeace, No Coal and others argue that CCS should not be compared 
with e.g. renewables in policy terms, as essentially the technology is a ‘sticking 
plaster’ and contributes to carbon lock-in (see sticking plaster metaphor).   
5.2.2.2 Abated coal - CCS as a technical solution to the problem of coal 
As an extension of the squaring the circle metaphor above, two themes 
emerge at UK level (i) emissions reduction and (ii) decarbonisation, which 
combined present new coal as ‘abated coal’, each is developed here in turn. 
(i) Emissions reduction 
UK Government policy has a particular focus on CCS as a technology that will 
contribute to UK’s emissions reduction targets.  Policies relating to coal 
developed since 2001 directly refer to the technology’s potential for use in 
reducing GHG emissions.  In addition, in the UK policy context the stated 
intention for CCS as an emission reducing technology is consolidated in both 
the CCS Commercialisation Programme and the DECC CCS Roadmap:  
‘…the power sector is the largest source of emissions – and 
therefore the sector which can contribute most to the reduction of 
those emissions.’  
(DECC, 2012a, p23) 
‘…with CCS we have a technology that will help us meet 
environmental commitments to reduce CO2 emissions.’ 
(Participant, O10, 2013) 
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Well thought out environmental regulation is seen as crucial in the context of 
abatement; for incumbent business actors, this also connects with economic 
metaphors for what they class as a level playing field for abated coal.36   
For the UK, coal is seen as a good option to meet CO2 reductions 
and NOx, SO2 legislation, but recognition that we need to have CCS 
and CO2 abatement technologies in place to continue to use coal.  
(Observation notes, O10, 2013) 
(ii) Decarbonisation and mitigation technology 
Decarbonisation of energy supply features strongly in the texts.  Coal with CCS 
is seen as an opportunity to, specifically, decarbonise electricity production in 
the UK.   
‘Carbon Capture and Storage is a mitigation technology essential in 
tackling global climate change…  Up to 90% of carbon dioxide (CO₂) 
from a fossil fuel power station can be captured using CCS 
technology.’   
(UK Coal Ltd, 2013, p. 2)  
It is interesting to note, that the government and business texts consistently 
quote the upper reaches of potential for decarbonisation.  However, a contrary 
view relates to the fact that full chain technology is not yet tested at scale.  In 
addition, capacity to mitigate emissions is questioned; government and 
business texts typically estimate up to 90% of CO2 emissions could be 
captured as above, however academic and NGO sources are more cautious: 
‘Assuming that commercial viability is reached, scenario studies 
indicate that by 2050 only 20-40% of global fossil fuel CO2 emissions 
could be technically suitable for capture. This includes 30-60% of 
emissions from the power sector. Therefore, up to 70% of emissions 
from electricity generation in 2050 may not even be technically 
suited to CCS.’ 
                                            
36 It is worth noting here again, that the level playing field is seen as necessary to make coal 
+ CCS economically viable rather than environmentally or technically viable. 
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(Greenpeace, 2008a, p. 6) 
It is also worth noting here that in 2008, along with statements on the future of 
coal, the incumbent Labour Government made announcements re 
construction of new nuclear. The aim was to develop a policy and regulatory 
framework which would see coal with CCS as a means of smoothing the 
transition to a more sustainable, low carbon energy system.  As discussed 
further in chapter eight, the relatively low capital investment required to 
develop new coal plant versus new nuclear was appealing to both public and 
private sector investors.   
5.2.2.3 Ideal geo-political context for clean coal in UK - environmental 
regulatory framework 
In concert with win-win economic metaphors, data from government sources 
in particular, as well as texts from business and limited civil society sources, 
suggest that the UK is actively presented as having an ideal geo-political 
context for CCS with fossil fuels and coal in particular.   
‘The UK is in a very advantageous position as we have access to 
offshore CO₂ storage locations, under the North Sea… The UK is 
well placed to deliver on its climate change targets and coal with 
CCS can provide a secure, affordable and low carbon solution.’ 
(UK Coal, 2013, pp. 2-3) 
At the UK level, existing infrastructure is presented as contributing to the ‘ideal’ 
geo-political context.  The physical location of energy infrastructure (i.e. close 
to former coalfields), makes continued coal use technically and 
environmentally, as well as economically, efficient.   
Figures 4 and 5 below and the accompanying extracts observed at a 
UKCCSRC workshop, exemplify this metaphor. 
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(Source:  Anonymised slides from UK CCS Future Coal Workshop, observation O10, 2013) 
Figure 4 Imported coal to UK coal fired plants via established routes  
 
(Source:  Anonymised slides from workshop) 
Figure 5 Existing rail infrastructure and links  
As a counterpoint to this ‘ideal’ scenario metaphor, the pre-existence of an 
energy infrastructure grounded in old technologies (old coal) is evidently 
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problematic in two ways: Firstly, reliance on existing infrastructure and 
resource use may be contributing to ‘carbon lock-in’ (Unruh, 2000).  There is 
some evidence here to support this: UK infrastructure has been developed 
based on coal use (environmental determinism – see chapter 4 it is no 
coincidence that the industrial cities of England and Scotland sit on coal fields), 
it will prima facie be less suited to other fuel sources. 
‘… coal forms the backbone of our energy infrastructure.  Ports, 
railways, canals, roads were all developed to export coal and 
distribute it to industrial centres… Make no bones about it, if we 
stopped using coal we wouldn’t just have to build new power plants 
we’d have to build a whole new infrastructure to support whatever 
other fuel we used.’ 
(Participant, O10, 2013) 
Secondly, in attempts to decarbonise energy infrastructure quickly and at low 
cost, continued coal use on these grounds, might be seen as evidence of 
carbon lock-in (Unruh, 2000).  The complexity of this wicked scenario, 
discussed below, is exemplified in the following extract: 
‘Basically, the Government has to decide whether we want to carry 
on using coal or not now…  There are some sound reasons why we 
would want to, infrastructure, transport networks… but obviously 
with CO2 emissions [it is a problem]. And they’re not thinking about 
where these new plants are going to be.  They can’t always be 
where existing ones are because capture plants are huge, so unless 
they’re under-ground where would they go?’ 
(Interviewee L19, 2012) 
[Emphasis and parenthesis added] 
An additional level of complexity relates to the extent to which coal and its 
environmental impacts are understood by both commercial actors and the 
wider public.  For coal, the business as usual scenario is at least well 
understood and coal, whilst not desirable, has a degree of public acceptance.  
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However, new technologies such as CCS associated with continued coal use, 
do not.  It is interesting to consider how this conundrum is viewed by UK actors: 
‘The environmental risks of CCS are no worse than natural gas, 
probably less than fracking, but we still need to convince people of 
that.’ 
(Interviewee L21, 2012) 
‘Consumers can be educated about what to expect – with coal 
starting from a better place than either nuclear or fracking’ 
(Observation notes, O11) 
This feature of the data is explored in more depth as a dominantly social 
metaphor, however, a point to note here is that the decision to continue to use 
coal, given the environmental issues associated with its combustion, is seen 
by dominant commercial actors as an issue for the Government rather than 
wider governance actors.  A final connected point relating to the ideal geo-
political context for new coal is that the environmental regulatory framework in 
the UK is presented as being well established and fit for purpose.  A 
combination of regulated limits to emissions, good reporting practices, strong 
relationships between the regulators and energy sector actors and good 
corporate governance is seen as ideal.  This ideal context is portrayed by 
dominant actors as ameliorating environmental harm (as well as public 
concerns about potential environmental harm) through existing governance 
processes. 
Discussion on planning being two-way process, BATT as basic and 
encouraged to go beyond.  EA involved from start. 
(Observation notes, O12, 2013) 
This metaphor therefore becomes disconnected on this point.  Incumbent 
commercial actors are present in the discourse, and new governance 
arrangements require their involvement in two-way governance and decision 
making processes, however, if new, low carbon coal technologies are to be 
deployed as a means of decarbonising energy supply, decision making 
ultimately rests with the Government. 
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5.2.2.4 Carbon lock-in, business as usual 
At macro level, this metaphor around CCS ultimately extending fossil fuel use 
emerges in two opposing ways.  Firstly, environmental NGOs and (some) civil 
society texts present CCS as an ‘environmental bad’ by encouraging business 
as usual and carbon lock-in.  Secondly, and in opposition to this view, 
government and especially business texts present coal with CCS as an 
economically and technically viable means of decarbonising UK energy 
supply.  Coal with CCS is this sense portrayed as an ‘environmental good’ - a 
sustainable, low carbon energy solution and an opportunity to continue using 
cheap coal and other fossil fuels.  These opposing views within the same 
metaphor are explored here in turn. 
(i) Sticking plaster:   
At the core of this metaphor is the view that continued use of coal, even with 
carbon capture has associated negative consequences; carbon lock in and at 
best weak sustainability; post-industrial agglomeration of environmental harm; 
exacerbated harmful climate change.  In addition, the national focus on 
developing CCS is seen as a distraction in the short and medium term from 
longer term sustainable energy options such as renewables. 
Coal with CCS as a sticking plaster is especially exemplified by texts from 
environmental NGOs who present concerns relating to the construction of new 
coal fired power stations as ‘capture ready’.37 This is problematic for a number 
of reasons including cost, diversion of resources from alternative renewable 
options, untested technology, associated risks and, in particular, that the 
technology will not be effective in time to avert climate change: 
‘Proposals to approve new coal stations that are “capture ready” are 
a dangerous distraction. Carbon capture and storage may have a 
role in future to deliver the deep emission reductions that are needed 
to avoid climate chaos. However, CCS technology has not yet been 
proven at scale… to be technically or economically feasible. Building 
                                            
37 This clearly relates to capture ready metaphors and concern with regulatory confusion in 
section 5.2.1.4 
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“capture ready” stations now would therefore impose unacceptable 
risks both to the climate and to the taxpayer, who may well be 
trapped into footing the bill for any future CCS retrofit.’ 
(NGO joint statement; 2008, p.1) 
This statement in itself represents something of a compromised, tempered 
account of the discourse as compared with individual NGO statements earlier 
in this governance era.   
Within this metaphor there is also a concomitant concern regarding 
sequestration and longevity of storage of CO2 and the inevitability of continued 
fossil fuel use if the technology is developed at scale.   In the early part of the 
era, CCS was at best seen as a stop gap or ‘sticking plaster’ to be employed 
until more sustainable energy solutions could be developed.   
(ii) Magic bullet (win-win… win?) 
As expectations associated with environmental benefits from clean CCS 
developed, so too did concerns that clean coal technologies were being seen 
as a magic bullet.  From Greenpeace’s ‘False Hope:  Why CCS won’t save the 
climate’ for example: 
‘The earliest CCS may be technically feasible at utility scale is 2030. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) does not 
expect CCS to become commercially viable until at least the second 
half of this century.  Even then, plants responsible for 40-70% of 
electricity sector CO2 emissions will not be suitable for carbon 
capture.  Despite this, CCS is being used as an excuse by power 
companies and utilities to push ahead with plans to build new coal-
fired power plants; branding them “capture ready.” The International 
Energy Agency (IEA) describes a “capture-ready” plant as one 
“which can be retrofitted with CO2 capture when the necessary 
regulatory or economic drivers are in place”. This definition is broad 
enough to make any station theoretically “capture-ready”, and the 
term meaningless.’ 
(Greenpeace, 2008a, p.6) 
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The connection to the ‘capture ready’ metaphor explored earlier is evident, 
here however ‘capture ready’ is discussed as harmful rhetoric.  The opposite 
view, i.e. that coal with CCS is a potential environmental good is, dominantly 
presented from business and government texts; coal is plentiful, cheap, easy 
to extract, readily available and available abatement technologies will reduce 
GHG emissions to the atmosphere.  This, again, ties closely with economic 
metaphors relating to coal with CCS as a win-win opportunity. 
Commercial actors in particular express this metaphor in terms of availability 
and stable cost of coal at current rates of energy use.  Most clearly exemplified 
by various national and international coal related business consortia, for 
example: 
‘Proven world coal reserves amount to around 900 billion tonnes, 
equivalent to 125 years supply at current rates of usage. Against 
this background, and with the massive growth in coal use in 
economies such as China and India, climate change policies need 
to include clean coal as part of the solution’ 
(Coal Importers Association, no date, p.1) 
‘With the aid of CCS our new, highly efficient coal-fired power 
stations will make a significant contribution to achieving our climate 
protection targets and halving carbon dioxide emissions from our 
power stations by 2030.’ 
(E.ON, 2009, no pagination)  
The point to note here is that environmental, technical, geological and 
geopolitical issues are integral yet, once again, secondary to economic 
considerations.  It also introduces a related, more nuanced metaphor that 
whilst environmental problems (associated with coal extraction and 
combustion) exist and are well understood, technical solutions will be available 
to overcome these environmental challenges.   
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This interesting passage from the World Coal Association exemplifies this 
somewhat promethean (Dryzek, 2005) perspective: 
‘The deployment of all energy generating technologies invariably 
leads to some degree of environmental impact… The use of coal for 
power generation is not exempt from these impacts and has been 
associated with a number of environmental challenges, primarily 
associated with air emissions.  Coal has demonstrated the ability to 
meet such challenges in the past and the expectation is that it will 
successfully meet future environmental challenges.’ 
(World Coal Association, 2013, p.1) 
In this sense, environmental problems associated with coal use are considered 
an inevitable by-product of energy generation; if not coal then other generation 
technologies will cause other problems.  In concert with economic metaphors 
already explored at UK and also Yorkshire and Humber level in chapter six, an 
element of ‘better the devil you know’ emerges from the business and 
government texts as these excerpts from observation data illustrate: 
Coal is being compared to other energy options, at least balanced, 
sometimes favourable if with CCS… coal with CCS is thought better 
than many options in both environmental and economic terms.  
Public acceptance less of an issue for coal than for nuclear, location 
of existing plant close to coal seams means hard work and 
environmental damage already done, new plant - gas or nuclear, or 
on-shore wind sufficient for base-load would be worse for 
environment. 
(Observation notes, O11, 2013) 
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(Source: Anonymised slide from workshop presentation, O10, 2013) 
Figure 6 Balancing nuclear versus new coal options  
 
This, of all environmental metaphors perhaps demonstrates the complex, 
wicked nature of the environmental social science problem being investigated 
in this thesis:  scalar and temporal issues and contradictions are inherent in 
the problem.  This interesting passage from UNDP 2008 Human Development 
Report perhaps best summarises this complexity: 
‘No single technology offers a magic bullet for climate change 
mitigation, and ‘picking winners’ is a hazardous affair.  Even so, CCS 
is widely acknowledged to be the best-bet for stringent mitigation in 
coal-fired power generation… CCS technology is projected to come 
on-stream very slowly in the years ahead. With planned rates of 
deployment, there will be just 11 CCS plants in operation by 2015. 
The upshot of this late arrival is that the plants will collectively save 
131 
 
 
 
 
only around 15 Mt CO2 in emissions, or 0.2 per cent of total coal-
fired power emissions.  At this rate, one of the key technologies in 
the battle against global warming will arrive on the battlefield far too 
late to help the world avoid dangerous climate change.’   
(United Nations Development Programme, 2007, p.145) 
Note the date of this report, and that the target for operative, commercial scale 
CCS plant by 2015 was not reached.   
5.2.2.5 Environmental Agents 
Not unexpectedly within this environmental organisational field, the UK 
Government, plays a lead role in governance of coal use for electricity 
generation.  This role manifests in two ways: firstly, environmental metaphors 
relating to GHG emissions reductions are evident in government texts.  In 
particular national and EU emissions reduction targets are seen as motivating 
factors for Government involvement in supporting the development of new 
clean energy opportunities throughout the era.  What is perhaps more 
interesting here is the clear connection between the economic and 
environmental metaphors and motivations in Government and bureaucratic 
texts.   
Secondly, importantly and discussed in greater depth in chapter seven, the 
Government is dominant in the environmental field where there are clear 
linkages with its dominance within the economic field for this wicked problem.  
This suggests the economic power held by the UK Government has influence 
over the environmental field and relationships within it.  The texts suggest this 
power manifests in terms of both the Government’s power to determine action 
of others (through legislation and regulatory controls or support for the market 
through ETS for example), and, crucially, through its non-decision making 
powers.  By heralding supremacy of market forces (despite lack of adequate 
features of a successful market e.g. competition) and tripartite governance 
arrangements, the UK Government is in part negating its own position as 
dominant within the environmental field. 
132 
 
 
 
 
An additional feature of Government agency is the influence of changing 
nature of views of key Government actors (successive Secretaries of State for 
example) and the impact these fluctuating political contexts have on CCS 
developments.  Again, financial and funding related decisions feature 
significantly in the environmental texts.  The change in national government in 
2010 lead to a wave of policy changes for CCS in particular. The introduction 
of the CCS commercialisation programme increased the relevance of markets 
and economic issues in environmental governance.   
In concert with economic metaphors, commercial actors, notably industrial 
incumbents in coal (extract and import), power generation and transmission 
sectors, but also chemical processing and developers are evident during this 
era.  An interesting feature of the environmental metaphors in relation to 
commercial actors is that whilst consortia are formed during the era as 
discussed above, their role in tackling environmental issues is less evident.  
Increasingly during the era, individual companies include support for coal with 
CCS as part of their CSR or sustainability reporting, most usually in the form 
of commitments to research or partnerships to develop test facilities (see 
appendix B). Interestingly, within the environmental organisational field, 
commercial actors are referred to as both emitters and generators. 
Whilst consortia have a less significant role in environmental organisational 
field than economic, other groups with mixed commercial, research and 
political roles emerge as significant governance actors during the era.  
Lobbying groups, associations, NGOs and ENGOs play a lead role in 
environmental discourse.  The differing views of these groups, with often single 
issue remits, creates interesting relationships within the environmental 
organisational field for governance, as illustrated below.  What is worthy of 
note here, is that this single issue nature of what might be termed opposition 
potentially weakens the cause for each group.  Towards the end of this era 
however, groups of organisations with similar issues begin to emerge and 
focus on core environmental metaphors.  For example, Friends of the Earth, 
Greenpeace with other ENGOs create working groups and joint statements to 
set out their combined views on environmental impact of CCS.  This albeit slow 
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merging of views through isomorphic in to a middle ground could arguably be 
evidence of ‘processes’ of governance and the dominant agency (power) of 
incumbents leading to organisational field change.   
5.2.2.6 Environmental Entities 
Two environmental entities are integral to the discourse; emissions from coal 
combustion and climate change with a core corollary throughout the texts that 
reducing emissions from combustion at source is sufficient to limit climate 
change.  However, the dominance of these two entities in the discourse means 
that other environmental issues, even those directly related to climate change 
(fossil fuel use, emissions from shipping of coal and biomass, water use, 
effects on biodiversity of particulate matter) do not feature strongly in the 
rhetoric.   
Underpinning these two core entities is the environmental problem of coal use 
in ‘dirty, old’ coal fired power stations. However, during this era at national 
scale, synonymous entities, future coal, clean coal, new coal, and sustainable 
coal emerge to linguistically ameliorate the problem.  CCS is at the core of new 
coal technologies with DECC’s CCS Roadmap intended to deliver operational 
CCS in the UK.  Whilst emissions reduction is nominally a driver for the roll out 
of CCS, in essence, the roadmap focuses on harnessing new coal’s potential 
for emissions reductions in economic terms.  The programme intends for CCS 
to be a ‘competitive clean energy’ option, and as seen above embeds 
economic and market led governance arrangements (competition for funding 
and the ETS for example) in to deliver.  Integral to this is the view that tax 
payers and/or consumers ultimately pay for developments of new technology.  
Perceived good environmental governance in the UK context including 
corporate governance - CSR and sustainability reporting or strategies – allows 
generators freedoms in developing strategies to develop new coal 
technologies.  The corollary is that developments must be seen in terms of 
cost effective emissions reduction within a business as usual context, rather 
than a more heavily regulated framework for emissions reductions per se.   
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The emergence of ENGOs as a fragile opposition to dominant agents, initially 
in opposed to CCS and then from mid-2000s in somewhat resigned 
acceptance of technical potential for CCS. NGOs and ENGOs provide a 
degree of opposition to dominant rhetoric, however there is a limit to their role 
and evidence of some crowding out of non-governmental civic or public actors.  
In many ways it is this very point, i.e. the lack of breadth and depth of 
environmental metaphors or powerful actors that is of most interest here.   
(Lukes, 1974, might discuss this in terms of the crowding out of alternatives).  
There are potentially contradicting interpretations available; evidence of weak 
sustainability, weak (albeit new) governance in competition with strong 
government in terms of non-decision making power.  As discussed in chapter 
seven, these contradictions develop into a picture of the dominant entities and 
how relationships between entities and actors shapes dominant metaphors in 
turn has implications for both effectiveness of new governance and 
sustainability of coal use.  This in turn allows a deeper understanding of the 
isomorphic processes at play in development of the organisational field, which 
helps to illuminate prospects for new coal. 
5.2.2.7 Environmental Relationships 
An interesting characteristic of this analysis is that within the environmental 
organisational field, economic rhetoric features strongly, but other aspects of 
sustainability (inter and intra generational equity, social sustainability, justice) 
do not.  Figure 5.5 illustrates the relationships between agents and entities 
emergent from the metaphors, but also the connection between the 
environmental field and the economic.  In addition, within each metaphor 
however, there is a greater degree of disconnect and opposition, and whilst 
more actors and opposition to the dominant discourse are evident, actors other 
than Government actors have only weak or diffuse agency or relationships. 
The environmental discourse in this era is dominated by the relationship 
between two key agents; UK Government and commercial organisations 
operating at national and international levels.  Their core motivation, in concert, 
is to find economically viable solutions to environmental problems, notably 
GHG emissions in order to maintain business as usual context for energy 
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generation.  At UK level, other environmental entities do not feature strongly 
in the discourse relating to the wicked problem of continued coal use, and 
where the texts do reflect wider discourse this is presented by what might be 
classed as less powerful actors, with weaker relationships with other agents or 
on the periphery of the discourse.  It is also interesting that where there are 
stronger relationships between agents and entities these are closely related to 
the economic field also, whereas connections between environmental and 
social organisational fields at UK level are somewhat tenuous.   
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Figure 7 Environmental relationships 2000-2013 – organisational field 
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5.2.3 Social Metaphors 
Coal, as discussed in chapter two has social and cultural as well as 
environmental and economic significance (Strangleman, 2001).  For much of 
the industrial UK, coal mining and combustion has been core to industrial 
development, and as discussed in chapter four, contemporary views and 
public opinion on coal cannot be divorced from their cultural, societal and 
historical origins.  This section explores the dominant social metaphors evident 
at UK level evident from a consideration of the texts to ultimately present a 
social organisational field. 
5.2.3.1 Energy security - Keeping the lights on   
Core to UK level texts during this governance era is the rhetoric that coal is 
essential for ‘energy security’ in the UK.  This links to the economic discourse 
that views the public as net beneficiaries of coal use identified in UK and also 
Yorkshire and Humberside levels.  Coal with CCS is seen as an opportunity to 
exploit cheap and readily available resource at an acceptable cost to 
consumers.  This rhetoric evidently links with economic organisational field, for 
example: 
‘You just have to look at coal price over gas prices for the last 
couple of decades, especially with cheap coal from the states since 
fracking, to see it makes sense to think of coal as a cheap, reliable 
feedstock.’ 
(Participant O11, 2013) 
Note also that concerns around the so called ‘energy gap’ which could arise if 
coal fired power stations are closed ahead of an alternative base-load as an 
economic and social risk. 
‘There simply isn’t an alternative to coal for base load at present.’ 
 (Interviewee L17, 2012) 
The physical supply of coal as a reliable feedstock, readily available at an 
acceptable price underpins these ‘keeping the lights on’ and related ‘reliable 
coal for base-load’ representations. 
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5.2.3.2 Tokenism; pleasing some of the people some of the time 
Public acceptance of coal with CCS is a dominant and complex feature of the 
discourse relating to continued coal use.  Wider discourse suggests public 
engagement and acceptance is a feature of success of adoption of new 
technology (Devine-Wright, 2005; Ashworth et al, 2012; Cotton, 2014; 
Wesselink et al, 2014), but that mechanisms employed in gaining public 
acceptance vary in their efficacy (Kates et al, 2005).  For coal and the future 
of coal, the need for public acceptance is seen (by dominant actors) at UK 
level as a necessary part of the process of development: public engagement 
is integral to the processes of governance.  However, full public acceptance is 
not seen as essential beyond certain basic levels in order for development to 
take place.  In this sense, engagement is seen as sufficient for social license 
(see chapter two) with consultation and information giving activities i.e. to 
inform and placate opposition in order to gain social license to operate 
commonplace.  In particular, consultation with ‘the public’ and wider 
stakeholders on the part of Government and developers, is widely reported as 
necessary but somewhat perfunctory: 
Discussion - seems industry and developers content to have 
‘tolerance’ of CCS rather than acceptance or support for new 
technology.  Whatever works to get things operational – licence to 
operate 
(Observation notes, O12, 2013) 
In part, this need for public (stakeholder) engagement is an established feature 
of regulatory requirement on developers.  Issues relating to public acceptance 
i.e. over and above public engagement, of CCS as a low carbon energy 
development do emerge to a degree toward the latter part of the era, most 
notably from the observation data.   
Discussion on concerns that developments fail because of lack of 
public knowledge/acceptance – DVPP and Vattenfall mentioned as 
struggling because of lack of knowledge and ‘ill-informed opposition’ 
to development being ‘louder’ than developers and funders. 
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(Observation notes, O12, 2013) 
Here, the need for a minimum level of public acceptance of CCS, is perceived 
as necessary because of earlier failings of Government(s) and developers to 
effectively engage with publics.   
Within the discourse (and in keeping with the uses and abuses of ‘community’ 
literature discussed in chapter two, ‘the public’ (or sometimes ‘communities’) 
are perceived by dominant actors as largely homogenous.  In this view, the 
public (albeit in a number of guises; consumers, tax payers, voters) are seen 
as net beneficiaries of affordable energy, one subsection of which is 
considered passive, tolerant or persuadable, the other as obstructive NIMBYs 
who cannot.38 
‘Whatever we do; coal, CCS, fracking, nuclear, wind… some people 
won’t like it, but we can persuade enough people to get any option 
through [planning].  When it boils down to it, people would like it less 
if we stopped’  
(Participant, O12, 2013) 
Or: 
‘They [the public in this case construed as NIMBYs] hate it all… but 
they want the lights kept on, so in the end we should do what makes 
most sense.  You’re lucky if you can please some of the people 
some of the time…’ 
(Participant, O10, 2013) 
[Parenthesis added]  
Further to this, the mechanisms by which ‘some of the people’ can be pleased 
‘some of the time’ are business as usual practices; CSR (noted as a pacifier in 
observations), reporting, public consultation.  Consultation on specific projects, 
stakeholder engagement to regulatory requirement levels is seen as 
necessary (Ashworth presentation and responses at UKCCSRC Bi-annual 
                                            
38 As discussed in chapter six, this feature is similar at both levels of enquiry 
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meeting) and CSR more generally (especially at local level) is seen as the way 
to smooth over any problems.   
In concert with the sustainability literature which suggests that this somewhat 
paternalistic approach to imaginaries of ‘the public’ is contributory to low levels 
of integration of civic actors with governance processes.  Where consultations 
have taken place considering Sherry Arnstein’s seminal work (1969), these 
activities can at best be considered in terms of degrees of tokenism.  This 
creates a challenge within the social organisational field, whereby public 
acceptance is deemed as necessary, but understanding of public engagement 
on the part of key actors (see 5.2.3.6) is poor. This creates challenges for 
governance processes and outcomes when there is a lack of effective 
engagement with civic and public actors at macro level.  This finding links with 
wider distributional and justice debates on the effectiveness of such tokenistic 
approaches to public engagement for sustainable outcomes.  Chapter seven 
expands on these debates.  
5.2.3.3 The risks (to the public) will be worth it (and manageable) 
This social metaphor falls broadly in to two themes:  Firstly, risks (either actual 
or perceived) to, for example potential public health or environmental risks 
associated with CCS or coal.  Secondly, the risks associated with doing 
nothing; unmitigated climate change, energy gaps due to closure of coal fired 
plant, job losses: 
‘storage and transit issues have risks associated with them, of 
course they do, but we’re ironing out the issues all the time.  We 
also know that because we [generators] are being scrutinised, the 
risks are being exaggerated. There is less immediate risk from 
[pressurised CO2] pipelines, than from natural gas that we all pipe 
in to our homes every day but people don’t think of it like that.’  
(Observation notes, O11, 2013) 
The risks associated with doing nothing, again link with the economic 
discourse (and in line with Stern, 2006); risks are expressed in terms of 
141 
 
 
 
 
potential economic costs of not doing anything and to a lesser degree, the 
social and environmental implications. 
‘Whilst CCS will add significantly to the costs of electricity 
generation from coal… According to the International Energy 
Agency, without CCS, limiting a rise in global temperature to 2°C 
will be that much more difficult, and up to 70% more costly.’ 
(Coal Importers Association, no date,  p.1) 
In both cases, UK level texts suggest there is a consistent view from 
government and commercial (i.e. dominant governance) actors that risks can 
be ameliorated with adoption of new technologies.  Furthermore, in keeping 
with rhetoric relating to public engagement and acceptance of new technology, 
public engagement activities are seen as sufficient to allay concerns and over 
time new technologies associated with potential public health risks will be 
acceptable.  
‘People used to worry about pylons now it’s wind turbines or CCS or 
fracking, they’ll get used to it.’ 
(Participant O11, 2013) 
5.2.3.5 Coal + CCS = economic growth = jobs 
In keeping with the strong win-win metaphor that runs through the texts for this 
era at the UK level, potential social benefits of new coal are seen as relating 
to socio-economic issues.  The potential for jobs growth in typically poor, post-
industrial regions of the UK is central to this rhetoric. 
‘Clean electricity, new jobs and reduced emissions, an impressive 
triumvirate’ 
  (Plenary session. Scottish parliament 5m27s 10/10/2013) 
And in terms of renewing and reinvigorating depleted UK coal sector.  
‘The future of the UK coal and coal power industry and its 10,000 
direct employees hangs in the balance.’ 
(Trades Union Congress, 2012, p.6) 
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At UK level, this metaphor extends to suggest particular relevance for the UK 
due to the existence of transferrable skills. 
‘We have the industries needed for CCS already, in the North of 
England and Scotland. Everyone recognises that there are skills 
shortages, but these are transferrable skills.  We could become 
leaders in the sector.’ 
(Interviewee L24, 2013) 
Throughout the texts, the social is inextricably linked with economic, in this 
case employment, employability (skills) and development link to evolution of 
longer term distributional issues.  These, as discussed in chapter four, 
emerged post structural adjustment and privatisation of power generation and 
coal mining in the UK but have significance decades later (Beatty et al, 2007; 
Foden et al, 2014). 
5.2.3.6 Social agents 
An interesting feature of the data at UK level is that one of the key social 
agents, the public, is perceived and treated by dominant government and 
corporate agents throughout the discourse as an homogenous group.  This 
homogeneity is granulated only to a small degree with reference to 
‘customers’, ‘consumers’ and ‘tax payers’ as distinctive (note these distinctions 
suggest economic agency).  There is also a distinction in the texts between 
passive net beneficiaries, i.e. in this case tax payers and/or consumers, and 
active oppositional publics, most often characterised as NIMBYs.   Whilst 
interesting, the relatively low levels of representation of civic actors in the 
primary data texts at UK level means it is difficult to conclude (i) whether this 
homogeneity is warranted and (ii) whether this low level of engagement 
reflects levels of power (Lukes 1974, 2005) and representation in decision 
making.  
As an extension of this, both the UK Government, and corporate actors 
demonstrate social agency by homogenising multiple potential publics in two 
related ways:  Firstly, by representing socio-economic actors’ perceived best 
interests, again in an homogenising way, Government decision makers 
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demonstrate a somewhat paternalistic role.  Secondly, corporate actors 
maintain their social license to operate in assuming their customers’ and 
consumers’ best interests by providing low and stable cost electricity.  Both 
agents’ texts reflect economic primacy with regard to their perceptions of other 
social actors. 
UK government bodies have additional agency in their role as the regulators.  
This is perhaps the most weakly evidenced agency at UK level, but corporate 
actors in both interview and observation texts defer to the role of the regulator 
as relevant in managing public interests: 
‘It’s up to the regulator to decide whether individual developments 
are in the public best interest, we can’t make that decision.’    
(Interview L17, 2012) 
An additional interesting feature of this governance era at UK level is that 
corporate actors, developers, generators and others, become proxy agents of 
social change.  As compared with the eras discussed in chapter four, these 
private sector actors evidently have an increased role relating to wider range 
of social characteristics; public health, job creation, public engagement, fuel 
poverty, energy security.  Corporate actors become representatives and 
guardians of public interests as a specifically noted feature of the UK CCS 
commercialisation competition.  The public has a degree of deferred agency 
in that their relationship with government and corporate agents is necessary 
for those dominant actors to continue to either operate or stay in power 
respectively.   
In a similar vein, but an issue that needs further exploration beyond this study, 
the role of NGOs and especially trades unions as ‘representatives’ of non-
governmental public actors emerges then fades during this era.  The UK 
CCSRC and other groups established as part of the commercialisation 
programme also demonstrate social agency, albeit to a lesser extent.  Within 
this group and others, Universities and research bodies with interests beyond 
technical CCS capabilities – e.g. STS, social/public engagement, sustainability 
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- influence the agenda for inclusion of public engagement in new technology 
development.   
The speculation on views and perceptions of the ‘public’ in their guises as tax 
payers and consumers by such a limited range of dominant actors, is 
exacerbated by a notable lack of alternative public representation in 
governance processes at macro scale.  The literature on public engagement 
is useful here to suggest four key aspects may be most relevant (i) uses and 
abuses of ‘community’ as homogenous (ii) public acceptance as dependent on 
understanding of the development (iii) trust of dominant actors and (iv) 
perception of associated risk.  For new coal use and development around new 
coal, therefore a summary may be:  (i) at UK level there is a lack of social 
agency and engagement with the public on decision making (ii) low levels of 
technical understanding of CCS amongst wider publics (Markusson, 2012) and 
untested technology (iii) commercial and government dominant actors are not 
well trusted (iv) risks are unknown and unquantified at scale.  
This somewhat gloomy, but evidently realistic summary, suggests a potentially 
compounded wicked problem, where low levels of social agency coupled with 
poor understanding of technical developments lead to lack of agency within 
the organisational field.  This in and of itself may not appear problematic unless 
one considers public engagement in decision making as critical for both good 
governance and ultimately the sustainability of decision making.   
5.2.3.7 Social entities 
The public as discussed above, emerges as being viewed as an homogenous 
group with minor distinctions around their essentially economic roles i.e. as tax 
payers and/or consumers.   This homogenous entity is, to some degree, core 
to the complexity of the wicked phenomenon under study.  To expand, 
dominant social, government and corporate actors have primarily economic 
motivations, are paternalistic in their views and actions towards the public as 
a single entity in order to gain sufficient public acceptance of new technology.  
There are few if any, non-governmental public voices in decision making 
processes at UK level (some from self-appointed representatives e.g. NGOs 
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and TUs), and so this paternalistic, constructed view of public views on new 
coal are presented as representative of wider social views.  The problem is 
exacerbated then in two ways:  firstly, new governance processes require 
tripartite approaches to develop sustainable solutions to energy challenges 
faced, this is not evident here.  Secondly, where the needs and wants of an 
amorphous homogenised ‘public’ are summarised and extrapolated by 
dominantly economic rather than social actors, the economic remains 
dominant.  Issues of public health, visual amenity, use of resources, well-being 
are subsumed at UK level in to two key socio-economic entities; jobs and 
keeping the lights on at acceptable cost. 
Again, as a construct of dominant actors, so called NIMBYs are viewed as an 
inevitable distraction from development.   To return to a metaphor explored 
earlier: 
‘They [the public construed as NIMBYs] hate it all [referring to 
different energy options]… but they want the lights kept on, so in the 
end we should do what makes most sense.  You’re lucky if you can 
please some of the people some of the time…’ 
(Participant, O10, 2013) 
[parenthesis and emphasis added]  
NIMBYism as a construct39 is a well-established phenomenon (Devine-Wright, 
2005; Cotton, 2014), what these data and the analysis add to the discourse is 
the use of NIMBYism to, in part support (or in some cases exonerate) actions 
of dominant actors in their decisions on coal use.  By including, in the 
paternalistic way described above, those imagined priorities of other wider 
publics as in opposition to NIMBYs’ views, dominant social agents crowd out 
opportunities for inclusion of opposition in decision making processes (Lukes, 
1974).   
                                            
39 Albeit a misconstrued and unhelpful one 
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Furthermore, the data suggest that the processes of governance adopted 
(including CSR, public engagement and consultation) at UK level in this case, 
are also controlled and owned by dominant actors.  To reiterate: 
‘…we can persuade enough people to get any [energy] option 
through [planning].  When it boils down to it, people would like it less 
if we stopped generating’  
(Participant, O10, 2013) 
In doing so, dominant actors both perpetuate the perception of ‘whatever they 
do’ as being in the best interests of the public, crowd out alternative 
perspectives, miss opportunities for support and, ultimately, misuse 
governance processes designed to generate potentially more sustainable 
energy solutions.  This chimes with Lukes (2005) three dimensional conception 
of power (p. 21).  
5.2.3.8 Social relationships 
As alluded to above, relationships between actors and entities within the social 
organisational field at the UK level are weak with the exception of that between 
government and corporate actors.  The motivation of these dominant actors is 
to engage with the public in a functional manner in order to allow development. 
Relationships then between other social actors at UK level are at best tenuous 
and typically government and corporate actors act as a conduit for other 
relationships.  Figure 5.6 below explores these relationships in more detail. 
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Figure 8 Social Organisational Field 
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5.3 Organisational Field for Governance 2000- 2013: New Coal, New 
Governance or Economic Dominance? 
It is evident from this analysis of the discourse, that the dominant rhetoric 
during this era at UK level is one of economic rationality (following Dryzek’s 
use of the term (2005)) and that this dominance extends beyond the economic 
organisational field of governance to both social and environmental fields.  
However, this dominance masks complexities within the organisational fields 
relating to relationships between dominant actors, within specific metaphors 
and between fields themselves.  These complexities are teased out here to 
conclude this section with a picture of the organisational field of governance 
for the 2000-2013 at UK level. 
In response to research objective 1 this section reflects on the characteristics 
of coal use in the UK using governance and sustainability as organising 
principles. The era saw some consolidation of industry and government 
positions within org fields as dominant; CCS implementation seen as essential 
and coal use as inevitable as part of the UK energy mix for some time to come 
unless unconventional gas or nuclear developed.  Ultimately, the dominant 
discourse relating to CCS implementation is of governance as through existing 
and reformed market mechanisms.  Issues of sustainable development were 
subsumed by those relating to implementation of ‘low carbon’ energy 
technologies which do not disturb the economic status quo in the short to 
medium term, and by the economic (and social) need to ‘fill the energy gap’ 
which will be created by the closure of older coal fired power stations.  By the 
mid-2000s at UK level there is a degree of consistency between dominant 
actors around the potential for CCS with coal to positively contribute to 
economic, environmental and social problems.   
What appears problematic however is that across all three organisational 
fields, agency is witnessed in very few actors; the impacts of this on the market 
for coal are explored further in chapter eight (8.2), but in brief engagement with 
decision making by non-state actors is limited.  In addition, agency at 
organisational field level, is associated with slow moving change whereas the 
utility of CCS with coal both in terms of reducing emissions, and as a means 
of development is time sensitive. The contradictory and negative metaphors 
from NGOs and other groups outside of government and industry operating at 
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macro scale to a degree subside to reveal some pragmatic unity with 
government and business actors.  However, this quietening, may be the result 
of a crowding out of alternatives and non-dominant agents.  
Whilst the win-win potential for CCS with coal dominates the discourse, there 
is a degree of discord between dominant actors on how best to capitalise on 
the opportunity that new coal technologies afford.  Both government and 
corporate actors want market led governance of a commercialisation 
programme for CCS, however, corporate actors pressure for a level playing 
field (with regulatory backing) and longer term investment from public funding 
to operationalise CCS.  
The era culminates with a documented (if not yet operationalised) intention to 
support new coal with CCS, and a degree of consensus between government 
and industry actors over potential economic viability and market mechanisms 
for commercialisation, albeit with noted caveats. However, whilst policy 
underpinning CCS competition and market reform has been established, as 
yet no commercial scale operation exists in the UK and as discussed in section 
8.2, funding and wider policy contexts remains uncertain.   
Research question two (p.8) asks whether organisational fields have changed 
over time.  The answer in short is yes, in some fundamental ways.  At the heart 
of these changes is an embedding of neo liberalism and dominance of at least 
the desire for market mechanisms to determine outcomes for new coal.  
However, the analysis shows that whilst private sector actors have new roles 
in governance which extend and consolidate during the era, it is apparent that 
state, Government power (including non-decision making and delaying power) 
remains dominant.  Attempts to liberalise energy markets have not lead to 
development of clean coal technologies; however, market forces have driven 
continued coal use.  Chapter seven reflects on whether and in what ways this 
seemingly paradoxical context has implications for the sustainability of new 
coal. 
Toward the end of this era, the need for ‘public acceptance’ of CCS with coal 
as a new low carbon technology emerges; industry and some government 
actors call for CCS to be classified as a renewable energy for policy purposes.  
As a discourse amongst corporate and government actors – in Dryzek’s terms, 
the discourse here is somewhat promethean.   This is of particular relevance 
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to the Yorkshire and Humber region with two of the favoured Nationally 
Significant Infrastructure Projects (NSIP) (as at Dec2013) in the region, plus 
operational demonstration projects of significant (if not commercial) scale.   
Finally, this narrative suggests that (when considered with chapter four) that 
whilst some of the dominant metaphors identified have galvanised and 
strengthened over time, others have weakened.  Notably, metaphors relating 
to social organisational fields and the role that non-governmental public and 
civic actors play in governance suggest a closing down of discord or opposition 
to business as usual through only nominally engaging governance processes.  
These features of the organisational fields are discussed in depth in chapter 
seven and considered below in chapter six in the context of the Yorkshire and 
Humberside region.    
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Chapter 6 - Yorkshire & Humberside 2000-2013:  From home of ‘dirty coal’ to 
host of ‘clean energy’? 
 
Figure 9 Iconic Ferrybridge C Power Station  
(Source: http://www.industcards.com/st-coal-uk-eng-n.htm) 
6.1  Introduction 
Chapter six considers the new coal, new governance era in depth for the 
Yorkshire and Humberside level of enquiry.  This provides an interesting 
counterpoint from which to then build a picture of organisational fields 
dynamics between levels of governance, core features of sustainability 
discourse and over time.  The remainder of this section presents metaphors 
identified in the texts and the agents, entities and relationships emerging as 
key from within them.  The data are presented in terms of economic, 
environmental and social factors in keeping with the use of sustainability as an 
organising principle; it is understood that there is some overlap, where this 
overlap is deemed most relevant to the discourse, this is drawn out further in 
the discussion in chapter seven.  
 
152 
 
  
6.2 Unabated coal – legacy of an industrial past  
As discussed in chapter two, the Yorkshire and Humberside region has close 
Following this introduction, this chapter drills in to the detail of the Yorkshire 
and Humberside (hereafter Y&H) case for the era c.2000 – 2013.  The case 
study data were generated through discourse analysis of interview, 
observational and document texts.   
6.2.1 Economic Metaphors 
6.2.1.1 ‘Clean coal’ as a local win-win scenario - green energy, local jobs 
In keeping with data for the national scale, this metaphor is witnessed at the 
sub-national, Yorkshire and Humberside scale.  What differs at Y&H scale is 
that the dominant view relates to the place related economic (and geological, 
geo-political) nature of the region as being specifically suited to new coal 
developments.   
‘A major new report to MPs highlights the significant economic benefits 
of investing in the Yorkshire & Humber Carbon Capture Storage (CCS) 
cluster… this would generate £1.3bn for the UK economy, deliver 4000 
jobs and help attract as much as £11billion in foreign investment.’  
(CO2Sense, website 2012,no pagination) 
Furthermore, the regionally felt legacy/post-industrial impacts of coal means 
the region is in need of development. 
‘CCS is exactly the kind of new green technology needed in Yorkshire, 
Humber and the Tees Valley, it could create thousands of jobs’ 
(Interviewee L24) 
It is worth noting here (and explored in more depth later), that whilst this is a 
strongly evidenced metaphor, its significance for different actors differs at local 
level to national scale.  So, for government (UK & regional/local), business and 
other dominant economic actors, the metaphor is strongly evidenced both 
scale.  However, whilst it is evident amongst local and community scale (non-
economic/commercial) actors, it does not have the same significance for 
example for either local (parish) or non-business community and instead 
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morphs in to something more akin to ‘better than nothing’ for non-
business/non-government actors at Y&H scale.  In addition, the ‘win-win’ 
metaphor for ‘clean coal’ specifically i.e. as opposed to economic development 
more generally, or even broad representations of green growth (which of itself 
does not present strongly amongst civil society/public actors at Y&H scale), is 
somewhat fragile.   
‘[People] used to be rich round here – you’ve heard people calling us 
‘Pontecarlo’40?  It’s a p*** take now, but used to be we had money’ 
(Interviewee L16, 2013) 
‘We need something to happen here, doesn’t matter what.’ 
(Interviewee L33, 2013) 
There is a specific role for economic growth at local level and potential for 
creation of employment opportunities in a region with lower than national 
average levels of employment (appendix C) 
 ‘Not only will this [CCS] mean cleaner air, it will bring jobs to the region.’ 
(Opening address at B2B event, O6, 2013) 
CCS in Yorkshire and Humberside will ‘…deliver 4000 jobs…’ 
(CO2Sense, website 2012, no pagination) 
However, within the field there is a degree of disconnect over perceptions on 
whether and how new jobs will materialise: 
‘…CCS …could mean thousands of new jobs in an area of high 
unemployment, but this government won’t commit to any investments. 
They’re clueless if they think it’ll come from the private sector.’ 
(Interviewee L24, 2013) 
The dissimilarity between the document texts (especially government and 
QUANGOs or other agencies), and the interview data becomes evident.  
Document texts promote the potential for development and jobs resulting from 
investment in CCS whereas interviews reflect a more questioning, critical 
perception on the likelihood of developments in the region.  In addition, the 
                                            
40  i.e. for Pontefract 
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dominant perception from civic actors is that economic benefits will not be felt 
in Y&H for largely structural reasons: 
‘I hope that they take on new people, but I doubt it will be many and I 
doubt it will be anyone from […] ’   
(Interviewee L15, 2013) 
[Redacted for anonymity] 
When asked to expand as to why that might not be the case, the interviewee 
pointed at a terraced street visible from the window: 
‘Pretty much the whole of that street is single mothers on benefits and 
that’s what it’s like all over. I should think they’ll bring graduates in from 
elsewhere.’  
(Interviewee L15, 2013) 
In a similar vein,  
‘The trouble is no-one has the skills here anymore.  Even if it [planned 
new coal fired power station with CCS] does bring jobs they won’t be for 
lads from round here.’ 
(Interviewee L1)  
[parenthesis added] 
What emerges from the data in this respect is that place, specifically 
connotations of ‘round here’ and local interpretations of the need for (and 
limitations of) economic development is significant.  
6.2.1.2 It’s different ‘round here’  
This place related metaphor emerges in two ways, each is dealt with in turn 
below: 
(1)  Y&H Ideal political economy for CCS 
The policy and governance context in Yorkshire & Humberside has been 
described as ‘ideal’ for the CCS commercialisation programme (see DECC, 
TUC, CO2Sense, DVPP, texts).  The combination of a history of coal mining 
and use, resultant energy infrastructure, current high emissions from 
generators and other heavy industry and close offshore aquifers make it 
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particularly appealing.  In addition, the region is characterised as in need of 
investment and development.  This combined with perceived public 
acceptance of existing energy infrastructure means the region is portrayed as 
an ideal setting for new coal developments.  
‘Unique geographic and industrial assets make the Yorkshire-Humber 
region best-placed to become a world-leading CCS location. It is not only 
within easy reach of offshore CO2 storage sites in the North Sea but the 
region also represents the heart of the UK's coal-fired power generation 
emitting 90mt CO2 per year - almost one fifth of the UK's annual CO2 
emissions.’ 
(GCCSI, 2011a, no pagination) 
[emphasis added] 
Similarly, Yorkshire and Humberside sites are: 
‘…particularly suitable due to their location near the North Sea oil fields 
and potential power sector regional CCS infrastructure…’ 
(TUC, 2012, no pagination) 
However, whilst new and ‘clean’ coal developments are also seen as potential 
economic development opportunities there are two key caveats.  Firstly, the 
intention of government (UK and EU funders) to fund only commercial scale 
operations poses specific operational challenges at the level of the firm: 
‘…we’re interested in CCS, but it’s not something we can develop at scale 
on our own, we’ve tried – we are still trying - to set up a network to see 
what might be possible.’   
(Observation notes, O1, 2011) 
What is interesting here is that commercial challenges for developers and 
incumbent industrial actors (e.g. being a loss leader, planning consents, 
meeting existing regulatory obligations around NOx and SO2 emissions), are 
driving the establishment of consortia and networks comprised of local, 
national and international actors.  As seen in section 5.1.3, these networks and 
consortia have agency at local as well as scale, suggesting multi-scale 
organisational field and power dynamics. In this sense, the economic 
organisational field is cross scalar. 
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Secondly, the slow decision making processes and delays (or avoidance) of 
decisions by Government introduces and adds complexity to a temporal 
dimension - the power of not making decisions is significant here. 
(2) Anything is better than nothing 
In contrast to the win-win metaphor particularly expressed from government 
and commercial texts at UK and regional scale, local metaphors developed 
from civic and public texts are stronger in relation to ‘anything is better than 
nothing’ metaphors. 
A commonly identified metaphor in the texts from interviews and observation 
data is that where problems of high unemployment, industrial agglomeration, 
poor public health and high GHG emissions are felt strongly, any development 
is viewed better than no development.   This metaphor is exemplified in 
particular in responses from social actors responding to economic and 
governance questions.  The following extract typifies the sentiment: 
‘I couldn’t not have a job though…  but there’s loads [of people] haven’t 
got anything… We need something to happen round here, doesn’t matter 
what.’ 
(Interviewee L33, 2013) 
Whilst, Y&H is widely viewed as being politically, economically, strategically, 
geographically and geologically unmatched for potential CCS developments, 
ignorance of these local cultural and social perspectives is imprudent.  In 
concert with Archer’s (1995) reflections on morphogenic change and the need 
to consider and reflect on the cultural and legacy backdrop for structure agency 
issues.   
6.2.1.3 Doing the right thing 
A parallel emerges here with historical texts relating to coal and energy 
generators as being at the heart of the UK economy.  At this Y&H scale, energy 
companies are ‘doing the right thing’ for communities they operate in: creating 
employment in an otherwise low employment region; demonstrating good 
corporate governance and CSR; community engagement and, importantly for 
coal with CCS projects, encouraging economic development and supporting 
other local businesses.  This ties with metaphors relating to ‘keeping the lights 
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on’, but at an acceptable cost, suggesting scalar and temporal connections 
between the economic organisational fields as well as connections between 
social and economic fields (see 6.3).  Government and especially business 
texts exemplify this metaphor: 
Need to get economy moving again in region.  Generators central to local 
economy and communities, whatever technology they are adopting – as 
they move away from unabated coal.  Note – most attendees MNCs 
(Hitachi, Doosan, SSE, Siemens, NG), some SMEs from across North of 
England and Scotland (caterers from South Shields, pipefitters from 
Livingston) 
(Observation notes, O6, 2013)   
This text also suggests an additional layer of complexity relating to both the 
intended and unintended consequences of investment in coal, as observed in 
different texts.  The ‘intended’ consequence of the Business to Business event 
noted in the observation above (O6) was to open up new opportunities for 
small, local businesses to engage with MNCs operating in the energy industry 
in the region.  This no doubt happened, however, given the attendance list 
many of the SMEs in attendance were from beyond the region.  The 
unintended consequence, whilst arguably positive, arose in part because few 
local businesses work in this area.  In addition, because of the nature of the 
economic organisational field for governance and the relationships within it, 
Business 2 Business (B2B) events attended also created greater opportunities 
for MNCs to strengthen existing relationships with other MNCs i.e. where these 
already existed within consortia (see figure 6.1).   
6.2.1.4 It’s not fair 
Throughout the texts, a strongly evidenced rhetoric and Y&H scale relates to 
decision making and power of agents operating at different, that is other, 
levels.  As suggested above, economic actors have cross scalar agency.  The 
data suggest, however, whilst economic agency is cross scalar (for 
government and national/international commercial actors), decisions are made 
(or perceived to be made) at national or supra-national scale i.e. without 
significant local influence (Cotton and Devine-Wright, 2012).  Texts from civic, 
community, business and local government actors suggest decisions on 
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continued use of coal and CCS developments were made, based primarily on 
opportunities for commercial benefit or national economic growth.  In addition, 
civic actors in particular perceived that the economic benefits whilst accrued 
locally would not be felt locally. 
‘It feels like decisions were made ages ago by someone else’ 
(Interviewee L12, 2013) 
‘It’s all about the shareholders.  It’ll only happen if it’s going to make a 
profit.’ 
(Interviewee L1, 2012) 
During this new coal/new governance era, there were a number of changes of 
ownership of power plants and generators under new private ownership, 
corporate sell offs and company closures/splits are commonplace.  Formerly 
publicly owned became national oligopolies through processes privatisation 
then sales e.g. Drax and Ferrybridge. The (re)distribution of economic risks 
and benefits is observed as a result; large, new technology companies for 
example have interests in the area with skilled work opportunities e.g. Hitachi, 
Doosan.  They also, notably bring in skilled labour and this shapes part of the 
local discourse: 
‘Anyone they bring in will need to be catered for, hotels to stay in, local 
businesses set to benefit indirectly’ 
(Observation notes O6, 2013) 
Similarly, for many participants there was a perception of an unbalanced 
distribution of economic benefits.   
 ‘If I thought we were getting some sort of local energy from local coal – 
keeping people in jobs, and we could use CCS for the emissions and 
what have you, well then I would happily pay more for that.’ 
(Interviewee L8, 2013) 
There is an additional nuance here however, that links with social metaphors.  
Whilst disproportionate/imbalanced economic benefits and decisions at ‘other’ 
scale, parts of the region, especially those with historic links with coal mining 
and energy, are in need of any economic development: 
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‘… I took a bloke from the plant all the way back to Glasgow last week.  
They must have some money getting a taxi from here to Glasgow?  There 
must be something going on [at the power station] and we could do with 
it really.’ 
(Interviewee L33, 2013) 
In this view, ownership matters.  Public reflections on the history of coal mining 
and electricity generation relate to ownership and dissatisfaction with 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and private consortia running the power 
stations.  In addition, there is a perception that historically, economic and social 
benefits were accrued and distributed locally for example through high levels 
of employment, better than average salaries, public health schemes and 
cheaper fuel costs. 
‘It used to be that we got free coal, then for a while there were 
discounts… but that’s all stopped now.  It all used to be ours of course 
but now it’s owned by [a company]’ 
(Interviewee L12, 2013) 
‘We don’t even get cheaper electricity anymore.’ 
(Interviewee L7, 2013) 
‘I used to take school children [to the power station] for visits, and they 
would always say how clean it is now they’ve introduced these new 
measures but they had to do it or they wouldn’t have. It would be just 
the same if it was publicly owned.’ 
(Interviewee L11, 2013) 
‘It’s not fair, they are playing with our health’ 
(Interviewee L2, 2013) 
An additional nuance here, is that the risk of developments not going ahead is 
high and the resultant closure of coal fired power stations leads to further 
deprivation in the region. 
‘It’s like we have to put up with the pollution and the noise and 
everything but don’t get any of the benefits.  Then when there’s a 
chance to improve things and invest in the area with clean technology, 
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we don’t get that either.  It doesn’t seem fair when you think about, so I 
try not to think about it.’ 
(Interviewee L6, 2013) 
Whilst undoubtedly there is an element of individual perceptions being 
reflected here, this adds a richness where, as Creswell states ‘Knowledge is 
within the meanings people make of it’ (Creswell, 1998). In addition, again, the 
historical context setting is relevant.  Place appears to matter in this case, and 
culture and agency cannot be divorced from an understanding of either the 
emergence of organisational fields for governance, or the dynamics, forces 
and morphogenic processes of change at play within fields. 
6.2.1.5 Y&H Economic Agents 
During this ‘new/new’ era at regional level, a class of what might legitimately 
be thought of as powerful elites (Wright-Mills, 1958) emerges.  Elites in this 
case are not individuals but rather organisations/groups with considerable 
power within and beyond the economic organisational field; they exhibit 
agency at multiple levels; local and regional, but also, importantly for decision 
making national, supra-national and multinational scale.  In additional, they 
hold sovereignty over the temporal dimension (Jessops, 2006) due to their 
non-decision (Clegg, 1989) making capacity, in particular over funding 
decisions.   
To expand, the UK Government, in particular DECC but also the EA (and 
Defra) as regulators and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) as 
investors but with less agency on the issue of new coal, have considerably 
greater impact on decisions at local level than does either local government or 
civic or social actors.   
The political economy and governance arrangements established during the 
1990s are consolidated during the era.  Incumbent corporate actors, in 
particular the generators and also noted emerging consortia and networks, 
would be expected to have agency in decision making.  However, it must be 
noted as relevant here, that a disconnect exists (which becomes especially 
apparent in environmental and social organisational fields), that national and 
international corporates either generators or within consortia (oligopolistic?) 
demonstrate greater leverage in decision making contexts than, say, local 
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corporate actors (e.g. Drax or Don Valley Power Project) working in isolation.  
This is perhaps in keeping with UK government as having greater power than 
others due to their role in determining funded projects where market approach 
would not lead to commercial scale CCS programmes.  It is worth noting here 
also, that the dominance actors are groups or ‘collectivities’ (Dryzek, 2005), 
but with common discourse. 
The picture for government actors with local and regional remits is somewhat 
different, MPs are seen as more powerful than individuals, but as ineffective 
when in opposition and not representative of constituents’ views.   
‘…constituents’ views are diluted.  They [MPs] have to keep everyone 
happy which in the end means not keeping anyone but those with power 
happy’ 
(Interviewee L11, 2013) 
‘We vote, and hope that the person we vote for makes their decisions 
based on evidence and sound economics but that’s not always the case.’ 
(Interviewee L2, 2013)  
The texts also evidence a lack of what might be considered representation in 
opposition to dominant agency from other actors/groups.   
 ‘…parish councils are useless really.  They’re all co-opted and it’s the 
same people get to everything…’ 
(Interviewee L10, 2013) 
A thought-provoking feature of this analysis is the lack of agency demonstrated 
by groups or organisations representing local actors. Little participation in 
economic field is evident in document, observation or interviews, other than 
from individual local residents who for example attend consultation events, but 
do not have individual influence or significant roles within the organisational 
field.  Similarly, individual plant managers and local business leaders, who 
perhaps have a more significant role, at interview and observations express 
opinion on new coal development, but do not appear to exert power within the 
field.  In this sense, a degree of paternalism is exhibited in the texts; powerful 
elites are confident that; planning and consultation for any individual 
development will ameliorate local concerns; development will be good for 
162 
 
  
communities in need of jobs; anyone in opposition is a NIMBY.  However, this 
paternalism and positive spin on CCS without actually committing means that 
not considering local complexities or need.  
Similarly, multiple associations, NGOs and QUANGOS (notably CO2Sense 
and TUC) are evident in the document texts (government and business) as 
being in support of new coal developments, however these actors are not 
observed as having significant agency.  In addition, whilst broadly in line with 
the Government led consensus on CCS, there is some disagreement between 
actors and more nuanced views on new coal in the interview and observation 
text.  There is some evidence from observation texts and interviews that local 
businesses (i.e. in addition to generators) view developments positively as 
potential opportunities for economic growth in the region.  However, there is 
little evidence that beyond B2B type events, businesses other than those 
directly involved with new coal technologies, are in engaged in decision 
making or demonstrate significant agency.   
A final point to note in summary, is that whereas government and business 
actors are grouped in to consolidated organisations, for social actors this is not 
the case.  Similarly, whilst Government and business actors demonstrate 
agency at multiple levels, this is not the case for individuals or social actors. In 
this sense, pluralism is not evident. 
6.2.1.6 Y&H Economic Entities 
New coal, clean coal, new coal technologies and CCS are synonymously 
presented as economic entities at the Y&H level. The Y&H cluster of 
developments is seen as increases economic benefit of individual projects and 
clean coal in the region: 
‘…benefitting from the cost savings to be had from using the same CO2 
transport and storage infrastructure and demonstrating the cost benefits 
of developing a cluster of projects in the Yorkshire–Humber area.’ 
(CCS Association website, 2014, no pagination) 
Government (UK and EU) funding in the form of the CCS competition is core 
to underpinning options for development, widely voiced opinion amongst 
government and business actors that without government funding, CCS at 
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scale is not likely to be get off the ground in the region despite perceptions on 
the region’s suitability for development.  As an extension of this entity, and in 
keeping with UK level data, commercial scale developments have potential to 
drive local economic development.  
In contrast to the dominant discourse, planning and consultation activities are 
viewed as giving the green light to new coal developments in two senses: 
firstly, planning consent gives confidence to markets, consortia and funders; 
secondly, the procedural consultation processes embedded within planning 
process then informs publics and smooths the way for next stages of 
development.  Involvement of actors beyond state and business actors in this 
view comes either in the form of individual relationships, or as at the bottom of 
Arnstein’s ‘ladder of participation’ (1969).  This is discussed in chapters seven 
and eight in terms of the implications of this tokenism for sustainability but a 
key part of governance at the sub regional level, even if only nominally so.   
The regulators (EA) themselves are evident as part of the planning and 
consents process. And Quangos (e.g. CO2Sense, Yorkshire Forward, 
Yorkshire Futures) have what might classed as supporting roles at regional 
scale.  Mergers, MNCs and then consortia and networks (both commercial, 
research and a mixture, MNCs and tech companies) emerge during the era as 
being relevant at the Yorkshire and Humber level despite having largely 
national roles.   
Finally, importantly, existing, active coal fired power stations in the region Drax 
and Ferrybridge especially, are themselves economic entities in two senses.  
Firstly, they underpin local (and national) economy and with new coal 
technologies provide opportunity for future low carbon development that will 
‘keep the lights on’.  Contrasted to this is the view that ‘old’ dirty emitters are 
inefficient and need to be closed.   
6.2.1.7 Y&H Economic Relationships 
Relationships at the Y&H level focus around two key economic entities (i) 
funding for CCS and (ii) planning for new developments.  For both, the UK 
government is dominant within the economic organisational field of 
governance, with consortia, notably relating to the Y&H cluster also significant.  
A key feature of the relationships at this scale is that community, regional 
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actors (e.g. Quangos) and local government actors come in and out of the 
organisational field at different stages but there is a lack of consistency here 
which suggests some fragmentation at this scale.  
It is also worth noting here the relationships that do not exist or are not strongly 
represented at this level, in particular when considered in contrast with 
previous eras.  It is evident that there are weakened relationships between 
individuals/communities and corporate actors as compared with old coal/old 
governance era due to lack of employment and very little direct engagement 
with power plants.  Again, this corroborate the themes developing around lack 
of agency amongst public actors, in part because the roles have changed.  It 
is worthy of note here and discussed in chapter seven, that the level at which 
agency does occur is different for different actors; business and government 
actors are typically in groups however for social actors there is little institutional 
capacity beyond weakly constructed ‘community’    
Figure 6.1 below summarises these relationships.  The key feature of this 
analysis is that within the organisational field, whilst funding and planning 
decisions on CCS and clean coal developments are to be based on economic 
factors (e.g. commercial viability), economic relationships within the 
organisational field are weak and skewed; government actors are dominant, 
commercial actors are risk averse and public actors not represented. 
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Figure 10 Economic Relationships Yorkshire & Humberside 
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6.2.2 Environmental Metaphors  
6.2.2.1 Clean coal/dirty coal; it’s still coal 
The clean coal, win-win metaphor widely heralded at national scale as an 
opportunity to reduce CO2 emissions to the atmosphere whilst contributing to 
economic growth, is mirrored in texts at Y&H scale.  CCS is presented by 
dominant actors as an opportunity to improve environmental conditions in the 
region; a technical fix to the wicked problem of coal use.   
‘The low carbon hub for the Aire Valley is a powerful example that green 
is good for growth. The great prize will be thousands of new jobs and 
massive inward investment, transforming the UK's highest emitting 
region with a huge carbon capture network for power companies and 
heavy industry.’ 
(CO2Sense press release, 17.10.12, p.2) 
However, an interesting feature of this rhetoric, is that at Y&H level, 
understandings of coal are more nuanced and arguably place based, rather 
than technically understood.  Predominantly reflected in interview responses 
this understanding translates the ‘old dirty’ to ‘new clean’ coal metaphor in to 
something more like ‘it’s still coal’.  Interview responses and observation notes 
introduce a different dimension41 i.e. that reduced CO2 emissions and cleaner 
air is only part of the coal use story at local level. 
Discussion on clean coal or dirty coal – it’s still coal.  What about all the 
stuff that’s not measured or not measured properly? Quote ‘…you can 
tell me all this about reduced emissions, but at the end of the day we 
don’t know what to think and we’ve heard it all before.’  
(Observation notes O3, 2012) 
This extract exemplifies a wider understanding of issues relating to coal use 
and the historical, cultural understandings which complicate already complex 
issues.  Whilst clean air is welcomed, there is an awareness that it does not 
                                            
41 Supports methodological approach 
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mean that coal itself is clean; local memory of coal means greater recognition 
of environmental implications beyond the region. 
‘Oh we used to come in black walking home from school.  Black!  We’d 
have to wear scarves over our mouths.  It’s not like that now of course 
it’s better, but they still use coal you know… I’ve been to Mexico City 
[where we get our coal from] and they all have to wear scarves on their 
faces like we used to!’ 
(Interviewee L12, 2013) 
‘We ship our coal in from all over the world now, that can’t be 
environmentally friendly can it?’ 
(Interviewee L9, 2013) 
In addition, civil society respondents in particular noted that whilst the air is 
cleaner in some respects, other environmental conditions have worsened: 
‘…this is great and everything [referring to RSPB Fairburn Ings where 
interview took place], it’s good that we have green spaces now but it’s 
not the same as actually being wild – really it’s just a big garden.  And 
we have cleaner air but they’re still burning coal which is terrible for the 
environment.’ 
(Interviewee L11, 2013) 
‘We might have cleaner air but environmentally it’s the worst it’s ever 
been…it’s like we’re putting out one fire and starting another.’ 
(Interviewee L26, 2013) 
‘What I’m worried about now is what we can’t see.’ 
(Interviewee L12, 2013) 
Whilst the data are not sufficiently robust to draw conclusions, these extracts 
reflect perhaps higher levels of public understanding of issues relating to coal 
use than are typically found in the literature (e.g. see Markusson et al, 2012), 
again, suggesting place based environmental understandings. 
Another interesting feature of this ‘it’s still coal’ metaphor relates closely to 
public perceptions of the environmental risks and benefits associated with 
continued coal use and, in particular, relating to private ownership.   In 
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response to the question, ‘Who has benefitted from the changes?  In what 
ways (economically, socially, environmentally)?’ 
‘The air’s cleaner now obviously, but that’s because of the clean air act, 
not because of anything the power station does voluntarily.  It was the 
clean air act brought about the major change in the environment not 
privatisation.  If we leave it up to them [pointing at visible cooling towers] 
they’re going to do what the shareholders want them to do or the 
government tells them to do which will mean the bare minimum’ 
(Interviewee L11, 2013) 
In this sense, lower emissions are viewed as having been brought about by 
enacted legislation, and the threat of imposition of fines and limits, i.e. arguably 
what might be classed as ‘old style’, regulatory governance arrangements 
rather than market led change or voluntarism.  This view is supported by texts 
from business actors also: 
‘We have to focus our investment on continuing to meet current legal 
requirements and for now that means NOx and SO2 rather than carbon.  
I’d go further than that actually and say that whilst there isn’t a legal limit, 
and with plant closures around the corner we can’t focus on carbon, we 
have to focus on what we are required to do.’ 
(Interviewee L18, 2012) 
Perhaps an unintended consequence of these governance arrangements if the 
focus on meeting regulatory requirements.  CO2 emissions during the era, 
whilst discussed, are not seen as a legislative issue for consideration at 
operational scale in the same way as NOx, SO2 and particulate matter, so 
companies operating in power industry have little incentive to deal with it in 
same way.   Given the complexity and poor understanding of the regulatory 
context at UK level (see section 5.2.1 and chapter eight), it is not clear that the 
step change (Gillard et al, 2016; Bolton et al, 2016) required to reduce GHG 
emissions is likely to materialise whilst market centric approaches dominate 
the discourse on new coal. 
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6.2.2.2 Regulatory confusion  
A problematic feature of the texts is that there is a distinction between 
government and business views on the effectiveness of regulation where 
either detail or intention of the regulation is not clear, or where there is 
contradiction on stated intentions to reduce CO2.  Difficulties associated with 
interpreting and enacting fluid or ill defined targets for example are 
understandable.  What results from dominant business actors is, arguably, a 
partial temporary withdrawal from the discourse at level of the organisation: 
‘We recognise that carbon capture would mean we could radically reduce 
our CO2 emissions, but there are alternatives for that – gas, nuclear - and 
we are just so wary of investing in something that could instantly become 
a costly waste of time42 [if legislation changes] when we don’t have any 
realistic targets.’ 
(Interviewee L18, 2012) 
[Parenthesis added] 
Similarly, in this extract: 
 
‘We don’t know where we stand with CCS here… we’re so close to 
housing so there’s the planning issues.  We have to, by law, focus on 
particulate matter and NOx and SOx [sic] so won’t prioritise CO2 until 
we have to.’ 
(Observation notes O3, 2012) 
There are parallels here with national discourse, that CCS is not a one size fits 
all opportunity to reduce emissions in every coal fired power station.  At 
operational scale, managers repeatedly expressed priorities relating to existing 
regulatory requirements rather than developing solutions to potential 
legislative change. 
                                            
42 Referring here to potential for ban on coal in UK power stations if mood changes in 5 
years… 
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‘Our focus has to be NOx & SO2 and particulate matter and getting that 
down because that’s what we are regulated for.  We think the best way 
to do that is to look at bio-fuels.’ 
(Observation notes O1, 2011) 
Similar frustrations exist beyond business spheres:  
‘Nobody seems to be thinking about the issues in any co-ordinated way.  
It’s all about this issue, then the next, then the next…’ 
(Observation notes O3, 2012) 
‘Someone in government needs to grasp the nettle, make a decision 
and legislate.’  
(Interviewee L1, 2012) 
6.2.2.3 Technical solutions to climate change 
The dominant metaphor relating to the ‘win-win’ scenario evidenced at Y&H 
level from business and government actors, is that CCS has a potential to be 
a technical fix for a wicked problem.  CCS’s potential to contribute positively to 
local environment is expressed in multiple ways: 
Project manager comment: ‘The emissions from the plant will be cleaner 
than the air we take in; we’ll actually improve the local air quality’ 
(Observation notes O3, 2012) 
In contrast, there is a view that whilst a technical solution may be achievable 
and suited to the unique geology and geography of the Y&H region, it is not 
well understood along the full chain, i.e. from capture and compression, to 
transport to storage.  In addition, new coal is perceived as technically complex 
and the planning and consultation processes may make it harder for lay people 
to grasp what they are being asked to accept.  This comment from an attendee 
during a plant visit:  
‘…there are just so many stats and figures, my head is still spinning.  It’s 
all very interesting but I don’t know what to make of it all really… I feel 
like I need an expert to explain everything.’ 
(Observation notes O1, 2011) 
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‘I asked to see the project plans before the [planning consultation] 
meeting and was sent a huge technical document, I’m not thick but I didn’t 
understand a word of it’ 
(Interviewee L29, 2013) 
In keeping with economic and social metaphors, the lack of understanding of 
the technical issues causes public concern which in turn is exacerbated by the 
organisational field relationships leading to perceptions of seems unfair 
distribution of environmental risks and benefits: 
‘You can tell me all this about reduced emissions, but at the end of the 
day we don’t know what to think.’  
(Observation notes O3, 2012) 
‘We [local single issue NGO] have invested in some air quality monitors 
ourselves so we properly understand what is happening’ 
(Interviewee L15, 2013) 
This fits with Markusson et al (2012) and Brunstig and Upham (2011) for 
specific examples relating to CCS, but also to the wider stakeholder 
engagement literature (Swift, 2002; Kates, 2005; Greenwood, 2007), that lack 
of trust of government and business actors where people feel they are being 
asked to make decisions by actors with little invested interest in the area.  
6.2.2.4 Public health & the environment – lack of connection 
The rhetoric relating to public health issues being seen by dominant actors as 
no longer related to coal is exemplified by this extract from observation data: 
Participant: ‘There’s a lack of joined up thinking around public health 
and continuing to use coal no-one seems to think of coal as a public 
health issue any more since we stopped mining. CCS with existing 
particulate reduction techniques could be an option to improve things 
but nobody is looking at it from that angle.’ 
(Observation notes O2, 2012) 
However, public actors (local residents and local government) recognise the 
continued relationship between air quality and public health.  This disconnect 
extends to issues of justice: 
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‘… we’re still feeling the effects of mining round here, of course we are.  
But now no one cares.  There used to be all sorts of screening and 
health care and pay outs when the Coal Board took care of things. We 
don’t have any contact with the mines or the station or anyone any 
more.  I wouldn’t know who to get in touch with, I don’t suppose anyone 
does so we just put up with it. It’s not fair really, they’re still making all 
the money but our health suffers.’  
(Interviewee L12, 2013) 
When asked to expand on this point, the interviewee explained, in her view, 
companies running power stations are now more concerned with making sure 
they are not ‘blamed’ for poor health outcomes.  As individuals it is difficult to 
know who to speak to and not clear who has responsibility for some of the 
negative legacy impacts associated with historic mining operations in the 
region. The texts exemplify two dominant themes; firstly, that public health is 
not sufficiently tied in to environmental health at policy or governance level.  
Secondly, that the support mechanisms and practices required to treat and 
deal with conditions associated with industrial agglomeration in the region are 
no longer evident, but once were. 
Interestingly, the focus on single (albeit most significant) issue of climate 
change as a dominant issue is seen as problematic for both eco-system and 
public health. 
‘…in my view it’s the very fine particulate matter that creates problems 
for human health and the environment.  It’s like we’re putting out one 
fire and starting another.’ 
(Interviewee L26, 2013) 
6.2.2.5 It’s better than nothing43, but it’s not fair 
One of the key narratives around new coal, i.e. that it is a potential win-win 
scenario, is evident also at local level, particularly amongst civic and public 
actors, but this perception is more nuanced.  CCS and other new, clean coal 
developments are seen as being better, environmentally, than old, dirty coal, 
but not better than no coal at all.   
                                            
43 For example getting involved with planning 
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‘I guess at least with this carbon capture it’ll be better than it has been 
but I really don’t understand why we don’t close them all now and get 
on with getting renewables, even nuclear.’ 
(Interviewee L7, 2013)  
‘It’s much better to plan environmental benefits from a project at the 
start than leave it to chance – or leave it to the developers and planners 
for that matter.’ 
(Interviewee L26, 2013) 
However, amongst residents and community groups, there is more difference 
within groups and a range of concerns relating to ownership of power stations 
and decision making.  For example: 
Speaker is very concerned because the government wants fracking and 
nuclear more than it wants coal with CCS, so even if there’s foreign 
investment (e.g. at Eggborough) they will find a way to green light any 
project they can 
(Observation notes O8, 2013) 
An interesting feature of this narrative though, is that planned developments in 
clean coal and new technologies, with consultative approaches to governance, 
allow for a more managed approach to the environment than has historically 
been the case in the region.  Coal fired power stations along the Aire valley 
have particular significance here given the valley’s importance as a biodiversity 
corridor in an otherwise industrialised belt.  The legacy of planning, CSR and 
conservation activities are seen by communities as better than nothing.   A 
managed approach to continued coal use in the region offers opportunity for 
planned environmental developments and habitat creation: 
‘It’s ironic - the disused mines are opportunities to create green spaces 
because basically they’re no good for building or development.’ 
(Interviewee L27, 2013) 
 ‘…it’s important that we [national environmental charity] get involved 
as early as possible but there are limits to what we can do.  Individuals 
don’t have the opportunity to [get involved] in the same way.’ 
(Interviewee L26, 2013) 
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However, there is a degree of conflict and reticence embedded within the texts.    
‘They’re44 supposed to think about this when planning new big 
developments aren’t they? But it just doesn’t seem to matter to them 
that the Aire valley is one of the most important wildlife corridors in the 
UK.  They don’t get that it’s an eco-system.’ 
(Interviewee L11, 2013) 
‘When there’s a conflict between nature and energy, when we need 
something from the environment, energy will win every time.  Nature 
versus economics, economics will win every time’  
(Interviewee L26, 2013) 
These extracts draw out features of the narrative which suggest that unlike for 
economic metaphors, within the environmental organisational field for 
governance, civic and public ‘groups’ demonstrate a degree of agency, 
however, there is an imbalance in agency both in terms of the level of actors 
effecting change, and the different environmental issues being discussed.  
When compared with the national picture, whilst national (and international) 
actors have agency across both fields this is not the case for local actors with 
more locally and individually relevant environmental concerns. 
6.2.2.6 Environmental Agents 
The texts are enlightening in three key ways:  firstly, a picture emerges here 
from interview and observation texts in particular that public views on coal with 
CCS, challenge the ‘mainstream’ dominant narrative relating to CCS being an 
environmental good.  Instead, the more nuanced narrative that CCS is better 
than nothing but lacking in many respects is strong amongst civic actors.  This 
might be seen to represent a scalar disconnect but does at least allow for 
discourse and (limited) space for sustainability. 
Secondly, the presence of groups, ENGOs, environmental charities and single 
issue groups becomes evident.  This differs from economic organisational field 
for governance as public albeit single issue, not democratic voices are heard, 
again creating at least space for discourse. 
                                            
44 Planners and developers 
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Thirdly, and this is especially key to an analysis of organisational field for 
governance, it is not at all clear that these groups (or individuals) have agency 
within the field in terms of involvement in decision making.  Rather, the texts 
would suggest that agency in decision making remains strong amongst few 
powerful elites, with ‘tame’ NGOs involved in prescribed consultation and 
planning processes (Edwards and Tallontire, 2009).   
To expand on the detail.  Electricity generators are framed as polluters and 
separate from communities, but at local level making efforts to develop CSR 
or legacy plans which will ameliorate their environmental impacts.  Their 
behaviours however are steered by Government and shareholders. The 
regulator, the Environment Agency also connects business and government 
with a liaison role.   
‘My role is to work closely with industry to make sure they understand 
their obligations under the legislation and have sound plans to satisfy 
these obligations.  I also make sure we listen to their concerns and 
come up with solutions that are commercially viable.  Putting the 
generators out of business wouldn’t help anyone.’ 
(Interviewee L31, 2012) 
6.2.2.7 Environmental Entities 
The primary entity throughout the discourse is ‘Clean Coal’.  Document texts, 
company literature, bureaucratic data, notifications, public consultation events, 
B2B events (see appendix F) all use the terminology to imply that ‘coal’ has 
changed.   Whilst there are differences in views from individuals, there is some 
consistency that for social actors within the environmental field though, ‘old 
coal’ and its historical context remains relevant. 
In addition to their stated aims in conservation and stewardship, local and 
national ENGOs are to a degree seen as ‘representatives’ of local opinion – 
willing or unwilling.   
‘We’re often asked to comment on behalf of some issue or other, then 
slated if we’re saying something people don’t like such as CCS is a good 
idea… We act as guardians of the environment – it’s not perfect, but we 
can act as opposition to government and business.  Local people often 
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don’t like this though because we take a scientific and national view, 
we’re not NIMBYs’. 
(Interviewee L26, 2013) 
When asked to expand, the interview elaborated. 
‘…for instance, we have supported wind turbines in the area, and even 
mines where it makes environmental sense.  Locals hate it but it’s better 
to have a small mine here where we can manage the legacy like we have 
done here.’ 
(Interviewee L26, 2013) 
The Aire Valley itself manifests as both source and sink.  During the era, issues 
of local conservation, stewardship, biodiversity emerge as significant, there is 
a temporal link here with conservation metaphors at UK level during 1990s.   
The coal fired power stations are, represented as local physical icons, part of 
landscape and culture.  Regulation (and other statutory instruments) is 
perceived as essential and having improved environmental conditions.  
However, regulatory approach is not being responsive enough to 
environmental challenges.  In addition, the LCP Directive at EU scale and 
Emissions Performance Standards are influencing operational activities to a 
greater extent than any local plans.  The regulator – at this scale the EA - also 
maintains a liaison role in concert with national discourse.   
Locals, viewed as homogenous by corporate and government actors and to 
be appeased (different from the public), as well as known individuals who go 
attend community and liaison meetings with single issues, can be considered 
entities, although their agency is restricted to influencing non-material and 
local environmental issues.  Such locals, and to some degree those 
characterised as NIMBYs, are viewed as not understanding the technical 
issues and there is an emergence of technical elites with roles within the 
environmental organisational field, however this is not dominant.  
‘They wouldn’t like it if we stopped operating and took away our [flood 
prevention] pumps’  
(Interviewee 23, 2012) 
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Again, as this extract suggests and in concert with national levels discourse, 
there is a degree of paternalism.  
6.2.2.8 Environmental Relationships 
An interesting feature of the data is the nature of the relationship of different 
actors (and entities) with the environment and in particular, with the Aire Valley, 
and the heritage of coal in the region.  In earlier ‘old coal’ eras, the environment 
was viewed as a source of coal, whereas interesting relationships relating to 
conservation emerge during the new coal era.  An additional new feature of 
the discourse is the relationship between experts, research groups and 
academics as actors.  A point to note here, is that their role and agency is 
national, but their activities are regionally based in the regions where CCS 
projects are closest to fruition. 
The regulatory and procedural relationships (administrative pragmatism) 
between business and government actors and entities, i.e. those relationships 
established to meet regulatory requirements, are dominant.  However, in 
concert with the economic organisational field, some relationships and 
institutions that are arguably a requirement for ML/MA do not exist or are weak.  
Notably, connections and relationships between the environmental and the 
social organisational field are weak.  Similarly, whilst ‘local’ and national 
ENGOs emerge as stewards of the environment, they are, by proxy, also 
taking on wider environmental and social issues. Arguably their role, along with 
that of CSR, stakeholder engagement or consultation practices are filling an 
institutional gap between the organisational fields at different levels left by the 
rolling back of the state (Scott, 2013).   
These relationships are illustrated in figure 6.2 below and discussed in chapter 
seven.  When read with chapters four and five, this analysis has demonstrated 
that (from research objectives 1 and 2) environmental organisation fields of 
governance exist at multiple levels and are changing over time in terms of 
dominant discourse and actors within the fields. 
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6.2.3 Social Metaphors 
6.2.3.1 Decline of community 
One consistent feature of the discourse relating to social features, is the 
decline of community, with disenfranchisement and underdevelopment 
commonplace in many parts of post-industrial Northern England.  This may 
seem somewhat reductive, but this metaphor emerges strongly from the texts; 
community for localities within the region (in particular those geographically 
close to coal mining and now the developments under discussion) developed 
around coal and heavy industry.  The decline in the industry is inextricably 
linked with the decline in community.  For this research, what is interesting is 
how this relates to potential for new coal and other energy generation 
developments.  The remainder of this section presents the key features of the 
decline in community rhetoric relevant to this case.  
In a similar way to understandings of wider environmental impacts of coal (see 
6.2.1), a key feature of the texts is an underlying understanding across social 
groups, that the decline of community is tied with economic decline and closure 
of coal mines.  This is evident across the texts from government, business and 
public actors.  However, the implications of this understood, social 
phenomenon for new coal development in the region, differ for different actors.  
For (local and national) government actors, lack of community implies two 
things:  firstly, development will lead to improved community (ties with win-
win): 
‘This is a region that needs jobs above all else, once people are working, 
there will be a better sense of community again. These CCS projects are 
an opportunity to bring something needed to the area.’ 
(Interviewee L31, 2012) 
Secondly, low levels of participation in local governance activities are 
challenging for engagement which leads to a perpetuation of the problem. 
‘We put on events in schools and community centres, but people don’t 
come.  It’s difficult when there’s no interest from the community, they 
need to know what’s going on if we’re going to make the projects work, 
in the end it’s for their benefit’ 
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(Interviewee L32, 2012) 
This extract also introduces a key feature of the social organisational field for 
governance, that, as with environmental discourse, the Government (and 
industry) actors have a paternalistic view of an homogeneous community.45   
For business, perception of lack of community becomes relevant in similar but 
nuanced ways.  At local level, business leaders see their role expanding46 as 
part of community because of lack of alternatives.  
‘There might not be much going on round here anymore, but we do our 
bit.  That’s why we brought the cricket pitch back to life, anyone can use 
it.’ 
(Interviewee L18, 2012) 
Quote: ‘It’s not like it used to be when the (CEG) Board ran it, but we try 
– we put on film nights and the club house is open to everyone not just 
staff.  And we have our newsletter to let locals know what community 
events we’re putting on, fund raisers, things like that.’  
(Observation notes O3, 2012) 
Furthermore, the community and the public are seen as synonymous terms, 
and both in terms of self-interest.  Although not dominant, metaphors relating 
to NIMBYism emerge.   
‘Whatever we do there will be NIMBYs who don’t like it.  To be honest, I 
can tell you now who they will be, you get to know them’ 
(Interviewee L22, 2012) 
CSR and local community activities are considered part of the role of corporate 
actors, however those activities are arguably not salient to operations, but 
instead are designed to maintain social licence as this comment from a senior 
manager exemplifies:   
                                            
45 Whilst a phenomenological analysis is beyond the remit of this research, there is a sense 
of ‘otherness’ and separation in the language used ‘they’ ‘their’ ‘the community’ ‘community 
stakeholders’. 
46 Fits with CSR and increasing roles of business in social literature 
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‘I don’t mind sending a couple of lads out to wash windows when the 
winds blowing dust from [factory X], it’s not our dust, but people think it 
is… it’s our way of showing we are part of this community’ 
(Interviewee L19, 2012) 
For public actors, the texts are perhaps less consistent. ‘Lack of community’ 
resultant from pit closures is still core to this rhetoric with ‘It’s different here’ as 
an understood running through the texts, however, what is interesting is that 
the significance of this for new coal and governance is evident; the drivers and 
implications of lack of community/public involvement for governance are 
understood differently by different actors: 
‘People are disengaged from governance, they don’t trust government, 
and they don’t want to get involved.  Community doesn’t exist anymore - 
I don’t think you can have strong communities when there’s no work.’ 
(Interviewee L11, 2013) 
‘It’s always us same few at all these community events, and we’re all grey 
haired.  What’s going to happen down the line?’ 
(Interviewee L29, 2013) 
‘We [national environmental charity] kind of take on the role [of 
community] because we have a huge membership - we take on the 
governance role and “take on” government where no one else does’ 
(Interviewee L26, 2013) 
Whilst wider collective views are not clearly evident from the texts from public 
actors as is the case for government and business actors, these extracts at 
least exemplify three of the key features of the texts relating to community.  
Firstly, members of the public are disengaged from governance and 
democratic processes beyond voting.  Secondly, specific individuals and their 
personal, often long standing relationships with individual business and 
government actors are more significant than wider democratic processes.  
Thirdly, non-elected groups such as charities and NGOs have emerged as 
having a role in ‘representing’ community from their membership. 
For the social organisational field for governance, paternalism and procedural 
levels of engagement are evident, combined with low levels of understanding 
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of clean coal technologies may be problematic.  This dynamic is discussed 
further in section 6.3, and ties with discourse relating to public engagement in 
decision making for this case. 
6.2.3.2 Public engagement: a sop to the masses 
The discourse surrounding the relative merits and demerits of public and 
stakeholder engagement is well established, what is remarkable here is the 
consistency across the groups, fields and scales for this metaphor.  Across the 
social organisational field for governance, this key feature of governance is 
widely perceived as (procedurally at least) necessary but at best a waste of 
time and a purposeful means of distracting from the salient issues at worst. 
From local residents and non-governmental public for example, some 
expressed an interest in wanting to be more involved in decision making but 
felt it would either be pointless as decisions would not be influenced by 
engaging with prescribed processes, or, interestingly that they do not 
understand all the issues and have their own biases so should not be involved.  
These distinctions are exemplified by the following quotes in response to the 
question ‘Do you personally get involved in making decisions about coal use 
or energy in the region?  If so, in what ways?’: 
‘…I might sound cynical but what would be the point? I’ve signed petitions 
before, and I vote but that’s about it.’ 
(Interviewee L19, 2012) 
‘Well it wouldn’t make any difference if I did, sometimes it’s like they 
decided what to do years ago… it seems to me that decisions are made, 
I don’t know by who, but by someone fifty years ago and decisions for 
what’s coming next have already been made.  So it doesn’t matter what 
I do or think... these [public engagement] events just mean they can say 
the public wanted this or that, it’s not legitimate.’ 
(Interviewee L12, 2013) 
‘[Company A] aren’t bothered about what happens here’  
(Interviewee L1, 2012) 
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Culturally and historically defined perceptions on who is or ought to be involved 
in governance become relevant:  In response to the question ‘Who are the 
main people involved in decision making about coal use?’   
‘Well it’s the government I suppose’ 
(Interviewee L20, 2012) 
‘I have no idea to be honest… I vote and hope local councillors and MPs 
are involved.  The power companies?’ 
(Interviewee L16, 2013) 
‘MPs are eloquent aren’t they, and I’m not really, well not in that sort of 
setting if you know what I mean. People as individuals don’t have much 
say.’ 
(Interviewee L19, 2012) 
As procedural processes are dominant, what becomes interesting is whether 
these are understood; when questioned on how to get involved with 
developments, few non-governmental/non-business respondents knew the 
processes for how to get involved. 
‘I wouldn’t know how to.  Would they send me a letter if there were plans?’ 
(Interviewee L6, 2013) 47 
This is exacerbated by an evident lack of trust of government and business.   
‘[Company A] aren’t bothered about what happens here.  They’re not 
from round here, they’re here because the plant’s making money for now 
and they’ll go again as soon as it isn’t.’  
(Interviewee L1, 2012) 
‘It won’t last’  
(Interviewee L11, 2013) 
‘I go along to all these meetings because I know if I don’t no-one else 
will…  it’s always the same people isn’t it?  And there’s such a lot of work 
- I’ve got a 400 page report from Selby council waiting for me – I mean 
                                            
47 Interesting that this interviewee lived less than ¼ of a mile from a major proposed 
development 
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who is going to read that? But then they tick the box to say the public has 
been consulted because they put up some displays.’   
(Interviewee L14, 2013) 
This view is not uniquely held by non-governmental public actors, but also 
expressed (albeit in different ways) by business and government actors. 
‘It doesn’t matter what [individual local] people think about a project, it’s 
about getting it through planning’  
(Interviewee L21, 2012) 
‘…our processes make sure that the best strategic result gets through in 
the end.  We follow guidelines for public engagement of course, but we 
have the bigger picture to consider not just members of the public.’   
(Interviewee L31, 2012) 
[Emphasis added] 
This links to national debates relating to nationally sanctioned, strategic 
approaches to climate change, where strategic national issues (climate 
change, energy security) take priority over local or regional sustainability 
issues.  It also ties with discourse on NIMBYism when taking in to account 
local views on developments.  As with economic texts, these extracts suggest 
that cultural and temporal features (whether perceived or actual) to power 
dynamics are observable here.  This exemplifies the theme that public 
engagement activities are largely perceived as procedural.  Part of the decision 
to not be engaged then emerges, at least prima facie, due to feelings of 
procedural failings, lack of perceived knowledge, isolation and disengagement. 
There is a circularity here that links with wider justice and power debates; 
individuals feel (and are perceived to be) external to powerful (decision 
making) groups. This disengagement takes them further from the procedural 
processes designed by others to engage wider publics.  Without intervention, 
the isomorphic processes at play within the social organisational field for 
governance will, over time, exacerbate this circularity. 
There is however a counterpoint to this discourse relating to efforts from 
business and government actors to engage with publics:   
‘We’re part of this community, most of us grew up here.’  
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(Interviewee L19, 2012) 
 ‘…people are lazy.  It used to be that everyone did their bit and got 
involved, but then pretty much everyone worked in the mines or the 
power stations.  Now people don’t work at all. This is a really poor village 
now, everyone is on benefits, and so they’re not involved in the same 
way.’ 
(Interviewee L16, 2013) 
‘All we’re doing is what people’ve done for centuries – burning coal to 
make heat, but suddenly we’re these bad guys’  
(Interviewee L22, 2012) 
‘Credit to them though, they do try, but people can’t be bothered 
anymore.’ 
(Interviewee L14, 2013) 
Here the interviewee was referring to a number of local consultation events 
designed to give the public more information both about CCS in general 
and specific CCS with coal developments in the region.  However, 
arguably, the public engagement activities are dominantly CSR activities 
and lack salience or materiality, rather they are designed to work within 
planning requirements or to gain social license to operate rather than to 
include local people in decision making, gain mutual benefits from local 
knowledge or experience.  To summarise, two key features emerge from 
this analysis:  Firstly, public engagement is procedural to maintain social 
licence to operate.  It is part of the planning process (key feature of 
governance), however, as very few actors get involved other than technical 
and managerial elites and co-opted individuals, low levels of ‘engagement’ 
beyond procedural.   
Secondly, one size fits all employed consultation occurs. CSR activities are 
not salient either to operations or to place.  This corresponds strongly with 
(and provides a degree of empirical evidence for) critiques of stakeholder 
engagement as procedural in wicked contexts 
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6.2.3.4 It’s not fair 
This ‘it’s not fair’ metaphor relates to procedural outcomes, but also connects 
to issues of distribution of economic and environmental risks and benefits. In 
chorus with dominant social metaphors i.e. that community has declined and 
this exacerbates issues associated with a diffuse social organisational field for 
governance.  Where public engagement activities are designed to engage with 
a perceived homogenous community, there is a disconnect between actors 
within the field; Government and business actors have procedural parallels, 
however public actors, because diffuse, do not demonstrate agency in the 
organisational fields with important consequences for sustainability outcomes 
at Y&H level.   
This metaphor is perhaps best exemplified by the following extract: 
‘We live here, they [company shareholders] don’t.  I can’t see what benefit 
it is to us to have the power station here.  I don’t know anyone who works 
there anymore.  We don’t even get cheaper electricity.’ 
(Interviewee L7, 2013) 
‘It’s all about the share-holders.  If it’s not going to make a profit it won’t 
happen, if it is, it will’ 
(Interviewee L1, 2012) 
This is a complex rhetoric.  Rather than evidence of NIMBYism as suggested 
from government and business texts, actors are broadly supportive of 
developments where this brings local benefits (whether that be jobs, 
investment or cleaner air) and the win-win metaphors explored in 6.1 are 
broadly accepted.  However, in part due to the disconnect and diffusion within 
the field, it is not clear what, how, or whether local economic, environmental or 
social benefits are likely to materialise from new coal development.  To 
reiterate, decline hampers development opportunities and temporal and 
culturally formed issues are not well understood: 
‘The trouble is no-one has the skills here anymore.  Even if it [planned 
new coal fired power station with CCS] does bring jobs they won’t be for 
lads from round here.’ 
(Interviewee L1, 2012)  
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‘It doesn’t seem fair when you think about, but I try not to think about it.’   
(Interviewee L6, 2013) 
An interesting process related feature of this rhetoric that fits with national 
rhetoric within the economic organisational field of governance emerges from 
the texts.  Complexities and difficulties with adopting market led approaches 
to development emerge because energy is considered as a public good, a 
necessity; climate change is evidence of market failure.  In this view CCS will 
not be developed without Government intervention, it is not likely to be a 
market based solution to climate change.  Public and social goods not factored 
in to decision making when governed by the market.   
‘I’m not against the market, but it’s not going to work here.  Energy should 
be owned by the public and run by the public otherwise we will lose out 
to shareholders.  It won’t work for the benefit of society unless the 
government steps in.  Everyone is talking about less government but we 
need more, and we need more people involved.’ 
(Interviewee L11, 2013) 
Jobs are needed, and development is welcomed, but there is a link here to the 
economic rhetoric relating to people ‘settling for anything’ at local level 
because of underdevelopment and the ‘it’s different round here’ social context.  
The following extract summarises: 
‘I couldn’t not have a job though…  but there’s loads [of people] haven’t 
got anything… We need something to happen round here, doesn’t matter 
what.’ 
Interviewer: Do you mean it doesn’t matter what type of job but that any 
jobs would be good? 
Interviewee:  Yeah 
Interviewer:  Is that different here to other places do you think? Why’s 
that? 
Interviewee: ‘…cos it’s s**t round here’  
(Interviewee L33, 2013) 
188 
 
  
6.2.3.5 Social Agents 
At this Y&H level, the national UK Government, in terms of planning and 
regulatory issues as well as in terms of its role in making funding decisions 
about new coal, has agency within the social organisational field. Interestingly, 
local government agency is not as evident from the texts.  Similarly, the EA 
and national level organisations have local level agency. 
The texts very strongly suggest that power plant managers as individuals as 
well as ‘vocal locals’, i.e. local individuals who are perceived as 
representatives of wider publics, have agency within the field, however this is 
limited and diffuse.  These personal, individual relationships (as entities) have 
agency and are referred to by multiple actors, sometimes: 
 ‘I’ve known [A] since school, I just ring him up’  
‘If you don’t know [B] you won’t get anywhere’ 
[Redacted for anonymity] 
In industry and government texts, residents and local people are, to some 
extent, characterised as homogenous ‘community’ and are typically perceived 
as either lacking interest (in which case adopt paternalistic CSR type 
approach), or oppositional NIMBYs in which case ‘community’ is engaged 
through either individual relationships as noted above, or via formal channels 
such as consultations.  Whilst, parish councillors and to some extent single 
issue NGOs emerge as proxies for homogenous community to engage with, 
in both cases, low levels of agency are observed.  
An additional core feature of the texts relevant for the new governance/new 
coal era at Yorkshire and Humberside level, is the evident disconnect between 
social and economic organisational field other than through representations of 
the public as bill or tax payers.  As compared with the connection between 
social and economic agency in the old coal/old governance era discussed in 
chapter four, this would suggest a growing disconnect. 
6.2.3.6 Social Entities 
For the social organisational field of governance, there is a considerable 
overlap between agents and entities.  Individuals, and vocal local residents, 
sometimes characterised as NIMBYs play significant roles within the field.  
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However, their individual agency is not strong and personal relationships 
between specific individuals are seen as more relevant in governance and 
decision making, than are the procedural activities relating to community 
liaison and public engagement. 
One important entity in its own right is the notion of ‘community’ and also lack 
of community: core to the discourse is an underpinning understanding that 
there is a lack of community due to decline of structures and agency 
associated with public ownership of coal.  This lack of community means poor 
representation of publics and social actors in governance and decision making.  
This core features extends to entities relating to the region itself – notably 
‘round here’ – culturally and environmentally placed understandings of the 
region, a history of coal use and perception that this matters contemporarily. 
6.2.3.7 Social Relationships 
As discussed, individual relationships are material and salient, however, over 
and above these relationships, there are few significant connections between 
social actors within the field at this scale other.  The exception is that where 
these relationships relate also to economic (and/or environmental) and 
strength is given to these relationships because of associations in other fields.   
An interesting single disconnect observed relates to local government and 
governance practices.  Again, what is missing is of interest.  Parish council and 
local government disconnects, and local government and national government 
relationships are at best weak or unidirectional. 
Corporate and government relationships with homogenised community may 
be seen as liberal paternalism, beyond that these are founded primarily on 
individual relationships, with some e.g. through community liaison groups for 
example. 
The social organisational field of governance, illustrated in figure 6.3 below, 
may be characterised here as diffuse.  An interesting point for discussion is 
that this diffusion means there are, no longer strong economic, environmental 
or social relationships across the fields at this scale other than individual.  To 
summarise, what this implies for both governance and sustainability will be 
discussed in brief in section 6.3 and fully in chapter seven. 
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Figure 12 Social Relationships Yorkshire and Humberside  
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6.3 Organisational Field for Governance – diffuse at Y&H scale 
This chapter presents a discourse analysis of the Yorkshire and Humberside 
organisational fields of governance for the period 2000 to 2013, and era 
characterised her as being new coal/new governance.  In doing so it illustrates 
that organisational fields of governance have changed over time and at 
different levels.  Furthermore, it finds that these changes have three significant 
implications for sustainability discussed in brief here and further in chapter 
seven. 
Firstly, in concert with the national discourse in chapter five, the degree of 
consolidation witnessed within the economic organisational differs greatly from 
that in other organisational fields at the Y&H level. This suggests dominance 
of few actors and entities with agency – powerful elites – and otherwise 
disparate/diffuse field at this level which raises questions for efficacy of new 
modes of governance.    
Secondly, social and public actors are represented in the texts to a greater 
degree than for UK fields.  This feature is especially evident for the 
environmental field where place specific, cultural connections and 
relationships are evident.  However, this representation does not translate to 
governance or decision making power; engagement with publics is notably 
procedural and paternalistic rather than in any way intrinsic to governance 
processes.  Furthermore, within the social organisational field, whilst social 
actors are evident, diffuse views on coal use and new technology (other than 
where these relate to lack of community and mistrust of corporate and 
government actors) means that processes for engagement designed to favour 
homogenous groups do not capture diffuse public discourse.   
Finally, for the Yorkshire and Humber case, there are also evident pressures 
(and disconnects) between UK Government and business owners of power 
plants with agency at both levels of governance explored.  This creates 
opposing local (governance and operational) pressures.  Disconnects exist 
over time and levels and within and between fields; for governance outcomes, 
where Government and commercial actors have more power than other actors 
and the UK interests are prioritised over local this has consequences for 
sustainability. 
192 
 
 
 
This also demonstrates an emerging theme especially evident in the interview 
data, but also in observations, relating to assumptions and characteristics of 
‘old’ governance roles and relationships where newer practices are not 
understood, adopted or trusted.  Despite attempts to create laissez faire, 
market friendly governance arrangements with engagement from public actors 
beyond the state, ‘The Government’ is assigned the roles beyond that of policy 
maker and regulator by other actors. In addition, Government and corporate 
actors are seen by some civic and public actors as being co-opted, ‘in each-
others’ pockets’ and, because economic field is dominant, environmental and 
social issues associated with coal use are of lesser significance.  
Organisational field and institutional logics around community in this context 
are weak and diffuse.  This was not historically the case in mining community 
where large numbers were involved in coal mining, power and associated 
industry and economy resource based. 
This diffusion and gaps between and within the fields leads where previously 
relationships existed (through employment, unions, managers) is problematic 
when considering the wicked problem under study.  Diffusion within the field, 
whilst not so weak that no field exists, means that slow isomorphic change is 
likely; dynamics required to make new governance practices work are not 
strong enough.  Social and civic roles and responsibilities in decision making 
processes intended to engage (ecological modernisation, new governance 
models) are ineffective.  Old roles, for example trades unions, no longer exist 
(or have no agency) and knowledge of governance practices and mechanisms 
are limited beyond the procedural.   
This analysis, when read together with chapters four and six begins to address 
the research objectives to both characterise and understand the organisational 
fields for governance. Chapters four to six together have shown how fields 
have changed and laid the foundation for consideration of why.  What follows 
in chapter seven is a consideration for why fields have changed and the 
dynamic ‘forces’ for organisational fields of governance over time and at 
different levels. 
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Chapter 7 - Governing complexity: slowing coal’s long goodbye? 
This discussion chapter reviews the key themes developed throughout the 
thesis; exploring the evolution of a wicked problem through consideration of 
the changing characteristics of organisational fields for governance at UK and 
Yorkshire and Humber levels.  It summarises and reflects on findings to 
explicitly address the research objectives presented in chapter one.  To do 
this, section 7.1 summarises governance characteristics identified to shape a 
governance timeline.  Section 7.2 then builds on this to discuss the emergence 
of organisational fields of governance.  How and why these fields change over 
time and levels of analysis is discussed in section 7.3. Finally, section 7.4 
provides a summary of the discussion with considerations for the prospects for 
sustainability of coal discussed in greater depth in chapter 8. 
7.1 Characteristics and timeline of governance and sustainability  
Objective 1:  Provide a characterisation of UK coal using governance and 
sustainability as organising principles. 
A review of the literature and desk top study of the historical context for this 
research reveals a number of core characteristics of the governance setting 
as relevant for coal use. From the detail in chapter two together with open 
coding of the texts (see 3.3.2), table 10 below draws these together in to broad 
eras of governance.  Whilst not entirely distinct, these eras provide a useful 
description of governance context to underpin the more rich findings presented 
in chapters four to six.  To add a layer of understanding, table 11, summarises 
the key metaphors and actors identified for these eras.  This illustrates that as 
a major fuel source in the UK throughout the period of study, coal use has 
differing but overlapping environmental, economic and social implications.  It 
also shows that multiple, often discordant, metaphors relating to coal are most 
evident during latter, new governance eras. 
Together, these summaries also suggest that whilst key governance 
characteristics change over time with intended implications, there is not a clear 
correlation between these and coal metaphors or outcomes for sustainability; 
dominant metaphors relating to king coal or clean/dirty coal for example, come 
and go under different governance contexts. 
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7.2 Organisational fields of governance for UK coal use 
Objective 2:  Develop a critical understanding of the existence and evolution 
of organisational fields of governance over time and at multiple levels, for the 
case of UK coal use.   
The new understanding of eras of governance developed here underpins this 
research. By identifying and exploring the changes in metaphors over time, it 
has been possible to categorise otherwise unknown organisational fields of 
governance.  As detailed in chapters four to six, organisational fields of 
governance change over time and levels in terms of both structure and agency.  
The texts also demonstrate that organisational fields emerge at different levels 
of governance with implications across the three pillars of sustainability.  
Furthermore, that over time, the fields change, and as discussed in more depth 
in section 8.1.2, the impact and effectiveness of specific policies is influenced 
by the context within which powerful actors and decision makers operate. 
This section goes beyond a description of the fields identified to demonstrate 
how and why the evidenced changes have occurred.  It explores these 
similarities and differences over time and between levels of governance, to 
suggest that isomorphic processes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) are influencing 
organisational field dynamics but in unexpected ways.   
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 Old governance/old coal New governance/old coal New governance/new coal 
 Post WW2 – c.1980 c.1980 to c.2000/5 c.2000/5 to circa 2015 
F
e
a
tu
re
s
 
Nationalised electricity and mines 
Energy security for growth 
Negotiated wages 
Guarantee supply 
Little related regulation  
Structural adjustment/change 
Privatisation and MNCs 
Old style environmental regulation 
New policy mechanisms (limits to emissions) 
Mine closures/strikes 
Imported coal/globalisation 
Climate Change Act 2008 
Mergers and acquisitions 
Market mechanisms preferred 
Regeneration/welfare liberalism 
Corporate governance and reporting 
Sustainable development 
High coal use Reduced coal use Static coal use 
A
g
e
n
ts
 
Government/state – CEB and Coal Board 
Managers 
Workers 
Strong unions 
Government 
Private sector managers 
Weakened union reps 
Government 
Private sector managers 
NIMBYs 
O
rg
s
 
State owned industry Government departments Government departments 
Unions Private sector firms Private sector firms 
Community associations QUANGOs Weak NGOs 
Table 10 Governance era characteristics 
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   1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
 Dominant Key governance characteristics 
 
 
Evident 
State ownership 
Strong unions 
Little social or environmental 
legislation 
Reduced state 
Privatisation 
Quangos 
Structural adjustment 
Increase in legislation 
Globalisation 
Welfare liberalism 
Third way, rise of NGOs 
CSR/Public engagement 
Increase in legislation and 
policy 
Austerity – 
cuts in 
welfare 
Reduced 
state 
 
D
o
m
in
an
t 
M
et
ap
h
o
rs
 
 
ECON 
King coal     
Keeping the lights on     
There is no alternative 
(TINA) 
   
New coal = Green growth   
 
ENV 
Plentiful coal    
No new coal   
Dirty coal - emissions    
New clean coal   
 
SOC 
Coal at heart of community  
Decline/disengaged   
NIMBYs   
It’s not fair   
Table 11 Timeline - characteristics of governance and sustainability 
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7.2.1 Field dynamics over time and levels of governance 
Applying a temporal lens to this analysis has revealed interesting features 
relating to how fields have changed, but also, notably, how and why they have 
not when it has nominally been the intention of new governance arrangements 
to steer towards development of new coal.   
Economic 
Throughout the governance eras identified for coal use, economic metaphors 
relating to coal are dominant.  Evidently, the well documented structural 
changes to management of the UK political economy from largely Keynesian, 
to neo-liberalism during the 1980s and 1990s (Jessops, 2002; Palley, 2004) 
had significant impacts on coal use in the UK.  However, two features of the 
analysis for economic fields stand out as particularly interesting for this wicked 
problem: the effect of market centric governance arrangements on coal use, 
and the changes to distribution of economic benefits.   
Firstly, beyond the initial decline in coal use during the ‘dash for gas’ era 
(4.2.1.1), economic drivers (stable price, abundance, infrastructure) mean that 
coal use did not decline again until well in to the 21st century, despite 
governance arrangements intended curb its use.  Throughout all the eras, 
metaphors relating to both stable price for coal and resource availability (albeit 
nuanced) were witnessed.  Despite reported intentions to reduce and phase 
out coal use (DECC, 2005), coal use remained stable in both old, and new coal 
eras.   
The regulatory and governance framework established from the 1980s 
onwards (characterised here as new governance), focussed on using market 
centric mechanisms to encourage reduced coal use or limit the impact of coal 
use rather than specifically reducing coal use (Department for the Environment 
Farming and Rural Affairs (Defra), 2015).  The Clean Air Act 1993 and the EU 
Large Combustion Plant Directive for example, have arguably led to some 
closures of old coal plants, but also extended the use of some old coal 
generators without refurbishment or supplements of bio-fuels.  The 
unexpected consequence of environmental legislation designed to improve air 
quality in this case is extended use, in some cases, of coal fired power stations 
without refurbishments where legislation does not require it. 
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This thesis does not suggest a specific correlation between the volume of coal 
used and specific governance arrangements.  Rather, what is suggested here, 
is that where the overall governance arrangements rely on market centric 
approaches, in a context where economic metaphors for continued coal use 
are strong, and market conditions for coal (stable price, abundance, 
infrastructure), unabated coal use is likely to remain a feature of UK energy 
production.  Furthermore, the UK is arguably entering, or indeed is in, a new 
‘dash for gas’ era (Friends of the Earth, 2015, p.1). An unintended 
consequence of new governance for new coal in this context may, although 
beyond the remit of this study to confirm, have led to increased unabated gas. 
Secondly, the nature of the economic benefits associated with coal use, and 
the actors who are beneficiaries, change over time.  As seen in chapter four, 
the ‘king coal’, and ‘keeping the lights’ on metaphors for example suggest that 
the economic costs to the state i.e. from subsidising coal mining and building 
infrastructure during the post-war period were deemed acceptable given the 
perceived economic and social benefits of industrial growth and high levels of 
employment.  Economic benefits were also felt by power sector and mine 
workers in the form of higher than average salaries, and end users in the form 
of subsidised fuel prices.  The decline of the coalfields however, in particular 
when considered in conjunction with continued use of imported coal, leads to 
a redistribution of the economic benefits associated with coal use in electricity 
generation.  Specifically, benefits (and agency, see 7.2.2) transferred away 
from the coalfields and towards the state and new private actors.  In addition, 
new private owners and shareholders of both power stations and mining firms, 
received economic incentives through subsidies and favourable taxation.   
Beyond these specific features of the discourse, as evidenced for all eras for 
coal use in the UK, the economic organisational field of governance, and key 
actors within the fields are dominant; this pattern is witnessed across time and 
levels.  These features relate to the agency of dominant actors and their ability 
to use agency to manipulate resources within the fields to achieve their goals.  
Table 12 summarises how the key similarities and differences between levels 
of governance have changed. 
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UK Y&H Movement 
Consolidated:  few actors, 
strong relationships within 
level 
Many actors – many 
connections some strong 
some weak, within level 
and within field.  Low 
influence. 
Increasing difference 
Coal fired power stations 
as economic entities 
Coal fired power stations 
as economic entities 
Increasing similarity 
CCS with coal as win-
win-win 
CCS with coal as local 
development opportunity 
Consolidated 
Market friendly policies: 
commercial scale 
Public investment 
opportunity 
Increasing difference 
Potential economic 
benefits 
Perception that economic 
benefits at national level 
Increasing difference 
Table 12 Economic field similarities and differences 
 
Table 12 also draws from the analysis the direction of movement where there 
is a change i.e. to either increase difference or similarity. Whilst economic 
fields are similar and to a degree consolidated at both levels of enquiry, there 
are some differences in particular in agency demonstrated by powerful actors. 
When read with the timeline in table 11, it also becomes clear that dynamics 
within fields and between levels are compelling change; for some metaphors, 
for example coal with CCS as a win-win scenario there is consolidation, for 
others, for example the UK having a good policy setting for new technology 
there is increased diffusion over time.   
Environment 
The environmental fields are interesting and difficult to interpret in this wicked 
context.  Initially, features of the environmental field relate almost exclusively 
to resource use, security and abundance (see 4.1.2).  However, as 
international debates relating to transboundary issues such as acid rain and 
climate change come to the fore, the field becomes more complex with 
competing metaphors within each era and at each level.  Dominant competing 
metaphors exist, including ‘plentiful coal’ versus ‘dirty old coal’ metaphors. It is 
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worth noting that legislation and policy instruments also increase during the 
old coal/new governance era. As noted in chapter two, this spatial disconnect 
suggests issues of spatial justice may not be embedded within planning and 
governance arrangements (Roberts, 2003).   In addition, in keeping with Parry 
and Murphy (2013) this would suggest that the old style and new style 
governance arrangements are, in a sense, competing for dominance within 
this complex field.   
Political inconsistencies and changes are seen to affect governance of the 
environment and, whilst the economic field broadly consolidates around 
metaphors for new coal as a win-win solution to an ostensibly environmental 
problem, the environmental itself field becomes more complex and diffuse.  In 
addition, actors within the environmental field change (at least nominally), from 
state owners and managers, with very few environmental responsibilities in the 
old coal/old governance era, to the state as regulators with the emergence of 
government departments and QUANGOs to take on new governance roles.  
An interesting point to clarify is that during the period of study, the effect of 
changing UK Governments is arguably more influential than it should be under 
nominally pluralist (or at least ML/MA) governance arrangements. For 
example, the negative impact of DECC’s delays and ultimately decision to pull 
out of funding new coal projects is evidence of non-decision making power 
(Clegg, 1989, p11). This demonstrates that the Government has agency within 
and between fields, i.e. where their changing political intentions and 
motivations are acted out.   
A final note on field dynamics with the environmental organisational fields, is 
that whilst there is a strong link between the environmental and the economic 
fields, connections to the social fields become increasingly weak in particular 
at national level.  As discussed below, throughout the period of study, the 
social organisational fields of governance become increasingly diffuse and 
more complex than either the economic or the environmental fields.  However, 
historically this was no so.  During the era of old governance/old coal, the 
metaphors identified for example are clear that social features were 
inextricably linked with the core narrative that (environmentally determined) 
economic benefits of coal mining and use outweighed the environmental costs.   
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For environmental fields, as with economic fields, there are differences and 
similarities between levels and over time. Notable differences include the 
relevance of transboundary environmental issues:  At the national level, drivers 
for change are to some degree driven by international targets and attempt to, 
for example, reduce GHG emissions.  These drivers are not, however, 
significantly reflected at local level, on the contrary, where the data do relate 
to transboundary environmental issues, it is with regard to for example 
importing coal from Mexico or bio-fuels from USA and Brazil and contradiction 
rather than either continued coal use or carbon reduction through CCS.  
At local level, place related, local environmental issues are witnessed to a 
greater extent, for example visual or environmental amenity of new 
developments.  However, it should be noted that dominant actors, i.e. those 
that demonstrate agency, at both levels are national rather than local actors.  
So, in this view it is not clear that these multiple, place related environmental 
priorities will be addressed in new coal developments.  
 
UK Y&H Movement 
Technical solution to 
problem of using coal 
Better than nothing when 
with consultation 
Increasingly different 
Structured regulatory 
framework – Government 
and corporate actors 
Regulatory confusion.  
Old style governance 
relationships in place 
Increasingly different 
Climate change Public health and local 
environmental concerns 
Unknown 
Clean coal Still coal Unknown 
Close ties with economic Economic ties only 
through dominant actors. 
Increasingly similar 
around economic 
dominance 
Global drivers Local impact Increasingly different 
Table 13 Environmental field similarities and differences 
 
202 
 
 
 
These similarities and differences between environmental organisational fields 
at two levels are summarised in table 13 together with, where it is possible to 
assert from the data, the direction of movement. 
In summary, for the environmental organisational field, metaphors at the Y&H 
level relate more closely to the immediate, local, physical environment with 
issues of public health and amenity at the fore.  For the UK level, environmental 
issues are closely related with transboundary and international issues notably 
climate change and greenhouse gas emissions.  New coal is seen as a way of 
addressing the latter, but not necessarily the former.  
Social 
The use of organisational fields as the unit of analysis has been especially 
useful in highlighting otherwise understudied social features on debates new 
coal.   As will be shown in this discussion, the period from c1980 onwards, so 
new governance for this characterisation, can be considered as an era of slow 
disaggregation within the field, and to some degree the emergence of separate 
fields. There are three core features to the social organisational fields to be 
discussed here.   
Firstly, as has been noted, the social fields are becoming increasingly diffuse 
over time.  In the old coal/old governance era, coalfield communities existed 
primarily because of economic benefits from mining and burning coal.  As 
these economic benefits eroded over time however, and the links to the 
economic benefits associated with coal; employment, wages, association, 
decline and are not replaced it becomes evident that the connection between 
social and economic fields weakens also.  Furthermore, by the end of the 
period of study, where any connections between social and economic fields 
are evident (for example in the prospects for new jobs), there is what has been 
described here as a discord between the dominant actors of the dominant field 
at national level, and the less powerful actors in weaker diffuse social fields at 
regional level.  
Secondly, whilst in the new governance/new coal organisational fields, social 
actors are not widely engaged at either local or national levels, this has not 
always been the case.  This analysis relates closely to the discussion on 
temporal disconnects and increasingly diffuse social fields.   
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The towns and villages next to coal fired (or now multi-fuel) power stations 
along the Aire Valley in Yorkshire and Humberside, were built around coal.  
The analysis in this thesis has demonstrated that the institutions that evolved 
around mines and power stations, but which no longer exist or have little 
influence had both social and economic agency.  This thesis argues that the 
arrangements for governance were, historically, embedded in the daily 
routines of social and economic activity; work, family, community.  Chapter four 
shows that up until the period of structural adjustment in the 1980s, social and 
economic organisational fields for governance were highly homogenous and 
strongly connected at both national and regional levels.  Social and economic 
institutions and organisations (Trades Unions, Working Mens’ Clubs), were in 
this sense formerly part of the fabric of governance.  Whilst some of these 
institutions are still in existence and do feature in this analysis, they have little 
agency within social, environmental or economic organisational fields or 
significance in the processes of governance.   
Finally, there are significant differences between the social organisational field 
at Y&H level and at the UK level.  These are summarised below in table 14 but 
to draw out key features here, it is evident that whilst there are many actors in 
the local level field that express interest (either positive or negative) in new 
coal or coal use, or are otherwise influenced by new coal developments, few 
social actors have agency.  Furthermore, those who do, for example corporate 
actors with community engagement roles, operate dominantly at national 
rather than local level, or on single issues.  In addition, the main connection 
between these actors with agency at both levels is through the economic field 
for example in relation to gaining social licence for new coal developments.  A 
corollary of this feature is that non-government, non-business social actors 
(public, civic or community actors for example) do not evidently demonstrate 
agency in governance at national level beyond external, homogenised 
characterisations of the public, consumers or NIMBYs (Devine-Wright, 2005; 
Markusson et al, 2012).    
At national level ‘the public’ is imagined, and principally treated in policy and 
practice, as essentially homogenous.  In a paternalistic sense, ‘the public’ (or 
publics) is external to decision making but needs to be ‘engaged with’ in order 
to gain social licence (Prno and Slocombe, 2012; Owen and Kemp, 2013).  
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Table 14 illustrates these increasing differences between UK and Y&H level 
social organisational fields. 
UK Y&H Movement 
New technology, win-win, 
jobs 
Local development 
opportunity 
Increasingly similar 
Corporates as social 
actors 
Us and them Consolidated – 
increasingly negative 
Homogeneous public Diffuse publics  Increasingly different 
Few actors with high 
agency 
Many actors, weak 
relationships, low agency 
Increasingly different 
Table 14 Social field similarities and differences 
To summarise, the increasing disconnects between and within levels for the 
social organisational field occurs because fewer social actors have either 
environmental or economic connections or relationships, for example through 
employment in power plants or mining.  Whilst social actors are at least 
nominally more evident at local than at national level, this is in part due to 
locals attending tokenistic (Arnstein, 1969; Devine-Wright, 2005) consultation 
events rather than meaningful engagement with governance.   These evidently 
diffuse social organisational fields, arguably an unintended consequence of 
neo-liberalisation, do not fit well with such notions of homogeneous community 
with agency intended ML/MA governance arrangements.   
When read together, the summaries above contribute to an answer to the 
research questions ‘Why and how have changes occurred?’ Section 7.2.2 and 
7.2.3 below now consider ‘What are the changing ‘forces’ for organisational 
fields of governance over time and at different levels?’  
7.2.2 Power and agency 
An interesting dimension that this analysis highlights is that dynamics of power 
and agency have been observed by using organisational fields as the unit of 
analysis.  By using the fields to identify connected metaphors and the actors, 
entities and relationships between them, assumptions about the agency of 
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dominant actors within and between fields can be asserted.  This analysis 
becomes interesting when considered in the context of new governance 
arrangements that by intention include social actors beyond the state as 
governors.  For the wicked case of coal use, however, what emerges in reality, 
is a set of governance arrangements in which Government actors have 
primacy and corporate and private actors’ behaviours are governed by a 
complex arrangement of new and old governance mechanisms within which 
they have limited agency. In addition, importantly under these arrangements 
dominant actors do not require involvement of social actors beyond tokenistic 
requirements for license to operate.  These three features of power and agency 
are explored in turn. 
Firstly, government actors have primacy across social, environmental and 
economic fields at both levels of enquiry and along the governance timeline.  
To qualify this statement, for example, over the period of study, the 
redistribution of economic, social and environmental risks and benefits has 
been observed. Specifically, social and economic benefits associated with coal 
mining and use in electricity have been redistributed away from social actors 
(mine and power workers, coalfield communities) to government (reduced 
subsidies, neo-liberal motivations) and commercial actors (ownership, profits).  
This redistribution may be attributed to either changing dominant actors, or 
changing motivations of the dominant actors (Hoffman, 2001; McIntyre and 
McKee 2012).  This analysis suggests a combination of both these factors 
applies: Following the processes of privatisation, workers’ agency, either 
individually as employees, or through trades unions declined significantly over 
the eras.  At the same time, private sector and shareholder benefits have 
increased. In addition, for the UK Government however, as a dominant actor 
throughout the eras, agency increased but more notably its role and 
motivations changed.  This suggests that agency and power of government 
and market actors have been acted out (Lukes, 1974, 2005; Clegg, 1989) 
above those of other actors.   
Secondly, the roles of corporate and business actors in setting and shaping 
new governance of new coal have been discussed in this thesis.  To 
summarise, corporate actors (often in the form of networks and consortia) have 
connections and relationships with government actors.  However, their power 
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and agency over decision making in terms of new coal is limited within 
constraints of competing governance arrangements of the market and 
complex, changing regulatory framework (see 5.2.1.4).  One of the observable 
features of this is that, risk-averse corporate actors are not prepared to invest 
in untested new coal technologies at a time when Government policy and 
decisions on future coal use are shifting.  Their power in this sense, whilst 
evident in shaping language and discourse of new coal, is limited in shaping 
the future use of coal. 
An extension of this limit to corporate power is evidenced by the weak and 
increasingly diffuse connections between fields through corporate actors.  
Where specific relationships exist between economic and environmental, or 
economic and social fields, these relate to regulatory commitments such as 
the Clean Air Act or consultations for planning requirements.   The social 
materiality of continued use of coal, either as unabated coal or with CCS, is 
not reflected in the texts beyond the need of dominant actors to gain social 
licence to operate or govern.    
This relates to the third feature of the analysis of power and agency which 
suggests that social actors have little agency or role in shaping governance 
arrangements for new coal. Connections between social and both 
environmental and economic fields, in particular at national level are 
dominantly procedural or (in Arnstein’s (1969) terms) tokenistic and designed 
to sufficiently gain social acceptance of new coal.  This feature of the discourse 
connects with Lukes’ (1974, 2005) analysis of power.  He questions:  
  ‘…is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to 
prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping 
their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they 
accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can 
see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as a natural 
and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and 
beneficial?’ 
(Lukes, 1974, p24) 
This chimes closely with the extent to which consultation is used by dominant 
actors as a means of placating opposition. 
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A final point on the relative power and agency of social actors in this case.  The 
organisational fields show that there are many social actors with differing views 
on coal and new coal.  It could be argued that this is evidence of pluralism 
(Dahl, 1983) in the governance arrangements for new coal, with multiple actors 
involved in decision making.  However, as discussed above, whilst there are 
many individual actors, the findings here suggest that the organisational field 
is diffuse, rather than diverse.  Beyond the tokenistic, there are fewer 
opportunities for community or civic actors to influence institutional structure of 
social organisational field, than there are for economic and environmental 
actors to through existing governance processes.  
The decline of employment and associated community and means social 
actors cannot condition or co-ordinate their actions in a manner that serves 
their own interests.  This results in higher levels of disengagement and 
diffusion, which prima facie without intervention on the part of dominant actors 
to reduce their own agency or redirect their motivations, seems unlikely.  
The discussion above illustrates that over the period of study the agency of 
different actors across environmental, social and economic fields has 
demonstrably changed.  This section explores these changes.    
7.2.3 Isomorphic processes; coercion leads to diffusion 
The detail here will demonstrate one of the key features of this analysis i.e. 
that ‘new coal’ is inextricably linked with ‘old coal’.  Similarly, it shows that new 
governance is inextricably linked with old governance through agency and 
power dynamics.  These insights add an underexplored temporal dimension to 
the ML/MA governance discourse.   
The discussion above shows that the multiple organisational fields for 
governance developed, have changed over time and level. In particular 
changes in the agency demonstrated by different actors, as well as the 
relationships between different actors and entities within and between fields 
have been shown.  These dynamics have implications for the efficacy of 
governance arrangements in steering development toward sustainability.  In 
answer to the research question 2.c ‘Why and how have changes occurred? 
What are the changing ‘forces’ for organisational fields for governance over 
time and at different levels?’  This section details how and why coercive, 
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mimetic and normative isomorphic processes of change have created 
previously unknown field dynamics which affect the prospects for coal use in 
the UK.  It concludes that beyond traditional institutionalist interpretations of 
isomorphism compelling fields toward homogeneity and harmony, (mimetic) 
processes of replication have exacerbated disconnects between and within 
fields. 
From a starting point of largely harmonious fields in post war UK, all 
organisational fields in this study have changed over the eras.  Notably, the 
processes of structural adjustment of 1980s and 1990s; the sale of state 
owned industries, redundancies and introduction of legislative controls over 
environmental issues, characterised here as new governance/old coal was a 
period of change.  The dominant isomorphic force evident for this era is 
coercive; government mandates and legislative changes created a new set of 
governance arrangements for institutions to work within. However, as 
illustrated in table 15 below, the effect of this coercive change differs over time 
and level for different fields.  The differences can be explained by differences 
in structure and agency within the fields, but also by wider isomorphic 
processes beyond the fields.  To expand, for the economic field, institutional 
arrangements for the distribution of resources changed dramatically during the 
period of structural adjustment, however, new institutions were established 
with roles in keeping with those formerly taken on by state actors; financial 
regulation and governance for example.  Whilst coercive forces created 
change, mimetic and normative forces emerge to maintain the status quo. 
In contrast, for the environmental fields, again, coercion and radical change 
during the new/old era is evident, however, this is largely brought about due to 
transboundary issues and new institutions are established over time to govern, 
for example international target setting and protocols and corresponding 
legislation.  This leads to persistence in coercive forces, but also normative at 
national level.  What is interesting here, is that at local level, connections with 
the environment remain place based and mimetic over time. 
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  Isomorphic pressures  
Field Level Old/Old Old/New New/New Moving towards 
E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
 
UK Normative Coercive Normative and 
mimetic 
Harmony 
Y&H Normative Coercive Normative and 
mimetic 
Harmony 
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
ta
l UK Normative Coercive Normative 
Coercive 
Conflict/split field 
Y&H Mimetic Mimetic Mimetic Conflict/between levels 
S
o
c
ia
l 
UK Mimetic Coercive Mimetic, Coercive 
Normative 
Dysfunction 
Y&H Mimetic Coercive Mimetic, Coercive 
Normative 
Dysfunction 
Table 15 Isomorphic pressures for field dynamics 
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The social organisational field is, in short, different.  In contrast to traditional 
institutionalism which would suggest movement toward harmony within the 
field over time (Bradach, 1998; McCarthy, 2005), the social organisational 
fields have moved from being homogeneous, to being diffuse.  This might 
again corroborate the suggestion that the social field is weak and 
dysfunctional, perhaps to the point of no longer existing in the context of 
governance arrangements for the wicked problem of coal use.  For Milstein et 
al (2002), however, this premise would not explain the differences between the 
fields given the coercive forces had different effects in each field.  Instead, 
bringing an element of realist analysis in to institutionalism is useful here.  
Margaret Archer’s (1995) seminal insights on change and dynamics are 
instructive here.  She suggests that change occurs where morphogenic 
processes of replication48 occur; dominant actors use their agency and 
resources.  Through this lens, the diffuse social organisational field of 
governance with its weak connections and relationship and low level of agency 
for actors other than state actors, morphogenic processes of replication will be 
slow.  To use an analogy from the natural sciences, it is easier to move a 
canister of gas than it is to move the gas once it has been dispersed.  In this 
light, in the absence of additional isomorphic forces to change the social 
organisational field, the replicatory processes within the field are likely to lead 
to further diffusion and, ultimately, collapse.  
The analysis here suggests that change within organisational fields over time, 
is in part determined by the relative diffusion of the organisational field, and in 
part by the relative consolidation around common motivations expressed 
through dominant actors’ motivations.  For the case of coal use in the UK, the 
dynamic processes of reproduction and conformity are not the same across 
different organisational fields. This creates an additional layer of complexity 
with greater discord replicated over time and levels.   
An alternative interpretation here is that rather than isomorphic processes 
leading to coercion and diffusion, what is being witnessed here is what Hannon 
and Freeman describe as a ‘squeezing out’ of inefficiency in the system 
(Hannon and Freeman, 1989, p.22).  There is some merit in this argument, 
                                            
48 Note the distinction between mimetic and morphogenic where, for the latter agency is 
purposeful 
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and in particular where lay and social actors do not for example have technical 
knowledge of CCS technologies it could be argued that contemporary 
arrangements for governance are simply efficiently placating concerns rather 
than engaging a wide range of actors unnecessarily.  However, this view is 
limited on two counts, firstly it does not explain the complexity of the dynamics 
and multiple forces in each era and alternative solutions might be deemed 
efficient by different actors.  Secondly, importantly, this view does not account 
for agency, and in particular the temporal agency (‘sovereignty for Jessops, 
2002, 2006) government actors use to affect dynamics. 
So, whilst institutionalism would suggest an emergence of harmony over time, 
this wicked problem of continued coal use plus intentional change from state 
control to ML/MA governance and all that entails in reality leads to greater 
instability within and between organisational fields.  This should be no surprise, 
returning to Dryzek,  
‘…environmental problems tend to be interconnected and multi-
dimensional, they are, in a word, complex…’ 
(Dryzek, 2005, pp.8-9) 
So, whilst institutionalism would suggest an emergence of harmony over time, 
for the wicked problem of continued use of unabated coal in UK electricity 
generation multiple contradictory processes are at play. For Fairclough (2005, 
p. 921) organisational processes are about managing contradictions.  
However, this research has shown that whilst the ‘intention’ is for new 
governance arrangements to steer society toward sustainable outcomes, 
temporal and agency disconnects mean that dominant actors are able to 
demonstrate agency.  This in turn means that, contrary to assertions that 
multiple actors and multiple levels are engaged in governance arrangements 
for new coal, few actors have agency.  In addition, rather than being diverse 
with actors from different spheres meaningfully involved in decision making 
relating to new coal, organisational fields of governance beyond the economic 
are diffuse which means social and environmental actors have few 
opportunities to engage.  This has important implications for the sustainability 
of coal use in the UK discussed in section 7.3 below.    
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7.3 Prospects for a new technology 
Objective 3: Draw from this understanding, conclusions on the prospects for 
sustainability of new coal. Contribute to knowledge on whether, how and why 
new forms of governance make ‘new coal’ more sustainable then ‘old coal’.  
Provide recommendations for practice and policy in wicked contexts. 
Returning to discussions in chapter one and two on the strategic imperatives 
for sustainability, this section uses what is now known about the nature of 
organisational fields for governance and implications for the sustainability of 
new coal.  Three core features of the analysis are relevant to this discussion: 
the dominance of economic factors and actors in governance arrangements; 
disconnects between UK and Y&H environmental fields; increasingly diffuse 
and dysfunctional social field.  These features in concert make it difficult to 
consider positive prospects for sustainability of new coal.  Each of these 
features will be discussed in turn to address objective three. 
Firstly, the dominance of economic factors in decision making and governance 
arrangements is evident throughout this analysis.  The motivations and agency 
of dominant actors are strengthened through mimetic and normative 
processes within economic fields, which leads to consolidation over time.  
However, as has been noted and discussed again in chapter eight, CCS is 
being characterised as a potential economic, technical solution to an 
environmental problem, i.e. climate change and there are disconnects 
between the economic and environmental fields at different levels.  
For new forms of ML/MA governance to perform functions beyond the 
economic sphere, there needs either to be a degree of agreement and 
ultimately consensus between diverse actors from different spheres (Adger 
and Jordan, 2009).  Or, alternatively, where there is not consensus (or 
diversity), as is the case here, then sustainable solutions will, due to slower 
morphogenic processes of change within and between fields diffuse fields, 
take longer to reconcile.  Whilst the latter is likely to produce stronger socially 
and economically sustainable outcomes in the longer term, the complexity and 
nature of wicked problem of coal use, which has developed over decades, 
means that targets for reduced emissions would not be reached.   
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So, thinking about the ways that new institutions mirror or mimic old ones, and 
the now mimetic, normative processes within economic field, the implication is 
that without another coercive force (e.g. a new government mandate) the 
economic organisational field is unlikely to change radically.  This has 
significant implications for sustainability.  Notably, sustainability has been 
characterised as relating to environmental, social and economic issues, this 
has been shown to be the case in particular for coal use in the UK, where 
economic benefits and risks associated with coal are inextricably linked with 
social and environmental benefits and risks. Embedded within the 
conceptualisation of the research problem, is the notion that for new 
governance arrangements to have a positive effect on the sustainability of new 
coal, these three core features of sustainability would need to be meaningfully 
integrated. 
Secondly, it has been shown here that the environmental organisational fields 
are disconnected between levels.  In addition, there is diffuse agency within 
the field beyond economic actors who have agency (notably government 
actors with non-decision (Clegg, 1989, p.11) making powers).   Again, these 
disconnects are problematic when considering the prospects for the 
sustainability of coal use.  In addition to issues of lack of agency of actors other 
than economic (and dominantly Government) actors in the governance 
arrangements, and not withstanding social impacts of mining, continued use 
of fossil fuels is, essentially, a wicked environmental problem.  However, the 
discourse relating to coal and new coal dominantly relates to one 
environmental issue, i.e. GHG emissions from combustion of coal. Any future 
for new coal in the UK would therefore likely omit consideration for wider 
environmental issues either associated with local amenity, biodiversity, with 
mining and extraction or alternative fuel sources.   
To summarise, whilst international and transboundary environmental issues 
have come to the foreground, the subservience of environmental to economic 
is problematic for this new low carbon technology where long-term economic 
feasibility of CCS is questioned.  If sustainability discourse and practice 
emerges from the space where social, environmental and economic overlap, 
then from this analysis opportunities for sustainability appear limited.   
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Thirdly, the evident lack of institutional capacity for social and environmental 
actors (beyond Government actors), within diffuse and fragmented fields 
combined with weak relationships at both levels of enquiry, suggests that 
consensus will only be reached over a longer time frame.  Decisions on CCS 
with coal are, however, being made on dominantly economic grounds without 
a balanced view on environmental or social risks associated with not investing 
in CCS.  This is problematic in particular for sustainability as a key tenet of 
sustainability is that social actors and issues are integral to sustainability 
(WCED, 1987, p8).  
The consequences of these three features when read together with the 
discussion on differential power and agency within fields, suggest that 
prospects for sustainability of new coal are reduced.  Unabated coal use 
however is likely to continue49 where market Government policy and drivers 
influence levels of use rather than restrict it.  Returning to the strategic 
imperatives identified from Our Common Future as being especially relevant 
to the case of coal use in electricity generation, these were: 
• Reviving growth;  
• changing the quality of growth;  
• meeting essential needs for jobs, food, energy, water, and 
sanitation;  
• conserving and enhancing the resource base; 
• reorienting technology and managing risk; and 
• Merging environment and economics in decision making.’ 
Continued coal use does, when coupled with new coal technologies, in many 
senses meet these strategic imperatives, in particular when considered in 
conjunction with alternative low carbon technologies (section 8.1.3).  With the 
exception of conserving the resource base, new coal discourses are not 
consistently contrary to sustainable development discourses.   
Where fields are diffuse or disconnected (as in social) or there are multiple 
unknowns and contradictions within fields (as in environmental), agency is 
mismatched, and dominant actors crowd out others.  The result is that 
                                            
49 Anecdotally relevant at time of going to press; in the UK on 10/05/2016 electricity was 
generated for four hours without coal for the first time since (Gosden, 2016). It is interesting 
to note however, that in the same week, the UK government removed tariffs on coal use.      
215 
 
 
intentionally multi-actor governance processes are ineffective because 
sufficient agency is not exhibited across all pillars. Returning to Stoker’s 
propositions (Stoker, 1998), the implications for governance are considerable.  
The lack of agency amongst diverse actors within the fields would suggest the 
multi-actor features of governance are not being acted out for the case of UK 
coal use.  In addition, where dominant actors across all fields and at both levels 
of analysis here are national actors, prospects for multi-level governance of 
coal are similarly weak. 
Whilst it has not been the aim of this research to forecast volumes of coal use 
in future, this analysis does suggest that coal will remain part of the energy mix 
for some time to come along albeit in small measure and with continued 
(expanded) gas use, and large-scale biofuel and nuclear.  What is concerning 
is that if coal with CCS is only to be developed if it can overcome barriers and 
become a commercial viability without Government investment then its 
prospects in the UK are limited.  This means that any future coal use will be 
unabated.  In a sense, new governance arrangements are not limiting the 
prospects for coal, rather the dominance of Government actors and their 
motivations for market lead solutions to environmental problems suggests that 
it is conceivable that where coal is cheap and stable prices then likely to be 
used in whatever form is legal. 
7.4 Summary 
This thesis asserts that changes to governance arrangements over time have 
unexpected economic, social and environmental impacts; what on the face of 
it may be classed as ‘new’ governance with multi-level/multi-actor approaches 
to decision making and policy reform, in reality is less impactful because of 
wicked context which emerges over time.  This deeper understanding of the 
organisational fields, identified through discourse analysis in chapter four to 
six, has illuminated fascinating field dynamics.  These dynamics are shaped 
by isomorphic processes, in turn influenced by the power and agency of 
dominant actors and their capacity to affect institutional arrangements and 
sustainability outcomes.  
Mimetic, coercive and normative processes perpetuate consolidation and 
exacerbate discord within and between fields.  Over time, these isomorphic 
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processes have changed the shape of the organisational field(s) of 
governance from a consolidated one with multiple actors and multiple levels 
demonstrating agency to create change, to a set of complex and diffuse fields, 
with multiple and changing actors demonstrating little agency and few 
Government actors and entities exhibiting considerable agency despite 
normative pressures for multi-level, multi-actor governance. The analysis and 
rich understanding highlights how dominant actors use their resources and 
power to shape fields according to their own motivations. 
To summarise, this analysis of the evident organisational fields of governance 
shows that even when new governance arrangements that are intentionally 
ML/MA are instituted, for this wicked problem, outcomes are effectively 
determined at national level by state and corporate actors.   This has negative 
implications for the prospects of sustainability of new coal. 
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Chapter 8 – Economic dominance in policy and practice?  The collapse of new 
coal. 
The findings developed in chapters four to six and discussed in chapter seven, 
clearly establish that the governance context for coal use in the UK, 
characterised here as the organisational field for governance, is only 
nominally polycentric, multi-level or multi-actor.  Power dynamics within 
organisational fields, at both national and Y&H levels, determine that 
government actors at national level, dominate the discourse and outcomes. 
The empirical study demonstrates that economic and market features are also 
dominant, and therefore key decisions, i.e. those having the greatest impact 
on policy relating to coal, are taken by few, homogenous (as opposed to many, 
diverse) actors based on narrow interests.  Furthermore, a principal finding 
that this thesis presents is that, over time, the economic metaphors, and 
government actors are becoming increasingly dominant in the organisational 
fields of governance.  This monocentricism, evident both within and between 
organisational fields (and over time), is instrumental in determining future use 
of coal, both in terms of volumes used, its impacts and sustainability.   
This chapter provides a comprehensive update on the changes in the market 
for coal and coal use in the UK, from the end of the empirical research to the 
present day50.  It then reflects on how and in what ways the organisational 
fields of governance developed in this thesis, contribute towards a ‘thicker’ 
(Geertz, 1973, p.14) understanding of the recent significant decline in coal use, 
and the future of coal in the UK energy mix.  Specifically, it draws out the 
implications of the evolving market for coal and CCS in the UK and uses the 
analysis to consider: 
• The changing nature of the market for coal and the impact of carbon 
tax; 
• The use of CCS and the changing economics of its application; 
• The implications of the above two points for the nature of decision 
making and implementation; 
                                            
50 2014 to 2018 where data are available. 
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• The consequences for the economic, social and environmental 
aspects of sustainable development as discussed elsewhere in this 
thesis. 
First, in section 8.1, this chapter brings the thesis up to date with a useful 
summary of the significant changes that have taken place in the market and 
economics for coal and CCS in the UK from 2014 to 2018.  Section 8.2 
considers the policy and governance features impacting coal use, including 
specific energy policy as well as the wider context this has been established 
within.  The discussion and thematic analysis in section 8.3 considers the 
implications for decision making, linking to and building on earlier discussions 
in chapters four to seven, to reflect on current coal use as well as the prospects 
for coal in the UK.  Finally, section 8.4 summarises the chapter and provides 
a link to the thesis conclusions drawn in chapter nine. In doing so it highlights 
the otherwise unseen, consequences for the economic, social and 
environmental aspects of sustainable development as discussed in this thesis.   
8.1  Changing economics of coal.  2014 to 2018, post new coal? 
Coal as a fuel source for electricity generation is in significant decline in the 
UK.  In 2017, coal accounted for as little as 2% (i.e. lowest monthly average) 
of electricity generation in the UK (Vaughan, 2017; no pagination, BEIS, 2018).  
In the same year, coal use peaked at 20% (on 11.2.17) during periods of cold 
weather (Drax, 2018a, no pagination) as compared with a peak of 38.44% in 
201251.  Figure 13 below provides a summary of annual changes to volumes 
of different fuel stocks over the period from 2008 to 2017.  A fuller breakdown 
of energy statistics, trends and fuel sources is included in appendix A and 
discussed in section 2.1, here a number of prima facie features of the changes 
in the market for coal emerge.  These include: 
• Coal use as a fuel stock is in significant decline in the UK, both as a 
proportion of electricity generated and in terms of volume of fuel. 
• Renewable energy has increased beyond 2015 targets of 17% of 
electricity generated. 
                                            
51 2013 and 14 saw higher volumes of coal use, however 2012 was highest as a proportion 
of fuel use. 
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• Gas has increased as coal has declined, however UK gas capacity 
does not consistently meet demand for electricity in Q1 and Q1. 
• Nuclear energy has not changed significantly over the period. 
 
(Source:  BEIS, 2018a, DUKES Table 5.1.1) 
Figure 13 – Fuel sources in energy generation 2008 to 2017  
Beyond these prima facie findings, key underpinning themes emerge.  These 
are, firstly, that whilst coal is in decline and the closure of coal fired power 
stations has brought about a significant reduction in coal use, the timing of 
closures has been (and continues to be) complicated by a number of 
externalities including economic, policy and political issues.  Secondly, the UK 
Government’s withdrawal from CCS programme hampered and delayed plans 
to develop abated coal.  Thirdly, scalable lower carbon alternatives to coal with 
CCS are in development, but are slow to materialise, in significant part due to 
the high capital expenditure associated with such developments.  Fourthly, the 
introduction of the carbon tax in the UK has affected coal use, but there are 
limits to its continued efficacy and the impact it can have on further, deep, 
carbon reductions in energy and other industrial sectors.  Finally, the wider 
governance and policy context for coal use remains complex and wicked, yet, 
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it will be argued here, existing policy is not sufficiently robust to be certain of 
bringing about this desired change.    
8.1.1 Coal use and decline 2013 – 18:  collapse of the market 
On 21st April 2017, the UK did not use coal to generate electricity for a 
complete 24-hour period for the first time since the 19th century (Brown, 2017, 
no pagination; Carbon Brief, 2018, no pagination).  In April 2018, electricity 
was generated without coal for 55 consecutive hours (Vaughan, 2018; BEIS, 
2018a, table 5.1) confirming a reduction in the UK’s dependency on coal.  As 
noted above, coal use as a proportion of fuel stock has also declined 
significantly over the period 2015 to 2017.  However, the picture is more 
complex than these summative statistics imply. Coal usage rose again in the 
first quarter of 2018, with coal accounting for an average monthly proportion of 
electricity generated of 9.8%52 (Drax, 2018a, p.11) and monthly coal usage 
peaks of 24.9% (Drax, 2018b, no pagination) as compared with peaks of 20% 
and 16.8% in 2017 (BEIS, 2018a, table 5.1).  Anecdotally these peaks can be 
attributed to cold weather, however, this is important as it demonstrates that 
whilst coal is in decline, there are periods when the UK remains dependent on 
unabated coal.  This section explores the causes of the decline in coal use as 
well as the complexities creating limits to further, deep reductions.   
The reduction in the UK’s emissions of CO2 between 2012 and 2017 has been 
attributed in large part to the decline in coal use over the period (Carbon Brief, 
2018, p.3).  As discussed in depth in section 8.1.2, the decline in coal 
specifically (i.e. as compared with fluctuations in gas and other fossil fuels), 
corresponds with implementation of key policy measures and industry 
decisions.  These include the introduction of carbon tax in the UK and closure 
of coal fired power stations in line with EU LCPD and IED commitments.  UK 
coal capacity has, evidently, reduced because of these closures, and 
government policy aims to reduce coal use further to 2025 (see 8.2).  It is worth 
noting that coal capacity does though remain active in the UK and will continue 
to until at least 2025.  Table 16 below, provides a summary of remaining coal 
capacity53 along with plans for closure or future change of use.   
                                            
52 Usage as a proportion is relevant here rather than volume in colder months.  Higher than 
average for Q1 2017 because of colder weather. 
53 As at January 2018 when coal consultation report was launched. 
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Name Owned by MW  Location Plans 
Drax 4-6 Drax Group 
(UK) 
1,960 Yorkshire Due to convert to 
biomass by 2019 
Eggborough EPH (Czech) 2,000 Yorkshire Closure announced 2nd 
Feb 2018 plant now due 
to close September 
2018 but could remain 
open until 2023 to meet 
ancillary demand54. 
Ratcliffe on 
Soar 
Uniper 
(German) 
2,000 Nottinghamshire No plans to close 
Fiddlers Ferry SSE 1,960 Cheshire Full closure postponed 
but likely 2018.  
Remains National grid 
ancillary service 
West Burton A EDF (UK, 
France) 
2,000 Nottinghamshire No plans to close 
Cottam EDF (UK, 
France) 
2,000 Nottinghamshire No plans to close 
Lynemouth EPH (Czech) 420 Northumberland Co fired. Due to convert 
to biomass 
Aberthaw B RWE npower 
(UK) 
1,580 Glamorgan Partial closure 
increased co-firing 
Kilroot AES (US) 520 County Antrim Due to close May 2018, 
now planned for 
September 2018 
Table 16 Coal fired capacity in the UK  
An interesting feature of the data, especially when read together with peaks in 
coal use between 2011 and 2014 explored in chapters five and six, is that 
many of the remaining coal fired power stations, have had their lives extended 
beyond earlier planned closures due in 2015 and 2016.  No plants closed in 
                                            
54 BEIS, 2018b 
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2017 despite plans for closure, and remaining plants have in some cases, been 
deemed essential for ancillary provision up to 2025 and potentially beyond in 
emergency situations. 
“We consider it prudent for the secretary of state to retain provisions to 
act in emergency situations, as a last resort, where there might be a 
shortfall in electricity generation, or risk of one, and that suspension 
would wholly or partially mitigate that risk.”   
(BEIS, 2018b, p.10) 
The decline in coal over recent years must, in this sense, be seen in the context 
of planned reductions in unabated coal over time, but not as a guaranteed, full 
and total removal of coal from the energy mix.   
As discussed in chapter five, the UK experienced high levels of unabated coal 
use in the early part of the 21st century.  By considering these peaks over the 
longer time frame, the analysis here suggests they were due to three main 
factors.  Firstly, the period 2000 to 2013 saw stable (and typically low) price for 
coal on world markets.  Operational costs for existing coal fired plants were 
low55, and despite dominant environmental metaphors relating to the need to 
reduce coal use in the energy mix, market and pre-existing infrastructure 
factors influenced higher levels of coal use.  Secondly, allowances for coal use 
up to given limits were, as discussed in chapter 5, planned under the 
framework of the LCPD (IED from January 2016).  Energy providers were 
effectively committed to using coal until these limits were reached; where 
allowances have not yet been reached, plants remain open.   
Finally, interestingly, the launch of the CCS Roadmap and Commercialisation 
Programme, presented potential benefits from continued (in some cases 
expanded) coal use when mitigated with CCS (see chapter five).  In the context 
of a regulated market, this, as integral to the dominant ‘win-win’ (5.2.1.1) 
discourse gave signals to suppliers that new investment in coal may be justified 
(SSE, 2012; 2CoEnergy56, 2012).  In addition, as noted above and discussed 
in greater depth in section 5.2, some planned closures were delayed as part 
of intended CCS developments (or so called ‘capture ready’ units) under the 
                                            
55 Although increasing due to higher maintenance costs of old plant. 
56 The company behind the Don Valley Power Project 
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CCS roadmap (e.g. Ferrybridge).   Taking these features together, higher 
levels of coal use correspond with the era of new governance/new coal 
characterised in this thesis.   
The closure of coal fired plants since 2014 and reduced use of coal in 
remaining plants have, evidently, had a direct and significant impact on CO2 
emissions in the UK.  Annual reductions in emissions from the energy sector 
have been directly associated with the UK’s reductions in CO2 emissions in 
line with its Carbon Budgets (The CCC, 2017). Unabated coal has been 
replaced, in large part, with unabated but lower carbon gas (Williams, 2018; 
BEIS, 2018a) and renewables (appendix A).  There are, however, complexities 
in both these markets (discussed in section 8.1.3) which impact both the 
demand for coal and the sustainability of UK energy mix.  In addition, whilst it 
is recognised that the decline in coal use is positive, this analysis supports 
earlier findings that unabated coal use has been extended in significant part 
because of UK government and other dominant actors’ prevarications on low 
carbon alternatives.   
As discussed in chapters four and seven, the UK’s remaining, operational coal 
fired power stations, have been characterised widely as ‘old, polluting and ripe 
for retirement’ (E3G, 2016, p.2), and further delays in their closure are 
problematic (BEIS, 2017a).  The extract below illustrates the point:  
‘In 2014 the UK’s 10 remaining coal plants were responsible for 20% of 
total CO2 emissions. Nine of them featured in Europe’s top ‘Dirty 30’ 
coal plants. They are old, polluting and ripe for retirement. Five are set 
to close during 2016, totalling 8GW. This will leave just five in operation, 
totalling 10.5GW of capacity.’ 
(E3G, 2016, p.2) 
However, of the five plants (Pearce and Evans, 2015, no pagination) that had 
been scheduled to close in 2016, only three57 did. Furthermore, forecasts in 
the first decade of the 21st century (IEA, 2010) suggested that UK energy 
demand could not be met in an economically sustainable way without coal with 
CCS as part of the energy mix.  The government’s recent report on energy 
                                            
57 Ferrybridge, which had previously had its operational use extended, also closed 
unexpectedly due to a fire in the cooling tower (Yorkshire Post, 2016). 
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trends (BEIS, 2018c) recognises that carbon budgets cannot be met with 
increases in gas use required to meet demand (ibid.) and so plans to expand 
gas and nuclear.  In addition, the government noted its continued commitment 
to bring full-scale CCS operations on line in the 2030s (BEIS, 2017b).  It has 
been argued, however, that unless CCS comes on line in the 2020s it will not 
be possible to achieve the CCS capacity required in the 2030s to meet 
commitments under carbon budgets four and five (Holder, 2018, p. 1; The 
CCC, 2017).   
This crucial point from the Commission on Climate Change is illustrative of the 
complexities of the challenge: 
‘UK emissions have fallen while the economy has grown, but progress 
will not continue without new policies. It would be wrong to assume that 
the UK has permanently shifted to a path of falling emissions. Three-
quarters of the decline in emissions from 2012 to 2016 has come from 
the reduction in the use of coal for power generation, which is now at 
low levels.  Eliminating the remaining coal-fired generation would 
deliver less than two years' worth of the required progress to 2030.’  
[Emphasis added] 
(The CCC, 2017, p.8) 
 
In this sense, despite record levels of carbon reduction, unless new 
approaches are developed, the UK will not be able to make the deep carbon 
reductions required (in energy and wider sectors) to meet carbon budgets 4 
and 5 (ibid., p.8) without CCS.   
In summary, whilst coal use has fallen and plans to close most of the remaining 
coal fired power stations by 2025 have been announced (BEIS, 2016), delays 
and uncertainty have impacted on the UK’s ability to reach future national 
targets for CO2 emissions without coal and CCS.   Whilst somewhat polemic, 
the contradictions raised here warrant further exploration in the remainder of 
this section.   
8.1.2 The impact of the UK Carbon Tax 
The Carbon Tax and Carbon Price Floor (CPF), was established as part of the 
reforms under the EMR (DECC, 2011b) as a means of creating a ‘cleaner, 
more diverse, more sustainable electricity mix’ (ibid., p.3). This section 
225 
 
 
considers whether and in what ways one of the UK’s main tools to reduce 
carbon and meet commitments under the Climate Change Act 2008, have had 
an impact on the use of and market for coal in the UK. 
Two connected, yet somewhat contradictory, themes relating to the impact of 
the Carbon Tax on UK coal use emerge from the data.  These are, firstly, that 
the introduction of the tax was a catalyst for dramatic decarbonisation from 
2013 to 2018.  Secondly, that the decline in coal use is only in part due to the 
carbon tax, that plant closures were due prior to its introduction and that further 
reductions in CO2 emissions as a result of the tax will, therefore, be limited.  In 
this latter sense, as a policy tool, the CPF is useful but not sufficient.  Concerns 
remain, in particular from industry and environmental actors, that the CPF is 
too low and lacks required nuance to tackle deeply ingrained carbon 
dependency on fossil fuels.  These themes are discussed in turn. 
8.1.2.1 Dramatic decarbonisation due to Carbon Tax 
Introduced in 2013, the CPF is the main UK government policy designed to 
support and supplement the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) by raising 
the cost of emitting carbon (Carbon Brief, 2013).  There are two components 
to the tax; the EU ETS and the Carbon Price Support (CPS) which together 
constitute the Carbon Price Floor (CPF).  The CPS is set annually by HM 
Treasury to be applied for the following three years.  The rate of the CPS is 
intended to be sufficient to increase the cost of emitting and hence reduce 
emissions and incentivise investment in lower carbon alternatives.  The current 
rate of £18/tCO2 is fixed until 2021 (HM Treasury, 2017b).58   
In 2016, emissions from CO2 coal fell by 52% on 2015 levels to 37MtCO2 
(Carbon Brief, 2017, no pagination).  This reduction has been associated with 
the introduction of the CPF as it is viewed as having sufficiently increased the 
cost of emitting CO2 to a level that provides disincentives for producers (HM 
Treasury, 2016).  In addition, as a consequence, the signal to the market, i.e. 
that higher emissions will incur higher costs for producers, is intended to 
                                            
58 A full discussion on the merits and demerits of carbon trading and taxation is beyond the 
remit of this thesis, however in short, creating a market mechanism for carbon in this way, is 
in keeping with wider neo-liberal approach to reducing GHG emissions discussed further in 
section 8.3 and chapter 9.   
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provide incentives to producers to reduce coal use in electricity generation and 
invest in lower carbon alternatives (ibid., 4; Drax, 2017a).   
Evidence of the impact of pricing carbon in the UK case, and its impacts on 
coal use is presented in two main guises; coal use statistics and industry 
strategies.  Demand for coal by electricity generators in the UK fell dramatically 
to record lows of 0.6 million tonnes59 by Q2 of 2017 (BEIS, 2017b, p.17).  This 
decline is in keeping with previous reductions in coal use from 2014 (appendix 
A).  In addition, the latest round of the Capacity Auction for electricity resulted 
in demand for renewables overtaking coal (National Grid, 2016) which 
suggests the longer term prospects for coal are poor.  In keeping with this 
reduction, leading electricity suppliers in the UK have been seen to adapt their 
strategies to reduce coal use in line with carbon pricing.  Whilst there are 
caveats as discussed below, examples such as Drax’s move from coal to 
biofuels as a feedstock (Observation O1, 2011; Drax, 2016, 2017b) suggest 
the mechanism is encouraging demand for lower carbon electricity.  Similarly, 
SSE’s strategy to increase its use of multi-fuels, hydro and gas (SSE, 2018a; 
2018b, p.27), and move away from coal to a more varied and robust model in 
line with the UK’s commitments under the Paris Accord (SSE, 2017, p. 3), 
indicate such incentives are effective. 
This analysis suggests that the impact of the CPF has been positive in terms 
of incentivising reductions in coal use.  However, wider market and other 
external factors affect the market for coal beyond the effects of the carbon tax.  
During periods of lower temperature and gas price fluctuations for example, 
coal use is comparable with (and even overtakes) gas usage (Drax, 2018b, 
see 2/3/18 for example).  In addition to pricing carbon, reductions in coal, have 
been associated with two main features of the changing economics of coal 
(BEIS, 2018b, p.3), these are: 
• Requirements under the EU Industrial Emissions Directive 
• Poor economic conditions for coal when compared with alternatives 
The following section explores the connections between these factors in more 
detail. 
                                            
59 Use of existing stock also rose (stocks held fell by 33%, i.e. 3 million tonnes) as generators 
used stock.  
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8.1.2.2 CPF: one factor but not sufficient  
As discussed in chapter two and section 8.2, policy mechanisms and 
governance tools designed to strengthen market solutions to problems in the 
energy market, are preferred by dominant government actors.  In this case, 
the Carbon Tax is being presented as the main policy tool for carbon reduction 
with other policy tools (notably the Capacity Market (CM)) designed to support 
market centric approaches to energy governance.  Metaphors relating to the 
limits of a monocentric approach which does not reflect the complexities of the 
energy market in the UK, and concerns over a market centric approach to 
energy provision have been discussed previously in chapter seven.  This 
section explores, these complexities in terms of three main features of the 
discourse; the value of the CPF, the potential for the Carbon Tax to stimulate 
private sector investment in low carbon technology, and the limit of its impact 
in further reducing coal use.   
A common theme expressed in industry and ENGO texts, and in keeping with 
the analysis presented in section 5.2, is that the CPF is too low to be a sufficient 
incentive to overcome deeply engrained, structural dependencies on fossil 
fuels including coal.  When implemented in 2013, the CPF was initially set at 
£13 and due to rise gradually to £30/tCO2 by 2020 (Harris, 2018, p. 2) and then 
to circa. £70/tCO2 by 2030.  The view from HM Treasury at this time was that 
this rate: 
‘…achieves the right balance between encouraging investment without 
undermining the competitiveness of UK industry.’ 
(HM Treasury, 2011, p. 5)  
However, scheduled increases in the CPF have not been mandated by 
successive governments.  In 2016, the CPF was frozen at £18/tCO2 until 
2019/20 and in the 2017 budget, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip 
Hammond MP, confirmed that the current price of £18/tCO2 will be maintained 
until 2021 (Harris, 2018, p. 3).  This pricing level was deemed appropriate 
because: 
‘The government is confident that the Total Carbon Price… is set at the 
right level and will continue to target a similar total carbon price until 
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unabated coal is no longer used.  This will deliver a stable carbon price 
while limiting cost on business.’ 
(HM Treasury, 2017a, p. 37)  
In response, there have been calls, notably from the utilities sector, but also 
from ENGOs and the CCC, that the UK commitment to carbon tax needs to be 
strengthened both in terms of value of the tax and in terms of its use in the 
longer term (Financial Times, 2017a).  This would more decisively incentivise 
electricity producers to continue to move away from high carbon emissions 
(Harris, 2018).  Finally, on this point, ENGOs also argue that the total carbon 
price does not adequately account for externalities and environmental costs 
associated with burning fossil fuels (FoE, 2016; The CCC, 2017).  
There are two main reasons why the price has been kept at its current rate 
which stem from the preference for a market centric approach.  Firstly, the UK 
government has repeatedly stated its aims to create an energy market that 
favours ‘low carbon generation’ without favouring or ruling out any specific 
technology (BEIS, 2016).  Secondly, without subsidies, ultimately the cost of 
energy is passed on to domestic and business consumers, which means 
setting a price for carbon is a complex, and a political balancing act.  High 
levels of fuel poverty (National Energy Action, 2016; National Statistics, 2018), 
low UK productivity and competitiveness and a backdrop of austerity 
economics, and Brexit60 all affect the palatability of increases to the CPF.  The 
government has stated that it will continue to set the CPS at a level which 
provides savings to consumers and ensures UK businesses are able to be 
competitive (HM Revenue and Customs, 2016, p.3).  This means not 
penalising UK industry more than their EU counterparts.  In this view, gaps 
between the UK’s and other countries’ carbon taxation policies means the UK 
may become increasingly uncompetitive in global energy markets if the price 
of carbon rises (CBI, 2014).   
However, pricing models suggest that a higher carbon tax would directly affect 
coal use more than other fuels and consequently reduce coal in the energy 
mix without impacting electricity prices.  For example:  
                                            
60 A full discussion on Brexit and the implications for coal use in the UK is beyond the remit 
of this thesis given universal uncertainty on the outcomes of the withdrawal from the EU in 
March 2019.  However, for this discussion, this uncertainty in and of itself is relevant.  
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‘Changing fuel price dynamics could lead to a revival of coal in the early 
2020s. Phasing out coal using carbon prices alone would require the 
price to double to over £40/tonne by 2025.’ 
(Aurora, 2018, p. 11) 
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that short run marginal costs and 
demand for low carbon energy that would be stimulated by a higher CPF, 
would lead to only marginal increases in wholesale energy costs to consumers 
(ibid., 9).  In addition to these critiques relating to the low value of the price 
floor, there have been concerns raised, both from environmental groups and 
industrial actors, regarding a lack of long term plans for investment in low 
carbon energy. Concerns relate in particular, to whether the CPF, as the 
Government’s main policy tool, is able to stimulate investment in alternatives 
to fossil fuels without additional Government direction or economic incentives.  
A principal aim of the Carbon Tax is to not only reduce carbon emissions from 
source by encouraging alternative fuels, but also to stimulate investment in 
low-carbon electricity generation.  It is worth noting the original pricing intention 
when the tax was introduced: 
‘The £30/tCO2 price floor in 2020 rising to £70/tCO2 in 2030 will drive 
£30-£40 billion of new investment in low-carbon electricity generation.’ 
(HM Treasury, 2011, p.5) 
Two points are important here; firstly, tax receipts from implementation of the 
carbon taxation are lower than HM Treasury had forecast (Scottish 
Government, 2016; Harris, 2018, p.1) in part because of lower than anticipated 
returns from coal (Yeo, 2016): 
‘…the OBR’s forecasts for receipts from the CPF have been reduced 
slightly, suggesting that the phase out of coal could reduce the 
Exchequer’s income more than it had anticipated.’  
(ibid., no pagination) 
Secondly, tax receipts have not been ring fenced to invest in (or to stimulate 
investment in) low carbon energy, rather, the Clean Growth Strategy (see 8.2) 
when coupled with the CPF, is intended to provide sufficient signals to 
investors.    
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At present, the economics for continued unabated coal use are relatively poor 
as compared with alternatives to coal (BEIS, 2018):  Without CCS, coal 
generates almost twice as much CO2 per KWh as unabated gas, and so 
carbon taxation favours gas use over coal use.  Plus, coal stock is aging and 
maintenance costs likely to increase in the short term61.   
These points combined suggest that, for industrial actors at least, the benefits 
in reducing coal are accrued by avoiding costs from emissions rather than from 
investing in any specific low carbon alternatives.  Those decisions are made 
on wider strategic grounds and impacted by additional factors such as the 
relative economics of coal and the feasibility of low carbon alternatives.   
8.1.3 Low carbon alternatives to coal with CCS – emerging policy and 
technology gaps? 
In and of itself, the significant reduction in coal as witnessed from 2015 to 2017 
is an environmental good, however, what is of concern to some actors is the 
lack of alternative to unabated coal since pulling out of CCS funding in 2015.  
This debate is exemplified by these extracts from ENGOs and campaign 
groups.  As the dominant actor in this context, the UK Government is 
characteristically viewed differently by different groups as either: 
‘…hitting this dirty industry where it hurts.’  
(WWF, 2018, no pagination) 
Or as prevaricating which causes concern where there is potential for 
continued carbon lock in (Unrah, 2000), for example:  
‘We are concerned that the door is left wide open for investments in 
new, long-term gas capacity, locking us into another generation of fossil 
fuel power…’ 
(Client Earth, 2018, no pagination) 
Contrasting logics in the discourse have re-emerged since the significant 
changes to policy from 2015 onwards: on one hand, withdrawal from 
                                            
61 With the caveat that some operators, e.g. Uniper at Ratcliffe, argue that some stations are 
running efficiently (https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-coal-uniper/uniper-says-ratcliffe-
coal-plant-in-uk-could-run-beyond-2025-idUKKBN13O1RS) 
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investments in coal with CCS is viewed as a missed opportunity for low carbon 
and cost effective energy, on the other policy measures for coal free electricity 
will stimulate investment in low-carbon alternatives.  Both logics are based on 
significant unknowns given the cessation of CCS viability programmes and the 
increasingly market centric approach to energy policy.  The following sections 
explore these conundrums in relation to development of and the market for low 
carbon alternatives to coal with CCS.  Section 8.1.3.1 considers CCS and the 
changing economics of its use.  Section 8.1.3.2 then considers alternatives to 
CCS in more detail. 
8.1.3.1 CCS and the changing economics of its use 
The UK Government withdrew their support for the competition for the CCS 
Commercialisation programme in November 201562 (Carrington, 2015; NAO, 
2017a) and subsequently cancelled the competition in January 2016, following 
repeated delays in funding decisions between 2012 and 2015.  The 
Conservative Party decision was based in the view that removing coal from 
the energy mix (as opposed to mitigating against emissions from coal) is an 
efficient and quick way of meeting emissions targets (HM Treasury, 2015). The 
UK Government stated that this move would also encourage private sector 
investment in alternatives to coal, notably natural gas (fracking), renewables 
and nuclear (ibid., no pagination).  However, it is not clear that arguments in 
favour of stopping the CCS funding programme before potential economic and 
environmental benefits have been fully tested are justified, on either economic 
(NAO, 2017a, p.5) or environmental (The CCC, 2017) grounds.   
During the new governance/new coal era, coal with CCS was heralded by 
industrial and (some) government actors, as a potential economic win-win 
option (5.2.1).  The end costs of meeting decarbonisation targets for the UK 
energy sector without CCS have been estimated at ‘at least £30 billion’, not 
including developments at Hinkley C (NAO, 2017b, p.4).  This figure is 
substantially greater than the forecast £8.9 billion cost to tax payers over 15 
years associated with developing full scale CCS as previously outlined in UK 
CCS Roadmap (ibid.; DECC 2012).  
                                            
62 The cancellation was announced in the November 2015 spending review and finally 
confirmed in January 2016 (NAO, 2017a). 
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This analysis suggests that the government’s unilateral decision, marked a 
move away from a growing industry, ENGO and expert consensus on coal with 
CCS, i.e. that it represents an important tool in the move towards a more 
sustainable, low carbon energy mix in the UK.  This departure from the 
consensus also chimes with questions that have since been raised (i.e. beyond 
those from industrial actors with economic vested interests), over the financial, 
economic and environmental logics of government withdrawal from the 
programme.   
An interesting feature of current developments in CCS is that despite having 
pulled out of the programme for its development, the government continues to 
at least nominally support its development (BEIS, 2017b) and expects CCS to 
be developed in full and on stream in 2030s as a means of mitigating against 
emissions from gas and bioenergy.  This timescale has been considered 
problematic for a number of reasons: 
(i) International developments (and test cases in UK) have in most 
cases used coal as a feedstock (GCCSI, 2018; MIT, 2018).  Globally 
22 CCS projects are operational (GCCSI, 2018).  The technology 
and infrastructure for CCS with gas or bioenergy differs considerably 
from that with coal (Appendix F(iii), observations 01 (2011) and O10 
(2013)). 
(ii) The economics of CCS determine that either carbon tax needs to be 
at a level of £30/tCO2 or requires investment to offset capital 
expenditure. 
(iii) World energy forecasts from a wide range of industry, government 
and academic sources (GCCSI, 2018; IEA, 2015) maintain that coal 
will remain an important energy source over coming decades.  
Investment in clean coal technologies worldwide - syngas, coal 
combustion to extract hydrogen from water, coal with CCS. 
This summary, when read in conjunction with questions relating to the ability 
of the carbon tax to either further reduce CO2 emissions at its current price or 
stimulate investment in low carbon alternatives raises doubts over whether the 
government’s current plans for CCS are realistic.  What follows is a 
consideration of alternatives to coal with CCS in this context. 
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8.1.3.2 Low carbon alternatives to coal with CCS 
As discussed above, the decision to pull out of investments in CCS was 
intended to signal the government’s plans to reduce/remove coal and stimulate 
investment in low (or lower) CO2 sources of energy.  This decision must be 
seen in the context of changes in the wider energy market, in particular in 
relation to three main alternatives to coal; renewables, natural gas and nuclear.  
Expansion of renewables.   
Figure 14 below shows that by Q1 of 2018, the UK’s renewable energy 
(including wind, solar, bio-fuels, hydro and other sources) capacity was 49.1 
TWh, an increase of 11% on Q1 2017.  This accounted for 30.1% (BEIS, 2018, 
table 6.1) of the UK’s electricity.  The expansion of renewable energy in the 
period is accounted for by three main sources: wind, solar and bioenergy.  Both 
in terms of volumes of energy and proportion of renewables, bioenergy 
accounts for the largest proportion of the expansion.   
 
(Source:  BEIS, 2018, Table 6.1) 
Figure 14 – Sources of renewable energy in the UK 2015 to 2018 
This increase from 2014 is, in part, due to Drax’s conversion from coal to 
biofuel as a feedstock.  Three factors make this especially interesting here; 
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firstly, as shown below in figure 14 below, there has been a slowing of 
expansion of renewables since the conversion of Drax to bioenergy.  This is 
important, as there may not be capacity in the UK to expand beyond current 
levels.  Secondly, it is relevant that the change in fuel stock was facilitated 
without a period of significantly lower production (Drax, 2018a) in part because 
changes to infrastructure (for example new plant, fuel transportation or 
connection to the National Grid) were not as costly or technically challenging 
as for example changes from coal to onshore wind or nuclear would have 
been.  Thirdly, there are (at least) short term implications for Y&H region, such 
as retained jobs in the region and improved air quality. 
It must be noted, however, that key questions relating to economic and 
environmental sustainability and security of bioenergy remain.  Proposals in 
development under the EU Renewable Energy Directive are being designed 
to ensure that whole life cycle CO2 is accounted for in bioenergy e.g. including 
processing and transport (European Commission, 2018, p.1).  It is not yet clear 
whether the UK will adopt these amendments to the regulations as they 
materialise post Brexit.  In addition, there are (physical and political) limits to 
further expansion of renewable sources of energy to meet energy gap left from 
coal reduction.  For these and other reasons, coal has dominantly been 
replaced by natural gas. 
Expansion of natural gas:   
The Government has stated that it is ‘essential’ to build a ‘fleet’ of gas and 
nuclear power stations in the UK over the coming decades in order to meet our 
commitments to reduce CO2 (BEIS, 2015, no pagination).   Figure 14 below 
shows that gas has increased in line with the decline of coal (BEIS, 2016).  
CO2 emissions from unabated gas are around half those from unabated coal, 
however, gas clearly is a fossil fuel with the environmental and human health 
consequences of its use.  Consequently, CO2 emissions from gas have also 
increased since 2014 (Carbon Brief, 2017; BEIS, 2017a), but less than 
emissions from coal have fallen.   
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(Source:  BEIS, 2017a) 
Figure 15 – Electricity supplied by fuel type 2015 and 2016 
Energy projections from the early part of this century suggested that natural 
gas, whilst remaining part of the energy mix would need to be abated by CCS 
to meet future carbon budgets (DECC, 2010b).  More recent energy 
projections including the Government’s Energy Trends report (2018) have 
confirmed that gas will either need to be reduced (at least one forecast 
suggests to as little as 10% (McGlade et al, 2017, p. 21; McGrath, 2017, no 
pagination) or abated (BEIS, 2017b) with CCS in the 2030s.   
The UK government’s Clean Growth Strategy includes plans to bring more gas 
on stream until 2030, (BEIS, 2017b; DECC, 2012a, p. 4).  However since the 
withdrawal from the CCS programme, it is not clear whether plans for abated 
gas have been fully formed (BEIS, 2017b; The CCC, 2018b).  This lack of 
clarity at a time when gas capacity needs to rapidly expand is problematic as 
it makes investment decisions challenging (Financial Times, 2017b; Client 
Earth, 2018).   This is especially so given complexities in the economics for 
gas.  It is important to note, for example, that in periods of high price variability 
(e.g. when energy demand is higher than expected during periods of cold 
weather) demand for coal rises.  This ties with forecast increases in price per 
therm for gas which, under the current policy scenario (IEA, 2016) are not 
expected to stabilise until 2030 (BEIS, 2017b, p. 30) at which point the price 
per therm will be, once again, comparable with coal (ibid., 36).  In addition, UK 
gas reserves are limited and fracking relatively untested in the UK.  
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Consequently, imports increased by 22% in 2016, with a corresponding fall in 
export market (BEIS, 2018, table 4.1).   
This increase in dependency on gas imports potentially means that the UK 
energy market is more vulnerable to externalities (Van der Ven and Fouquet, 
2014).  Furthermore, from a social-economic perspective, the expansion of gas 
for electricity generation creates a monopoly of fuel for many consumers.  Fuel 
poverty is already high in parts of the UK including the Yorkshire and Humber 
region (National Energy Action, 2016), therefore concerns have been raised 
regarding potential for price increases in gas and electricity.  In this respect, it 
is worth noting that the aggregate fuel poverty gap (i.e. the amount households 
living in fuel poverty fall short each year) is higher, on average, for households 
with a gas connection than for those without see (ibid.,).  Without price caps, 
or other adequate price regulation for gas63, prices to consumers are likely to 
fluctuate in line with commodity pricing.   
Nuclear energy:  
Th UK’s Clean Growth Strategy (2017) sets out the ‘vital’ role that nuclear 
energy is set to play in energy generation beyond 2025.  Current nuclear 
capacity in the UK is 8,883 MWe delivered from 15 nuclear power stations 
(World Nuclear Organisation, 2018, no pagination).  Development of Hinkley 
Point C, which is due to come on line in 2025, will add a further 3,300 MWe 
capacity and provide an estimated 7% of the UK’s electricity for up to 60 years 
(EDF, 2018, no pagination). 
The intended contribution to UK electricity from Hinkley Point C is 
considerable, however, critics of the development have noted that although 
the scheme will deliver low carbon energy, construction, operational and 
decommissioning costs are extremely high.  Hinkley Point C construction costs 
have been estimated at between £18 and £21 billion (NAO, 2017a, p.4), and 
full construction, operating and decommissioning costs estimated at £79.3 
billion over its lifetime (ibid).  In this view, Hinkley is the ‘most expensive power 
plant in the world’ (Dorfman, 2017, no pagination), having been given the 
                                            
63 A full exploration of impacts of energy pathways on fuel poverty, whilst interesting, is beyond 
the remit of this thesis.  For interest, see Policy Pathways to Justice 
http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/programmes/energy-economy-and-societal-preferences/policy-
pathways-to-justice-in-energy-efficiency.html.   
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preferential strike price of £97/kwh for 35 years, compared with 15 years for 
renewables (ibid., 2017, no pagination; Watt, 2017). 
The decision to withdraw support for coal with CCS on economic grounds, was 
concurrent with decisions to increase support for new nuclear and gas 
developments despite unconvincing economics.  Such preferential treatment 
for one energy over others is contrary to the government’s stated intentions 
not to favour any particular industry but instead to create market conditions 
that favour low carbon (BEIS, 2017b).  Any future government decision to 
expand nuclear must reasonably be suggestive of evidence of its unilateral 
power.  Similarly, in June 2018, the Government withdrew backing for a £1.3 
billion Tidal Lagoon development in Swansea, even though independent 
reviews had previously concluded economic, technical and environmental 
feasibility (Clark, 2018; BBC, 2018).  On this point the Secretary of State for 
Business Energy and Industrial Strategy said: 
‘Securing our energy needs into the future has to be done seriously and, 
when much cheaper alternatives exist, no individual project, and no 
particular technology, can proceed at any price.’  
(Clark, 2018, no pagination)  
In addition, the evident inconsistencies and lengthy timescales for decision 
making,64 whilst anecdotal, send further signals to wider stakeholders that the 
government appears to support certain types of lower carbon energy over 
others.  This matters for three significant reasons; firstly, it corroborates 
findings here that whilst it is government’s stated intention to encourage 
market solutions to perceived problems with the energy market, the dominant 
discourse of economic prudence and fiscal responsibility (Gillard, 2016), and 
the power and temporal sovereignty (Jessops, 2006) it maintains, give the 
government license to unilaterally determine outcomes.  Secondly, it reiterates 
points raised in chapter five relating the weak and inconsistent messages from 
government causing confusion and uncertainty in markets and amongst 
investors.  Finally, it suggests that beyond planned coal closures and 
expansion of gas, it will be difficult to meet carbon emissions reduction targets 
with a market only approach.   
                                            
64 2003 to 2018 for Swansea Tidal (BBC, 2018) 
238 
 
 
What becomes evident from this analysis, which corroborates findings 
discussed in chapters five and seven, is that for each of the alternatives to coal 
with CCS, there are corresponding technical, economic or policy complexities 
which will make their development problematic.  In addition, it is unclear 
whether the Government’s main policy on carbon reduction is based in 
economic rationality as claimed or on political preference.  This is potentially 
problematic as it may either lead to shortages in energy supply (the energy 
gap), or CO2 emissions reduction commitments not being met.  This has clear 
implications for decision makers and the implementation of policy.  It suggests 
that decision makers need to look beyond the impacts of one single policy 
measure.  The following section expands on this to highlight the wider policy 
and regulatory changes between 2014 and 2018 that are key in affecting both 
the market for coal and the future of CCS.   
8.2 Policy context and the consultation on coal 
As discussed in chapter two, under the Climate Change Act 2008, the UK 
government is required to establish and implement policies which will ensure 
the UK is able to meet its five carbon budgets up to 2050.  This section links 
with this and wider debates on the government’s approach to policy to underpin 
the discussion on the implications for future coal and CCS use in section 8.3.  
To do this, it brings together the key features of the discourse including 
government policy, energy and industrial strategies, with a discussion on the 
government’s Consultation on Coal (BEIS, 2016).   
Government policy to reduce coal in the energy mix is progressive in terms of 
instituting further reductions in GHG emissions from coal combustion and 
reductions in coal use to 2025.   As this quote suggests, it is also seen as an 
efficient way of meeting carbon reduction targets:  
‘Ending our reliance on coal for power generation is… a swift and 
effective way of reducing the carbon intensity of electricity generation.’ 
(Clark, 2016, p.6) 
Policy changes in the UK over the period 2014 to 2018 intended to move 
toward an increasingly market centric approach to dealing with complexities in 
energy supply, have been implemented.  Of these, key activities and strategies 
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that have implications for coal use are:  The Clean Growth Strategy, the 
Industrial Strategy, and the Consultation on Coal. 
The Clean Growth Strategy  
The Clean Growth Strategy (BEIS, 2017b) is designed to form the corner stone 
of UK policy relating to energy.  It sets out government actions and policy 
aspirations designed to meet the UK’s commitments under the Climate 
Change Act 2008.  Metaphors relating to economic sustainability being core to 
government policy in the context of the opportunities available from developing 
a low carbon economy (BEIS, 2017b, p. 30; The CCC, 2017, no pagination), 
are evident throughout.  The strategy, if executed in full (The CCC, 2017), has 
been widely presented as a positive step towards national goals for both 
economic growth and deeper GHG reductions.  However, questions have been 
raised over whether the current iteration of the Clean Growth Strategy will be 
operationalised in time to meet the requirements for the fourth and fifth carbon 
budgets (ibid., no pagination) especially with current plans for closure of coal, 
expansion of gas, and no workable strategy to fully develop CCS required by 
2030s (Holder, 2018, p1; Aurora, 2017).    
It is also worth noting that responses to these concerns about a lack of detail 
to underpin the strategy and the resultant potential for slippage65 from 
industrial and environmental groups, have been met with confident (somewhat 
‘promethean’ in Dryzek’s terms) assurances from the government.  This ties 
with features of the discourse relating to a potential emergence of policy and 
energy gaps.  
The Industrial Strategy 
First launched in 2016 and amended in 2017 the government’s Industrial 
Strategy is, again, designed to provide a signal to investors to move away from 
heavy, carbon intensive industry.  Two features of the strategy are notable for 
this research.  Firstly, whilst there is an intention for the Industrial Strategy to 
be read alongside the Clean Growth Strategy (BEIS, 2017b) the limited 
specific connection to energy, existing industrial sectors (Fothergill et al, 2017, 
p.5) or the environment has been critiqued (CCC, 2017).  Secondly, and 
                                            
65 For an interesting example see Lord Deben’s letter to the RH Claire Perry MP, Minister for 
Climate Change and Industry and her response.  
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importantly for this thesis, the dominant focus on R&D in high technology 
industries favours ‘…an exceptionally narrow range of sectors…’ (Fothergill et 
al, 2017, p.2) dominantly based in the south of England is problematic.  One 
of the core features of this discourse is the implication that the government is 
potentially ‘…trying to pick winners…’ (ibid., p.5) rather than providing 
conditions under which a range of industries will thrive.  This chimes with the 
discourse relating to government’s power and sovereignty and unilateral 
decisions to back one energy option over others. 
The second iteration of the strategy published in 2017 included amendments 
designed to specifically address the challenges of clean energy, and link to the 
Clean Growth Strategy.  However, critiques relating to the absence of clear 
action plans for CCS and a missed opportunity to reduce emissions in existing 
industrial sectors such as cement and chemical production (Haszeldine et al, 
2015) are evident.   
The UK Consultation on Coal 
In November 2015, the UK Government announced their intention to support 
a phased reduction in coal use in electricity generation with a view to removing 
coal from the energy mix entirely by 2025.  As part of their approach, they 
launched the Consultation on Coal in 2016, the aim of which was: 
‘…to ensure that the closure of remaining unabated coal-fired power 
stations in Great Britain takes place in a way that minimises the impact 
on the electricity system and provides certainty for investors to enable 
them to invest in lower-carbon alternatives in good time to replace the 
lost capacity.’ 
(BEIS, 2018, p.5) 
What is notable in this aim, is that in and of itself it connects the coal reduction 
debate with expanding the market centric approach to delivering future energy 
objectives.  Table 17 below summarises the consultation process and 
outcomes to date; the timeline, and especially delays in the process are 
relevant here.  Two interesting features that chime with the metaphors and 
power dynamics identified in chapters five and six, and with this thematic 
analysis of changes to market may be drawn from the consultation as follows.   
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Date Action 
November, 2015 UK government withdrew support for CCS programme  
November, 2016 Launch of consultation on coal. Questionnaire on BEIS website. 
Published Impact Assessment 
September, 2017 Prime Minister Theresa May announced (in Canada) UK intention to 
phase out unabated coal by 2025 
October, 2017 Summary of consultation released: 
• 94 unique respondents (40 business, 29 NGO, 16 individuals, 6 
academics, 2 political parties, 1 trade union).  5845 total 
responses through NGO campaign (BEIS, 2017c, p. 4). 
• Announcement that full response due by November 2017.  
Response delayed until January 2018. 
January, 2018 Government response to consultation report released: 
• Support for government proposal on closure of coal 
• Some preference for closure before 2025 deadline 
• Coal with CCS no longer seen as viable without Government 
backing 
• Calls for more joined up approach to coal closures and energy 
policy e.g. investment in renewables and abated gas 
Table 17 UK Consultation on Coal 2016 to 2018 
Complexity in the governance of coal:  The economics of coal use are 
complicated by ‘distortions’ in the wider energy market (Financial Times, 
2017b) which lead to uncertainty in decision making.  The Government 
response to the consultation therefore has many (no doubt necessary) 
caveats and conditions within it as exemplified by this extract: 
‘This suggests that the majority of our remaining coal power stations will 
close (or invest to abate emissions) in the early 2020s, with around 1.5 
GW of unabated coal capacity likely to remain until 2025.’ 
[Emphasis added] 
(BEIS, 2018, p.8) 
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This complexity and lack of clarity becomes relevant given the importance of 
both detail and timing of Government decisions for investors.  The market for 
coal (and wider energy) is not yet structured in a low carbon way; it still favours 
low capital expenditure projects (such as conversion to bioenergy at Drax 
(Drax, 2016)).   
Government power and sovereignty:  The Impact Assessment which 
accompanied the consultation set out potential timescale scenarios for the 
closure of coal fired plant.  One option presented was to close/abate coal 
earlier than the government target of 2025.   In the summary of respondents, 
it is noted that: 
‘Many stakeholders, particularly from NGOs, private individuals and 
some elements of industry reflected on the analysis presented in the 
Impact Assessment accompanying the proposals, which suggested it is 
feasible that all coal plants might close without further intervention in 
2021/22. Roughly half of unique responses argued that the date for 
ending unabated coal should be brought forward (2023 being commonly 
cited). The responses through the NGO campaign argued this point.’ 
(BEIS, 2017c, p.5) 
In the response to the consultation, this point is noted but rejected without 
significant justification. 
‘…we have considered this, but our assessment is that 2025 is the 
appropriate date for intervention, balancing the need to ensure security 
of our electricity supplies, maintaining affordability and the benefits of 
emissions reductions.’ 
(BEIS 2017c, p.8) 
Here, whilst the government aims to promote investment in low carbon 
alternatives to coal, it will maintain its final say on coal use: 
‘Ministers will also retain emergency powers to suspend the phase-out 
in the case of an emergency shortfall in electricity supplies…  We 
consider it prudent for the Secretary of State to retain provisions to act 
…where there might be a shortfall in electricity generation, or risk of 
one, and that suspension would wholly or partially mitigate that risk.’ 
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(Williams, 2018, no pagination) 
It is also worth noting that during the consultation, there was little attempt to 
engage with wider stakeholders.  The government had stated their intention to 
engage widely (BEIS, 2016), but in reality, took little action to engage beyond 
consultations with incumbent actors. 
By drawing out the detail of these features, this section has highlighted the 
degree of complexity that remains in the market for coal.  On balance, the 
analysis suggests that UK energy policy does not currently adequately reflect 
on or address the complexities of coal use.  If coal is to be removed from the 
energy mix by 2025 as the government intends, policy will need to be 
strengthened and more coherently aligned with wider strategies in order to 
support decision making in this direction.  Under current conditions, coal use 
will undoubtedly stay low, and there will be periods of no coal, but it will remain 
an option for suppliers unless the regulatory framework relating to coal is made 
more robust or signals to stimulate investment in low carbon alternatives are 
strengthened. 
8.3 The future of CCS and sustainability of coal. 
This thematic analysis has so far illuminated a number of interesting and 
interconnected themes which have consequences for the economic, social 
and environmental aspects of sustainable development as discussed 
elsewhere in this thesis.  This section briefly summarises these themes and 
draws out connections with the earlier analysis. 
Embedded governance complexities mean a market centric approach will be 
challenging 
The UK government seeks market-centric solutions to energy problems and is 
implementing policies designed to (i) increase the cost of emitting carbon and 
(ii) stimulate investment in alternative technologies to coal with CCS.  In 
addition, investment in lower carbon technology is not yet leading to an 
increase in electricity capacity which is concerning as further coal plants are 
set to close in near future (National Grid, 2016). 
This chimes with the discussion in chapter seven which asserts that changes to 
governance arrangements over time have unexpected economic, social and 
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environmental impacts.  Policy prescriptions designed to in this case reduce 
CO2 and phase out coal, may, in reality be less impactful because of a wicked 
context which has emerged over time.  
Current policy does not support joined up thinking across sectors 
Environmental and industrial actors are consistent in their views on the need 
for the government deliver a regulatory and governance framework that 
adequately reflects the complexity of the issue, but does not lower its 
commitments to low carbon.  This chimes with findings in chapter five and it is 
interesting to note that this rhetoric has been dominant for well over a decade.  
For example: 
‘A number of respondents, mostly from industry and academia/research 
organisations, expressed views on the importance a whole-system 
approach to determining security of supply.’ 
(BEIS, 2017c, p. 7) 
In this sense it is viewed as important to develop policy which support 
connections across the energy and wider industrial sectors.  Whilst the Clean 
Growth Strategy and the Industrial Strategy have been recognised as a 
foundation for this, the lack of meaningful connection to other government 
strategies (industrial, transport, health, employment), and narrow focus 
(Fothergill, et al, 2017) is problematic.  In addition, the detail of policy and plans 
which will allow investors and other decision makers to act on the strategy is 
slow to materialise.   
Government sovereignty; economic precedence, ‘post new coal’? 
This thesis contests that the collapse of the market for coal with CCS is 
illustrative of government sovereignty and power in decision making.  What 
this thematic analysis of the period 2014 to 18 has added to the understanding 
developed here is that, whilst nominally dominant, economic rationality is not 
evident across the whole energy debate.  Government decisions on energy 
are political and strategic, and whilst there is an ideological preference for 
market centric, ML/MA policy tools, ultimately unilateral government decisions 
determine the what, how and when of low carbon technology development.  
This sovereignty suggests that a ‘post new coal’ era – i.e. one in which 
monocentric governance and removal of coal from the energy mix dominate - 
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is emerging.  The consequences of this are considered further in chapter nine 
with reference to the contribution this analysis makes to wider understanding 
of governance of complex contexts. 
What this means for CCS and the sustainability of coal 
The government has stated that in order to meet commitments under the 
Climate Change Act 2008, full-scale CCS will need to be on line for gas and 
bio-energies in the 2030s (BEIS, 2017b), yet there are no meaningful plans in 
place to do this.  In the current context the economics of CCS depends on the 
rate of carbon tax, but also wider on market features as discussed above in 
section 8.1.2 and in chapter five.    
It is important to note, that without intervention, the costs of energy are 
ultimately passed on to business and domestic consumers.  For the UK, the 
costs of meeting both energy demand and emissions reduction targets without 
coal and CCS have been estimated as significantly higher than with it (NAO, 
2017a; IEA 2015).  In addition, as discussed in section 2.1.2, coal use is 
forecast to increase worldwide (IEA, 2017) with continued use for electricity as 
well as other industrial purposes.  In removing funding and support for UK 
based clean coal technologies, the government has done two things:  removed 
the option of clean coal in the energy mix in the near term and reduced, but 
not removed, uncertainly in the market for coal.  By maintaining a get out 
clause, whereby the government holds an option to keep coal on the grid 
should it be necessary (see 8.2), the signals to the markets are inconsistent.  
This implies that even given the significant changes in coal use over recent 
years, the policy detail does not support the fundamental (i.e. irreversible) 
changes required to remove coal from UK energy picture permanently.  This 
analysis suggests that unilateral decisions by the UK Government on coal and 
wider energy issues, have, ultimately determined the immediate future of coal 
and CCS in the UK.  However, the longer-term role of coal and the role of CCS 
is more complex.   
8.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter has brought the thesis up to date with a reflection on how the 
complications of the changing market dynamics for coal and CCS affect the 
nature of decision making.  To do this, key features of the changing economics 
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of coal in the period 2014 to 2018 were presented in section 8.1.  These have 
then been drawn out to explicitly consider the effect of key government 
decisions and actions on coal use and the future of coal.  In particular in 
withdrawal from CCS funding, the capping of the Carbon Price Floor, and 
Clean Growth and Industrial strategies have been explored.    
This analysis connects with earlier finds that wicked complexities in the market 
for coal contribute to both the collapse of CCS and the continued, albeit 
reduced, unabated coal use.  The limitations of a weak, liberalised regulatory 
framework (one which does not address social, environmental and economic 
challenges), together with government dominance, suggest it will be 
challenging for the UK to continue to meet both energy demand and emissions 
reduction targets without considerable policy changes.  This feature of the 
debate links with discussion and conclusions drawn in chapter nine to give a 
comprehensive commentary on sustainable development in the case of a 
particular industry.  
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Chapter 9 - Conclusion 
The primary aim of this research has been to establish whether, why and how, 
new forms of governance affect the prospects for sustainability of ‘new coal’.  
This thesis conceptualises coal use in UK electricity generation as a wicked 
problem (Rittel and Webber, 1973); one that is multi-layered, complex and has 
multiple, competing explanations. It uses both governance and sustainability 
as organising principles to explore, characterise and understand the changing 
features of the governance of coal and implications for the prospects of the 
sustainability of coal use in the UK.  
To gain an in-depth, qualitative understanding of the research problem, the 
novel approach of bringing the organisational fields literature to the 
governance literature was developed here.  By building on new 
institutionalism, this approach works well to explore a wicked problem where 
considering a single snapshot, or policy, or transition pathway, or economic 
model would not equally illuminate the distributive effects of dominant actors 
within and between fields, or over time or levels.  This analysis finds that whilst 
the characteristics of governance - arrangements, agents and institutions - 
impact prospects for the sustainability of coal, they do so in unexpected and 
potentially unknowable ways in this wicked context.  
The insights developed here show that dynamic processes of organisational 
field change, create and exacerbate complexity, leading to multiple 
disconnects both between and within fields which allows dominant actors to 
maintain (and indeed increase) power over time.  Specifically, social 
organisational fields have become diffuse, heterogeneous and unpredictable 
and environmental fields have embedded disconnects over time and level of 
analysis.  In contrast, economic fields have, over time and levels, become 
more focussed with dominant actors exhibiting power beyond the economic 
organisational fields and at both levels. This wicked context has potential for 
conflict and contestation and makes outcomes from ML/MA governance 
arrangements, designed to promote new coal, difficult to predict. Ultimately, 
this has important implications for the sustainability of future coal use 
discussed here.   
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This chapter provides a summary of the research structure, content and 
overarching findings.  It then outlines the main contributions of the research in 
applied and academic contexts as well as the limitations in the context of how 
these create opportunities for future research.  Finally, it presents some 
concluding thoughts on this environmental social science challenge. 
9.1 Summary of the research 
This research conceptualised coal use in the UK as a wicked problem (Rittel 
and Webber, 1973) with multiple layered complexities, with different potential 
solutions that are difficult to ascertain.  Coal use in electricity generation was 
identified as having significant economic, environmental and social impacts, 
both contemporarily and historically.  In the UK and internationally, coal use is 
at an interesting juncture; despite recognised concerns about the 
unsustainability of its use, coal, for the substantive part of the period under 
study and for some key actors at least, is seen as a stable, readily available 
fuel source which, with technological adaptations such as CCS, has the 
potential to become a low carbon energy option.  For others, removing coal 
from the energy mix is an effective way of further reducing carbon emissions 
in line with carbon budgets. 
In order to attend to this wicked problem, a novel analytical approach has been 
developed and applied to good effect.  Governance and sustainability 
literatures have been brought together to add strength to both debates where, 
as suggested by Adger and Jordan, ‘unsustainability’ can be considered a 
‘crisis of governance’ (2007, vii).   By using both governance and sustainability 
as organising principles, it was possible to illicit deeper meaning from the data 
in order to first discover and then analyse distinct eras of governance.  The 
‘desirability’ of multi-level, multi-actor polycentric governance when dealing 
with complex environmental challenges (Gillard, 2016; Gouldson and 
Bebbington, 2007) has been discussed in chapters one and two.   
A multi-methods methodology was adopted to consider the case of UK coal 
use between 1960 and 2018.  Texts from interviews (35), non-participant 
observation of naturally occurring events (12) and document analysis (317 
documents) were generated.  An adapted version of Dryzek’s (2005) approach 
to discourse analysis was used to identify key metaphors, actors, entities and 
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the relationships between them were identified for each era up to 2014.  This 
approach illuminated organisational fields of governance which became the 
useful unit of analysis for this work.    The analysis shows that within each era, 
isomorphic forces create field dynamics which effect change.  Specifically, the 
analytical strength this approach afforded as allowed the research questions 
to be addressed.   
Chapters four to six present the organisational fields of governance discovered 
and illuminated for the case of coal use in the UK.  Institutional theory would 
suggest a ‘merging’ and gradual coming together of institutions and fields 
through processes of structuration, however what has been demonstrated 
clearly for this wicked context, played out over time and across multiple levels, 
is that there is an often ignored temporal disconnect between organisational 
fields.  This disconnect (and others) has arisen, and is relevant, because of 
distinct power dynamics that have emerged differently over time in different 
fields.  In short, government, political and business time frames (i.e. economic) 
do not match environmental, cultural or societal time frames for change.  In 
this sense, one of the core outcomes of new governance arrangements in this 
wicked context, is the creation of discord between fields and within fields where 
economic actors and entities have significant agency. 
Chapter seven provides a fuller discussion of the research findings and 
implications for the sustainability of coal. In summary, the organisational fields 
of governance show that structure and agency associated with decision 
making and governance of coal are heavily skewed toward economic factors.  
Social and environmental issues do not feature equally in the discourse over 
time, beyond single policies which are changed depending on economic 
principles of powerful actors within the organisational fields.  This is evidenced 
for example, by the impact of changes in government.  
Chapter eight then brings the research up to date by developing a thematic 
analysis of documents and bureaucratic data from 2014 to 2018.  In doing so 
it highlights and then and considers the implications of this analysis on the 
current market for coal and future of CCS in the UK.  This approach to 
considering wider contexts and organisational fields is useful in considering 
not simply how a context has emerged, but why and the likely future outcomes 
of current dynamic processes.  Whilst it is neither possible nor intended to 
250 
 
 
forecast specific outcomes, there is benefit (in practice and policy as well as 
academic terms) from explaining these complexities.  This approach also leads 
to a more complete thesis which offers a thorough appreciation of the 
connections and disconnects between the three fundamental elements of 
sustainable development in this wicked context. 
Returning to the overarching conceptual question, ‘Do new forms of 
governance effect the prospects for the sustainability of new coal?’  The 
answer is yes, but in this wicked context (i.e. in this case where there is not a 
straightforward market solution to an environmental problem), new 
governance arrangements are not performing in such a way as to steer society 
toward harmonious, sustainable outcomes.   Instead, the role and motivations 
of dominant Government actors for this case and the relative diffusion of social 
fields mean that governance arrangements cannot be considered either multi-
actor or multi-level in any meaningful way.  In the absence of either further 
regulatory mandates to reduce coal use, or stronger economic conditions in 
favour of alternatives to coal, dominant actors’ motivations are being acted out.  
At present this means intended moves toward reducing coal further. However, 
what this research demonstrates is that complexities in the market for coal 
have already extended the use of unabated coal beyond scheduled closures. 
Given noted gaps in policy (The CCC, 2017), lack of strategy for developing 
CCS and the Government’s intention to maintain the option of continued coal 
use, unabated coal may remain part of the energy mix beyond 2025. 
9.2 Contribution 
In answering the research questions, this thesis contributes to debates on the 
shaping of processes and outcomes of multi-level, multi-actor (ML/MA) or 
‘new’ governance arrangements. In particular, it makes generalizable 
epistemological, conceptual and applied contributions to knowledge in three 
core areas.  These are:   
Firstly, from an epistemological and conceptual perspective, this research 
builds on and extends the organisational fields literature to develop 
organisational fields of governance as the unit of analysis.   Using both 
governance and sustainability as organising principles adds analytical 
strength, and also enabled the wicked problem of coal use to be 
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conceptualised in an effective manner where a single policy approach would 
have delivered too narrow results. 
Secondly, by bringing together critical approaches to discourse analysis with 
the strength and legitimacy of new institutionalism to explore a case study, 
critiques of the case study as a limiting tool (Yin, 2014) are overcome.  This 
methodological advancement means that case specific outcomes relating to 
how and why fields change due to power dynamics and isomorphic processes 
at different levels of governance are generalizable to other wicked problems.  
In doing so, this research also contributes a new way of thinking about novel 
temporal dimensions to ML/MA governance arrangements.  In particular, it 
proposes that wicked contexts are likely to emerge where structural and 
agency imbalances have arisen over time.  In such circumstances, the efficacy 
of new governance mechanisms as a means of stimulating sustainable 
development is limited.  For the case of coal use in the UK, this research shows 
that place specific, economic, environmental and social drivers have led to 
diffuse social and environmental organisational fields.  This in turn allows for 
economic dominance in discourse and policy, which has affected decision 
making on coal and CCS.   
Thirdly, this research shows that the temporal dimension developed here adds 
not only complexity and conceptual interest to the research problem, but also 
creates opportunities for greater understanding of wicked contexts in applied 
settings.  As a result, the research lends support to applied and academic 
literatures relating to limits of ‘one-size-fits-all’ governance arrangements and 
provides a means of efficiently illuminating features of the governance 
arrangements in wicked contexts such as coal use in the UK. 
9.3 Limits and critique 
As with most research projects, there are limits to the reach and scope of this 
research and alternative approaches to the analysis could have been applied. 
Chapters seven and eight, and section 9.2 above set out the strengths and 
contributions of this research, this section considers some of its limits.    
This was a necessarily a large wide ranging study, that covered a long time 
frame in order to develop a meaningful understanding of the problem under 
consideration.  Whilst the historical institutional approach added depth and 
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interest and using governance and sustainability as organising principles 
helped to limit the scope, there were notable methodological challenges 
associated with the scale and scope of the research.  Firstly, it was difficult to 
get either depth or comparability over the longer time frame.  To overcome this 
challenge, archive and bureaucratic data were triangulated with reflections 
form individuals generated in primary data.  Secondly, linking methods and 
literatures has produced analytical and conceptual benefits here but the 
approach is time consuming.  An alternative approach would have been to limit 
the study either to a shorter time frame or to a smaller problem, however, 
neither approach would have yielded similarly generalizable results or the 
novel contribution in the same way. 
Notwithstanding the discussions above on the analytical strength of the novel 
approach adopted, as expected for a wicked social science problem, the data 
could have been differently interpreted.  One feature of the discussion in 
chapter seven was that through isomorphic processes, organisational fields 
move toward harmonious states; this thesis suggests that where there are 
diffuse or dysfunctional field, they can move toward collapse.  A different 
interpretation might suggest that whilst there has been some diffusion, the 
fields are now moving toward harmony around dominance of government 
actors for a wicked problem.  There is legitimacy in this interpretation, however 
the temporal dimension of the problem suggests that even if this is the case, 
the wicked context means that harmony will not be reached because of 
competing isomorphic processes across fields.   Instead, the imposition of new 
governance mechanisms through coercive measures has led to more discord 
not harmony.  In practice the evidence presented in chapter eight since the 
collapse of coal with CCS in the UK supports the interpretation here. 
A final reflection on the limits of this study also introduces potential for future 
research.  One of the features of the discourse that (if time and resources had 
permitted) that could usefully have been explored in more depth is the drivers 
and dynamics beyond the levels of analysis here.  Both international and local 
level metaphors emerged from the discourse, but to a lesser extent than 
national and regional; further consideration of these additional levels would no 
doubt have helped to identify additional or corroborate dynamic forces 
discussed here. 
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9.4 Future direction 
The findings from this research and the limitations of this study both provide 
opportunity for, and potential future direction for this work.  Starting with the 
limitations, as noted above, the research is wide ranging which provides 
opportunities for further study within each of the areas explored.  Of particular 
interest is further consideration for how the organisational fields of governance 
approach can be used to develop a better understanding of how drivers and 
dynamic processes at one level, drive change with implications for 
sustainability at another. In terms of future direction of the research, the 
method developed proved especially useful in conceptualising and then 
compartmentalising a wicked problem without losing depth or richness.  This 
approach could legitimately be tested further for its efficacy in other wicked 
problems. 
From an applied policy perspective, this research has found that for wicked 
problems policy makers (i) need to look beyond single policy to the 
organisational field(s) to better understand problem (ii) explore the historical 
emergence to better understand drivers of discord useful, and (iii) look beyond 
favoured market centric solutions where these complexities dictate ML/MA 
governance arrangements will be limited. This thesis both provides theoretical 
underpinning for why and how, and also suggests methodologies for how to 
adapt to other wicked scenarios. 
9.5 Concluding thoughts 
This research makes significant methodological and conceptual contributions 
to debates on the efficacy of ML/MA governance arrangements in steering 
sustainable development outcomes in wicked contexts.  Using the 
organisational field as the unit of analysis, it illuminates the relationships and 
circumstances that create such wicked problems that might not otherwise be 
understood. 
This thesis adds an interesting temporal dimension to ML/MA debates for 
wicked contexts.  Through use of a novel approach it illuminates previously 
unknown dynamics within and between organisational fields.  These dynamics 
reveal that although policy and governance arrangements are on the surface, 
pluralistic, multi-level, multi-actor, in reality power and agency is centred with 
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dominant economic actors who are able to shape fields through coercive, 
mimetic and normative isomorphic processes. Furthermore, the diffuse social 
field together with pacifying, homogenising nature of existing mechanisms of 
public engagement within the contemporary organisational field for 
governance, delegitimises ‘non-legitimate’ and means dominant actors 
continue to shape policy and development outcomes to suit their motivations.  
In the case of coal, this has meant, and continues for the present to mean, that 
sustainability features beyond the economic are not fully embedded in to policy 
or practice.   
Powerful institutional logics of governance have evolved through isomorphic 
processes from within the economic organisational fields which are shaped by 
and shape business and state actors more significantly than.  The resulting 
institutional logics include notions that CSR, community engagement, public 
consultation and acceptance, new forms of governance, efficiency of markets 
and SD are essential, yet the form these initiatives take are less well 
considered and rarely address material issues.  Further to this, institutional 
logics have evolved from within dominant government and state fields and 
without equivalently community or social actor agency.  Fields have diversity 
required for sustainability.  To return to Scott: 
 ‘Structure and outcomes are not those planned or intended, but the 
consequence of unanticipated effects and constrained choice.’ 
(Scott, 2008, p31) 
The thesis agrees that because of isomorphic ripples over time and within 
fields, power and agency dynamics are evident in organisational fields of 
governance.  This insight and understanding of the evolution of fields is useful 
to consider prospects for sustainability of coal and why, currently, unabated 
coal is ‘accepted’ as being part of the energy mix. This timely research 
contributes to debates that aim to unpick this elaborate, wicked problem.  In 
concert with Rittel and Webber (1973, p.159), the conclusions drawn suggest 
the need for greater understanding of issues wider than the market for energy 
if sustainable outcomes are to be achieved.    
‘As we seek to improve the effectiveness of actions, as system 
boundaries get stretched, and as we become more sophisticated about 
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workings of open societal systems, it becomes ever more difficult to 
make planning the idea operational.’ 
(Rittel and Webber, 1973, p.159) 
To conclude, the compelling argument developed in this thesis shows that, in 
answer to the research questions, yes, new forms of governance do impact 
the prospects for the sustainability of new coal, but in unexpected ways for this 
complex, wicked problem. 
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Appendix A UK coal use and energy statistics 
Table A1 - Coal use and supply 2000 to 2012 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Average 
/annum 
Coal supply (gross) (1) 59,838  63,530  58,639  62,865  60,567  61,780  67,340  62,903  58,219  48,786  51,448  51,500  64,327  59,365  
UK production (total) 30,600  31,513  29,539  27,759  24,535  20,008  18,079  16,540  17,604  17,374  17,817  17,892  16,287  21,965  
Imports 23,446  35,542  28,686  31,891  36,153  43,968  50,528  43,364  43,875  38,167  26,541  32,527  44,815  36,885  
Coal use for electricity  46,197  50,931  47,741  52,464  50,444  52,058  57,438  52,511  47,808  39,681  41,498  41,850r 54,906  48,887  
UK electricity from coal (2) 34% 33% 34% 35% 35% 36% 37% 36% 36% 31% 32% 33% 41% 35% 
Sources: Digest of UK Energy Statistics (2015) Table 2.1.1 - Supply and Consumption of Coal 1970 – 2014.  Digest of UK Energy 
Statistics (2014) Table 2.4 – Coal Production and Stocks  
(1) Million tonnes oil equivalent 
(2) Coal supply = production plus import  
(3) Annual average percentage of total energy from coal (million tonnes oil equivalents) 
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Table A2 - Coal supply and consumption 2009 to 2017 
Supply and consumption of coal 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
 Thousand tonnes 
Supply          
Indigenous Production 17,874  18,347  18,552  16,967  12,767  11,648  8,598  4,178  3,041  
Deep mined 7,520  7,390  7,312  6,153  4,089  3,685  2,784  22  20  
Surface mining 9,854  10,426  10,580  10,134  8,584  7,962  5,814  4,156  3,021  
Other sources 500  530  660  680  95  -  -  -  -  
Imports 38,167  26,541  32,527  44,815  50,611  42,225  22,518  8,494  8,498  
Exports 646  715  491  488  595  425  385  443  495  
Stock change -6,609  7,206  836  2,966  -2,641  -5,131  6,869  5,547  3,159  
Total supply 48,785  51,378  51,424  64,259  60,143  48,316  37,600  17,775  14,203  
Statistical difference +67  +54  -83  217  -62  21  149  30  19  
Total demand 48,718  51,324  51,507  64,042  60,206  48,295  37,451  17,745  14,183  
Transformation 46,188  48,584  48,946  61,498  57,192  45,255  34,775  15,468  12,126  
Electricity generation 39,681  41,498  41,850  54,901  49,873  38,234  29,330  12,056  8,724  
Heat generation 482  477  562  461  362  272  6  6  6  
Coke manufacture 4,936  5,399  5,282  4,965  5,288  4,977  3,667  1,821  1,888  
Blast furnaces 852  978  995  987  1,411  1,513  1,544  1,364  1,301  
Patent fuel manufacture 238  231  258  184  259  259  228  223  207  
Energy industry use 5  5  4  4  3  1  -  -  -  
Final consumption 2,525  2,736  2,557  2,541  3,011  3,040  2,676  2,277  2,057  
Iron & steel 60  64  53  51  53  54  44  35  33  
Other industies 1,682  1,894  1,745  1,776  2,269  2,388  2,029  1,632  1,436  
Domestic 689  719  705  674  640  549  552  550  535  
Other final users 94  58  55  40  49  49  51  60  53  
Stocks at end of period                
Distributed stocks 22,641  15,368  15,115  11,883  15,114  20,142  13,546  7,953  5,197  
Of which:          
294 
 
 
Major power producers 21,770  13,370  13,496  9,561  11,871  17,091  12,595  6,962  4,387  
Coke ovens 806  1,338  1,355  831  518  795  553  611  331  
Undistributed stocks 1,450  1,517  926  1,120  530  633  360  406  4  
Total stocks 24,091  16,885  16,041  13,003  15,644  20,775  13,906  8,359  5,200  
 
Sources:  DECC, DUKES_2.4 Supply and consumption of coal 1996 to 2016.  BEIS 2018a Energy Trends Tables 2.1 to 2.6 
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Table A3 – TWh per fuel source 2009 to 2016 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Fuel source TWh 
Coal 103.04 107.59 108.44 142.79 130.26 100.24 75.88 30.71 
Oil 5.99 4.81 3.12 2.89 2.07 1.92 2.04 1.84 
Gas 166.50 175.65 146.50 100.17 95.84 100.89 99.88 143.36 
Nuclear 69.10 62.14 68.98 70.41 70.61 63.75 70.34 71.73 
Hydro (natural flow)  5.23 3.59 5.69 5.31 4.70 5.89 6.30 5.39 
Wind and Solar 9.30 10.33 16.21 21.21 30.41 36.02 47.86 47.79 
- of which, Offshore 0.00 3.06 5.15 7.60 11.47 13.40 17.42 16.41 
Bioenergy 10.71 12.26 13.31 14.73 18.10 22.62 29.24 30.04 
Pumped Storage 3.69 3.15 2.91 2.97 2.90 2.88 2.74 2.96 
Other fuels 3.20 2.54 2.82 3.40 3.39 3.89 4.64 5.57 
Total 376.75 382.07 367.98 363.87 358.28 338.10 338.92 339.40 
Source:  BEIS, 2017a, Table 5.1. Fuel used in electricity generation and electricity supplied 
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Table A4 - Proportion of electricity from coal 2009 to 2016 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total TWh  376.75 385.13 373.13 371.48 369.76 351.50 356.34 355.80 
Fuel source % of total for each source 
Coal 27.35 27.94 29.06 38.44 35.23 28.52 21.29 8.63 
Nuclear 18.34 16.13 18.49 18.95 19.10 18.14 19.74 20.16 
Renewables (including bio) 7.68 8.41 11.60 13.95 18.28 22.99 29.06 28.83 
Gas 44.19 45.61 39.26 26.97 25.92 28.70 28.03 40.29 
Oil 1.59 1.25 0.84 0.78 0.56 0.55 0.57 0.52 
Other listed 0.85 0.66 0.76 0.92 0.92 1.11 1.30 1.57 
  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Source:  BEIS, 2017a, Table 5.1. Fuel Used in electricity generation and electricity supplied 
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Table A5 - Fuel volumes consumed per annum by fuel type, 2008 to 2017. 
Year  
Total of 
all fuels Coal Oil (1) 
Natural 
gas (2) Nuclear 
Natural 
flow 
hydro (3) 
Wind 
and 
solar (3) 
Other fuels 
(4) 
 Million tonnes of oil equivalent 
2008 81.58  29.96  1.58  32.40  11.91  0.44  0.61  4.67  
2009 78.42  24.66  1.51  30.90  15.23  0.45  0.80  4.87  
2010 79.41  25.56  1.18  32.43  13.93  0.31  0.89  5.11  
2011 76.52  26.03  0.78  26.58  15.63  0.49  1.39  5.62  
2012 77.24  34.33  0.73  18.62  15.21  0.46  1.82  6.07  
2013 74.52  31.33  0.59  17.70  15.44  0.40  2.61  6.45  
2014 68.48  24.01  0.55  18.73  13.85  0.51  3.10  7.73  
2015 66.72  18.34  0.61  18.28  15.48  0.54  4.11  9.36  
2016 63.68  7.54  0.58  25.63  15.41  0.46  4.10  9.96  
2017 61.00  5.55  0.54  24.60  15.12  0.51  4.56  10.12  
Source:  BEIS, 2018a. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/digest-of-uk-energy-statistics-dukes-2018-long-term-trends 
(1)  Includes oil used in gas turbine and diesel plant or for lighting up coal fired boilers and refinery gas. 
(2)  Includes colliery methane               
(3)  Fuel inputs have been calculated on an energy supplied basis      
(4)  Main fuels included are coke oven gas, blast furnace gas, waste products from chemical processes, 
refuse derived fuels and other sources including biofuels.   
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Appendix B CCS project status 
Project66  Location Lead organisation(s) Status/key features Status as at June 2016 
CCPilot 100+  Ferrybridge, North 
Yorkshire 
SSE 
UK Government 
Operational 2010 -2015. 
Demonstration of post combustion capture from coal 
Closed 
White Rose  Drax, North 
Yorkshire 
Capture Power consortium 
(Drax Power Ltd, Alstom 
UK Power Ltd, National 
Grid PLC) 
426Mw generator (90% CO2 capture predicted = 2Mt/yr) 
Off-shore storage – saline aquifer/EOR options considered 
FEED stage - Shortlisted for government investment 
No government 
investment.  Project on 
hold 
Teesside Low 
Carbon 
Consortium 
 Wilton, Teesside Progressive Energy Ltd 
BOC, Premier Oil,  
GDF SUEZ 
400Mw, pre combustion 
Off-shore storage – depleted oil 
Planning/FEED 
Delayed decision on  
government investment 
Don Valley 
Power Project 
 Hatfield, South 
Yorkshire 
2CoEnergy 
EU, CCS Humber cluster 
National Grid 
650Mw (net), pre-combustion.  Off-shore storage – saline 
Planning/FEED 
Shortlisted for EU/UK investment 2011 
No government 
investment 
Captain  Grangetown, 
Scotland 
Summit Power Ltd 570 Mw, post combustion 
Planning/FEED 
Closed 
C.Gen  Killingholme, 
Yorkshire 
C.Gen NV 
National Grid 
470Mw, pre combustion CCGT 
Post FEED  
Awaiting belated UK 
Gov and EU decisions 
on investment  
                                            
66 At time of research, other CCS with coal (and different feedstock/industrial applications) research projects were operational in the UK but on either micro or test facility scale e.g. at Universities of 
Nottingham/Leeds/Sheffield/Edinburgh, PACT (UKCCSRC) but these are not intended as commercial projects 
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Appendix C Regional discrepancies in former coal mining regions 
 
Source:  Foden, M., Fothergill, S., and Gore, T. (2014, p1) 
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Appendix D Documents reviewed 
UK Yorkshire and Humberside 
BEIS CCS related 
BEIS Industrial Strategy 
BEIS Clean Growth Strategy 
CCS Association 
Carbon Briefs 
Coal Authority 
Committee on Climate Change  
DBERR consultation on CCS 
DECC CCS related 
Defra CCS related 
E.On FEED reports 
Environment Agency Coal 
Resources 
EU Energy Strategies 
EU Large Combustion Plant 
Directive 
Friends of the Earth 
Global Carbon Capture and 
Storage Institute  
Greenpeace press releases 
Greenpeace CCS resources 
Hansard 
International Energy Agency 
IPCC special report on CCS 
CO2Sense reports and 
presentations 
Company sustainability and CSR 
reports 
Company newsletters 
EA special reports on CCS 
Local newspapers 
Local and regional strategy docs 
and annexes 
Minutes of public meetings 
Parish council meetings 
Pontefract & Castleford Gazette 
Project websites:  
Drax, White Rose, DVPP, 
Ferrybridge CC100+ 
The Stainforth Voice 2010 - 2014 
The Yorkshire Insider 
Trades Union Congress (Y&H) 
Reports 
Yorkshire Forward 
 
301 
 
 
 
 
National Grid  
National Newspapers 
Project data from MiT 
National Coal Mining Museum 
Archives 
National Archives 
National Audit Office 
National Statistical Office 
RSPB State of Nature reports 
Scottish CCS 
Scottish Parliament CCS 
resources 
The Treasury 
Trades Union Congress CCS 
UK Energy Policy 
UK Energy Research Council 
World Coal Association 
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Appendix E Semi-structured interview structure 
 
The following interview schedule is designed to be semi-structured allowing.  
The questions were used to guide discussion without being so rigid as to miss 
opportunities to find out about participants’ knowledge. 
 
1. In your experience, how are decisions on using coal in UK electricity 
made?   
 
2. Who is involved in the decision making process?  That can be 
individuals or groups of people 
 
3. What are the key ways for different people to get involved in decision 
making? 
 
4. Is this appropriate/legitimate in your opinion? 
 
5. Have there been changes over time?  If so, what has changed?  
 
Processes  
 
People  
 
Outcomes 
 
6. Have there been any changes in environmental outcomes over time in 
your opinion? 
 
7. Have there been any changes in social outcomes over time? 
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8. Have there been any obvious changes in economic outcomes over 
time? 
 
9. Who has benefitted from the changes?  In what ways (economically, 
socially, environmentally) 
 
10. Who has not?  Who has lost out? 
 
11. Are the outcomes fair and balanced? 
 
Anything more you would like to add that you think I would be 
interested in?  Thank you very much for taking part! 
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Appendix F Primary data 
(i) Interviews conducted for Yorkshire and Humber level67 
No Interviewee type Position/role Date/duration 
L1 Public  Local resident 
Retired engineer 
11.09.12 
10:30 – 11:57 
L2 Public  Local resident 
Retired miner 
17.10.13 
11:30 – 11:50 
L3 Public  Local resident* 27.10.13 
10:45 – 11:10 
L4 Public  Local resident 27.10.13 
12:20 – 12:45 
L5 Public  Local resident 27.10.13 
15:00 – 16:10 
L6 Public  Local resident 03.12.13 
11:10 – 11:35 
L7 Public  Local resident 03.12.13 
13:45 – 15:00 
L8 Public  Local resident 06.12.13 
09.15 – 10.05 
L9 Public  Local resident 14.12.13 
10:20 – 10:45 
                                            
67 * Not voice recorded + interview relevant for both levels 
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L10 Public  Local resident 14.12.13 
11:20 – 11:55 
L11 Public  Local resident 14.12.13 
12:30 – 13:25 
L12 Public  Local resident 14.12.13 
14:00 – 16:00 
L13 Public  Parish councillor* 06.11.13 
20:00-20:20 
L14 Public  Parish councillor* 06.11.13 
20:25-20:50 
L15 Public  Parish councillor 27.11.13 
10:00 – 10:48 
L16 Public  Parish councillor 27.11.13 
11:00 – 12:14 
L17 Business  Environmental Consultant* 07.12.12 
19:20 – 19:55 
L18 Business  Senior manager 1 at power 
station*+  
27.06.12 
09:00 – 09:45 
L19 Business Senior manager 2 at power 
station* 
19.07.12 
13:45 – 14:50 
L20 Business Project manager at power 
station 
02.08.12 
13:30 – 14:05 
L21 Business CC project manager 02.08.12 
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15:00 – 15:40 
L22 Business Community liaison officer at 
power station* 
08.05.12 
09:30–10:00 
L23 Business Environmental manager at 
power station* 
08.05.12 
10:05-10:45 
L24 Trades Union/NGO TUC+ 07.02.13 
13:15 – 13:50 
L25 Trades Union/NGO RSPB 30.10.13 
11:00 – 11:25 
L26 Trades Union/NGO RSPB 30.10.13 
11.40 – 12:25 
L27 Trades Union/NGO RSPB 30.10.13 
13:00 – 14:20 
L28 Trades Union/NGO Local NGO - AIRE 14.11.13 
12:30 – 13:45 
L29 Trades Union/NGO Local NGO - AIRE 14.11.13 
14:00 – 15:50 
L30 Trades Union/NGO Retired community 
development org CEO 
10.07.15 
11:00 – 12:20 
L31 Government/Regulator EA+ 10.08.12 
10:00 – 11:20 
L32 Government/Regulator EA  10.08.12 
11:30 – 12:10 
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L33 Business Local business owner and 
resident 
27.10.13 
08.45 – 09.10 
L34 Business Local business owner and 
resident 
19.09.13 
15:00 – 15:20 
L35 Public sector Energy Business 
Development Manager – 
public sector 
03.02.16 
14:05 – 14:55 
(ii) Non-participant observations Yorkshire and Humberside 
 Events Attendee type Date/duration 
O1 Drax visit Leeds based green group 
members 
23.08.11 
2hrs 
O2 Community Liaison 
Meeting 1 
Industry, local government, 
local residents 
04.05.12 
1hr30m 
O3 Community Liaison 
Meeting 2 
Industry, local government, 
local residents 
27.06.12 
1hr35m 
O4 FBC CCPilot100+ 
visit 
University PG students and 
researchers 
02.08.12 
2hr45m 
O5 B2B event 1 Business representatives 04.10.12 
4hr15m 
O6 B2B event 2 Business representatives 19.09.13 
2hr30m 
O7 Parish council 
meeting 
5 parish councillors 06.11.13 
2h20m 
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O8 Parish council 
meeting 
7 parish councillors 21.11.13 
2h05m 
O9 White Rose Public 
Consultation, Drax 
Sports & Social 
Public meeting 17.07.14 
14:00 – 20:00 
Attended 2hr 
(iii) Non-participant observations UK 
 Event Attendee type Date 
(duration) 
O10 UK CCS Research 
Council – Future 
Coal Workshop 
Business (10) 
Academic/research (14) 
NGO/other (4) 
Government (2) 
06.02.13  
(2 hrs) 
07.02.13  
(7 hrs) 
O11 UK CCS Bi-annual 
meeting 
Academic, business, 
government 
8-9 April 2013 
Attended 8 
hrs 
O12 UK CCS Bi-annual 
meeting 
Academic/research, business, 
government, NGO/TU 
4 September 
2013 
Attended 4 
hrs 30 mins 
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Appendix G Ethics approval 
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Appendix H Participant consent form 
Consent to take part in C Bastin’s PhD Research. 
 Add your 
initials 
next to the 
statements 
you agree 
with  
I confirm that Claire Bastin has explained the above research 
project to me on     , I have received a written 
summary sheet and I have had the opportunity to ask questions 
about the project. 
 
I agree/do not agree for the data collected from me to be used 
in relevant future research. 
 
I agree to take part in the above research project and will inform 
the lead researcher should my contact details change. 
 
Name of participant  
Participant’s 
signature 
 
Date  
Name of lead 
researcher  
Claire Bastin 
Signature  
Date*  
*To be signed and dated in the presence of the participant.  
Once this has been signed by all parties you will receive a copy of the signed 
and dated participant consent form, the information sheet and any other written 
information. A copy of the signed and dated consent form will be kept with the 
project’s main documents which will be kept in a secure location 
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Appendix I Coding example 
Item 
ID Event Metaphors Agents & Motives 
Assumptions about 
relationships Entities Econ/env/soc 
2.01 Community Liaison Meeting 1  Power plant   Mixed 
2.02 Community Liaison Meeting 2  Managers, locals   Mixed 
2.03 B2B event - Castleford     Economic 
2.04 UKCCSRC Future Coal w/s notes New coal UKCCSRC - R&D 
Business and 
academic - Mixed 
2.04 UKCCSRC Future Coal w/s notes Future coal UKCCSRC - R&D 
Business and 
academic - Mixed 
2.04 UKCCSRC Future Coal w/s notes Abated coal UKCCSRC - R&D 
Business and 
academic - Environmental 
2.04 UKCCSRC Future Coal w/s notes Abated coal SEPA Gov & Bus Emissions regulations Environmental 
2.04 UKCCSRC Future Coal w/s notes 
Flexibility for use in coal 
gasification UKCCSRC - R&D 
Business and 
academic - Economic 
2.04 UKCCSRC Future Coal w/s notes - - - Networks Mixed 
2.04 UKCCSRC Future Coal w/s notes 
Place - site specific acceptance of 
future coal - - 
CF power stations, 
NIMBYs Social 
2.04 UKCCSRC Future Coal w/s notes 
Retrofit options viable – life in old 
plant Power station managers - CF power stations Economic 
2.04 UKCCSRC Future Coal w/s notes Capture ready plants - - CF power stations Mixed 
2.04 CSRC Future Coal w/s notes - DECC -  Mixed 
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2.04 UKCCSRC Future Coal w/s notes New coal, future coal 
Energy Minister (John 
Heyes) -  Economic 
2.04 UKCCSRC Future Coal w/s notes - - - Communities Social 
2.04 UKCCSRC Future Coal w/s notes - - 
Incumbant 
industrial 
relationships - Economic 
2.04 UKCCSRC Future Coal w/s notes - - - Power companies Economic 
2.04 UKCCSRC Future Coal w/s notes - - - Markets Economic 
2.04 UKCCSRC Future Coal w/s notes - - - Consultants Economic 
2.04 UKCCSRC Future Coal w/s notes - - - Investors Economic 
2.04 UKCCSRC Future Coal w/s notes - - - Regulators Mixed 
2.04 UKCCSRC Future Coal w/s notes - SEPA - seen as regulators - - Mixed 
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